Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/6–553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

top secret
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Seoul,¹ June 5, 1953—5:50 p.m.

DTG 050850Z. (Army Message) Repeated information CINCUNC for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy AmEmbassy Pusan from General Clark and Briggs.

We met with President Rhee for approximately one hour this, afternoon, acting Foreign Minister Pyun present. Rhee’s position is that within next day or two he will issue ROK statement along lines his May 30 letter,² but will not make precipitate move against armistice, or take unilateral action with ROK troops at least at this time.

Clark began by summarizing armistice position, describing meeting yesterday as virtual Communist acceptance May 25 UNC proposal.

This was followed by a statement by Briggs that we had returned to Rhee as friends of Korea to invite him once more to join with other countries associated with ROK during past three years in establishing honorable armistice, conclusion of which declared now imminent. Armistice is designed constitute first step toward peace and unification of Korea, giving Korea in meantime opportunity bind wounds and begin hard task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this connection US Government prepared to pledge close and vigorous collaboration in forthcoming political conference as set forth May 25 conversation³ and confirmed by May 27 aide-mémoire.⁴ We also authorized to reiterate assurance of military and economic aid, and maintenance of American Forces in Western Pacific on long-time basis, provided assurance received of Korean cooperation likewise as set forth in aide-mémoire.

Rhee replied by lengthy statement along now familiar lines declaring armistice proposals represent appeasement, Communist victory, first step toward World War III, et cetera, including outline of views as set forth his May 30 letter. Rhee’s major emphasis in this exposition was on simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese Communist and UN forces without which he said no peace or unification possible and toward which he refused recognize proposed political conference can make progress.

He said he preferred not consider reasons US Government might have against withdrawal but he was left in no doubt as to Washington views that withdrawal is out of question as part of armistice terms, even though we of course agreed with Rhee that withdrawal together with unification constitute ultimate US objectives. Rhee then said that since Communists have made proposals and US/UNC has made proposals he believes it only fair for ROK to have opportunity make public its proposal, thereby placing ROK views before world, and that it is now his intention to do so. When in connection with discussion of views set forth in May 30 letter, Rhee mentioned mutual defense treaty, we asked whether assuming it might be possible at appropriate time to negotiate such agreement, ROK support of armistice terms on that basis could be anticipated. Although this question was put to Rhee several times, he declined to answer it, continuing to declare instead that he wished to place ROK views before world through statement, as next ROK move.

Since implication of what Rhee said was clearly that nothing short of withdrawal would satisfy him, Clark and Briggs agreed during brief recess in discussion that it would not be desirable at this juncture to propose mutual defense treaty as authorized in DA 940241 May 30 and DA 940543 June 3.⁵

We informed Rhee that while we did not contest his right to make public statement should he be determined to do so, statement in question would be widely interpreted as split in united front hitherto maintained in Korea against Communists and as such would give them much satisfaction (a point promptly contradicted by Pyun). Beyond that, we anticipated statement would have certain other effects and requested indication President’s views as to steps that might follow. Rhee again declined to be drawn into any discussion of ROK steps contemplated after issue of statement, and conversation ended on that note, except for additional remarks by Pyun, who spoke of question attacking UNC armistice proposals. When we pointed out this was altogether different matter from what Rhee had stated earlier, President did not back up Pyun but limited himself to speaking again of making public ROK proposal.

Our conclusion from meeting is that although Rhee is absolutely determined to “speak his piece”, he is proceeding cautiously and carefully and has probably not yet decided on steps to be taken after making public ROK views. Although he is permitting, perhaps even encouraging, Pyun to make inflammatory statements, we believe Rhee himself may be more circumspect and that possibility exists that having had his say, he may be prepared to go along with armistice as fait accompli, or at least not to attack it or to take unilateral action. On the other hand, early in our discussion, Rhee did refer to his opposition to entry of Indian troops “with 1,000, 10,000 or only 10”, or to the entry of Communists into the rear areas of Korea.

Rhee clearly understands that issue is drawn and also that, unless he collaborates, he cannot expect to receive US support—military, economic or otherwise—which if he collaborated, American people would be glad to extend. On the other hand, it is perhaps encouraging that Rhee gave his personal assurance that no unilateral ROK step that might jeopardize the security of UNC forces will be taken without prior consultation.

We shall watch for suitable opportunity to offer mutual security treaty in return for required assurances of ROK armistice support, if situation develops in direction rendering this feasible.

1. During the summer of 1953, the South Korean Government continued to transfer its operations from Pusan to Seoul. With President Rhee and his ministers in Seoul, Ambassador Briggs found it expedient to move himself and part of the Embassy to Seoul. Telegrams from Briggs and his staff were therefore sent through Army channels directly to Washington.
2. Ante, p. 1124.
3. This conversation was reported in telegram 250539Z from Seoul, May 25, p. 1097.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 3 to telegram 250539Z, p. 1098.
5. Ante, pp. 1122 and 1135, respectively.