Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, March 17, 1952—7:40 p.m.

CX 65424. Re JCS 902159.¹

1. Agreement to move discussions in item 4 from subdelegation to staff officer level has opened a remote possibility that agreement might be reached with the Communists under which lists of POWs in UNC custody would be so adjusted as to permit acceptance of an all-for-all exchange of remaining POWs while at the same time eliminating forced repatriation. These new lists would, by mutual understanding, omit selected captured persons released from POW status and designated by some term such as “special refugees” prior to the date of exchange of POW lists. An addendum list of civilian internees desiring to go to the Communist side would also be furnished by UNC.

2. Our proposal would have to be made in such a way as to specify the return of the 11,559 POWs now held by the Communists in exchange for all the POWs held by the UNC who would not violently oppose repatriation. We believe such agreement would permit the UNC to obtain all of the non-Korean UN POWs and the great majority of the other POWs the Communists hold, while agreeing to the all-for-all exchange of the newly listed POWs. This would satisfy the Communists’ insistence on agreement to the letter of the principle of release and repatriation of all POWs and would be consistent with JCS 92059² which authorized UNC to agree to an all-for-all exchange if necessary so long as there is no forced repatriation.

3. Should Communists indicate receptive interest in any such proposal it would be necessary to immediately screen and segregate all POWs who indicate they oppose repatriation, and to screen civilian internees to segregate those who desire return to the Communist side. POWs desiring not to be returned to Communist control could be given some appropriate designation other than POW. New lists of POWs to be repatriated, made up as of a date mutually agreed upon by both sides, would then be prepared as quickly as possible for submission to the Communists, such lists representing the total number of POWs and civilian internees to be returned to Communist control.

4. As I have previously indicated, I am convinced that any covert plan to select that category of prisoner who would violently resist repatriation because of fear for his life is thoroughly inadequate to acccomplish the objectives you have set. Any plan which does not entail individual self-expression of the prisoners concerned can be only partially successful and will carry positive danger of violence at the time exchange takes place. Equally, it is impossible to develop a screening plan that can distinguish between those who would violently resist repatriation to the point of self-destruction and those who merely elect a choice because of the circumstances existing at the moment. Our latest estimate, while admittedly highly conjectural, is that about 73,000 persons, including civilian internees, may elect not to be returned. To screen and segregate the population at UN POW camp with a minimum of administration will take about 5 days.

5. The possibility of obtaining agreement is tenuous. The Communists may reject any such plan solely on the basis of the uncertain future disposition of those POWs reclassified to a designation other than POW and retained in UNC custody. However, the exploration of this proposal at staff officer level will at least serve as a gauge of their resistance to any plan to circumvent forced repatriation.

6. A statement substantially as follows can be submitted by UNC staff officers at the appropriate time:

“On 15 March the sub-delegations of both sides agreed that their respective staffs meet for the purpose of exploring the stated positions of each side with a view to their further clarification and with a view to seeking, and recommending to the sub-delegations, means by which progress can be made toward a solution mutually satisfactory to both sides.

“Each side has made a proposal which it considers is a proper basis for negotiating a solution to our present differences. If each side is completely sincere in its expressed desire to negotiate a solution to these differences, our 2 sides may be able to utilize these 2 proposals as the basis for such a solution.

“We are well aware of your repeated insistence that both sides must agree to the principle of release and repatriation of all prisoners of war in the custody of each side. We are aware too that you have stated that you cannot accept any actions of our side to retain your captured personnel under the guise of voluntary repatriation or no forced repatriation.

“You, in turn, are well aware that we cannot agree to any solution which does not provide for the return to our side of all our military personnel in your custody who desire to return to our side. Likewise, we cannot agree to any principle or armistice agreement wording which will require us to participate in forced repatriation of prisoners of war.

“What is required is a compromise solution which will satisfy the legitimate interest of each side and which will be mutually agreed to by both sides as a part of the armistice agreement.

“We have, through the past discussions, developed certain basic facts. Each side has, during the period of Korean conflict, taken into custody large numbers of personnel. Our side announced a total of over 176,000 such persons. Your side has announced capturing upwards of 65,000 in the first 9 months.

“On 18 December our 2 sides exchanged data on prisoners of war then in the custody of each side. Neither side was, for various reasons, fully satisfied with the lists exchanged. These reasons are well known to each side.

“It appears that both sides might reconsider the lists previously exchanged, and that upon the basis of such reconsideration agree to exchange new lists which could satisfy the stated requirements of both sides. These lists would contain only prisoners of war in the custody of each side at the agreed date of the exchange of the lists.

“It would be understood, of course, that the new lists of POWs in the custody of each side as of the agreed date would not include captured personnel already released by either side,³ such as those released at the front; and would not include civilian internees, although those of this latter group who wished to go to your side would be permitted to do so, and the names furnished you in a separate list.

“It is our belief that this process might solve the problem without the necessity for including in the agreement any renunciation by either side of its declared principles, while at the same time obtaining its legitimate objectives. It would insure the return of the upwards of 11559 POWs held by your side in exchange for all the POWs held by our side except those who would violently resist,⁴ plus all of the civilian internees who desire to join you.

“We request that you study our statement carefully and that you give us your comments.”

7. Should this proposal be rejected at staff officer level it will not disrupt our present planned procedure for a final stand. Should it be accepted, we will have achieved both our primary objectives of the return of our PWs and of no forced repatriation. However, it is essential that no publicity be given to this until after the exchange has been effected. While some propaganda advantage initially may accrue to the other side, once the exchange is completed, the UNC can make factual explanation of its approach and possibly recover the propaganda initiative.

8. My primary objective has been and continues to be the safe and prompt return of all our prisoners in Communists’ custody. I feel, as do all here, that there is grave danger to them in any attempt to circumvent what we can to date only accept as absolute Communist insistence on forced return; that every possibility must first be exhausted to determine whether or not the Communists will yield on this position; that every possible effort should be made to achieve our primary objective without resorting to forced repatriation; and that only in the event of complete conviction that this last is impossible of attainment should the US Government even consider its action stated in para 1 of JCS 902159.

9. In event of failure to secure these 2 objectives I continue to feel, as do all here, that execution of the directive contained in paragraph 1 of JCS 902159 will gravely imperil the safe return and even the lives of UN personnel now in Communist hands.

10. Request your earliest consideration.

1. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
2. Dated Jan. 15, p. 25.
3. In a separate telegram, CX 65436 from CINCUNC to JCS, dated Mar. 18, 1952, the UNC requested the following editorial change at this point: the substitution of the phrase “released by either side prior to that date” for “already released by either side”. (795.00/3–2452)
4. In CX 65436 UNC requested the following editorial change at this point: substitution of the phrase “except those would have to be forcibly repatriated” for “except those who would violently resist”.