Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

top secret
operational immediate

DA 940728. From CSUSA for CINCUNC. Pass to US Ambassador, Pusan, for Amb Briggs. This is joint State–Defense message.

[Page 1147]
1.
Reference your 050850Z June.1 We concur in your proposal to withhold offer of Mutual Defense Treaty until in your judgment it will be most effective in securing from Rhee assurances of ROK armistice support. However, the President is preparing a letter, which will be sent through you, to Rhee in reply to Rhee’s letter of 30 May, in which the President will mention that you and Briggs, as his representatives on the ground, are prepared to discuss conditions under which we could arrange a Mutual Defense Treaty with ROK.
2.
Ref CX 628212 and DA 940674.3 We are prepared to agree that Communist proposal, subject to clarification of para 8a and 8e, is acceptable basis for armistice. While it may be desirable to clarify certain other points as indicated in your CX 62821, we feel primary substantive points are those raised in paras 8a and 8e. Further study here of para 11 of Communist proposal confirms our belief that Communists should be informed that we accept this para literally as intended to be a forthright proposal and that it means what it says. Feeling here is that the procedure outlined in this para offers Chinese a face-saving device to cover the actual acceptance of no forcible repatriation.4
3.
Rhee’s proposed 6 June statement may produce some serious repercussions not only in ROK but in US. It is highly desirable that this be counteracted as promptly as possible. This can best be done by publication of agreed armistice terms. You should therefore proceed with armistice negotiations without delay as planned.
  1. Supra.
  2. Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1137.
  3. In this message dated June 4, Clark’s superiors, commenting on the revised language of the Communist proposal concerning nonrepatriates, advised him to assume that the text meant what it said and that the UNC should not seek clarification; see Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 431.
  4. Reference was to a portion of paragraph 11, telegram CX 62808, June 4, quoted in the editorial note, p. 1137.