Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”

The Chief of Staff United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief Far East (Clark)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, June 3, 1953—8:45 p.m.

DA 940543. From CSUSA for CINCUNC exclusive for General Clark. Pass to US Ambassador, Pusan exclusive for Amb Briggs. Refs CX 62781,¹ Pusan’s 1390² repeated Tokyo as Pusan’s 413. The following are joint State–Defense instructions:

1. Concur that if following 4 June Panmunjom meeting your assessment situation is that we are close to agreement on PW issue Briggs and you should meet with Rhee on 5 June. It is left to your discretion after consultation with Briggs as to whether Rhee’s attitude at that meeting is such that it would serve useful purpose to make offer of Mutual Defense Treaty as authorized by DA 940241.³ In any case, you can renew assurances on military and economic aid and maintenance US forces in Western Pacific on long-term basis in accordance with instructions contained State tel 2740 Tokyo (repeated Pusan as 723⁴) and approved text subsequent aide-mémoire. If on other hand, it does not appear we are close to agreement on POW issue, 5 June meeting with Rhee would be unnecessary.

2. As we analyze Rhee’s proposal in 30 May letter for simultaneous withdrawal UN and Chinese forces it appears he is now seeking an armistice agreement which would provide for such simultaneous withdrawal leaving the now superior ROK forces to deal with North Korean forces, and a Mutual Defense Treaty with the US which would assure him of US intervention if Chinese Communists or the Soviets again came to aid of North Koreans. If this is in fact Rhee’s intent, it is of course not in accord with the conditions set forth in DA 940241 which must be met prior to offering him a mutual defense treaty. Apart from foregoing consideration view here is that now to introduce into armistice negotiations concept of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces would jeopardize maintenance our present position in negotiations.

3. In connection with Rhee’s proposal in this regard following points should be made as appropriate:

a. US and UNC have consistently taken position question withdrawal forces political in character and beyond competence of commanders on spot to discuss or reach binding agreements. Forces are ordered into Korea by decisions of governments and not commanders. Proposal for withdrawal foreign forces has been consistently advanced by Communists and resolutely opposed by UNC in armistice negotiations as well as by US in discussions at UN.

b. In order assure security of ROK, US and UNC have consistently taken position that there should be no commitment to withdraw all UN forces until ROK and UNC satisfied regarding security of ROK.

c. Actual presence of UNC forces in Korea is additional deterrent against renewal of attack.

d. If all UNC forces withdrawn would mean dissolution of UNC and complete loss of UN character present military action.

e. Continued presence of UNC forces during political conference will improve bargaining position of ROK and UN delegations at conference.

f. Under Article 60 the Armistice Agreement, both sides are committed to discussion question withdrawal foreign forces and it is intent US to do all possible in such conference to bring about withdrawal Communist Chinese forces under conditions which will present minimum hazard to ROK and UNC. Political conference will, of course, also give ROK opportunity to participate in discussions of and decisions on this difficult question.

g. Dissolution of UNC as responsible UN agent for armistice would vitiate international character armistice agreement as presently envisaged and leave to ROK burden its administration.

h. Dissolution UNC and disbandment its constituent forces would undermine basis for proposed greater sanctions statement which is not only important to ROK but also to US and US ability enter in mutual security treaty with ROK.

i. Withdrawal of UN forces would mean the disbandment of the vast supply organization and facilities now provided by 8th Army and KCOMZ to back up ROK units. Without the support of these installations and their technicians the ROK Divisions would be stranded.

4. In connection with continued economic aid to ROK if you and Briggs consider it helpful you are authorized in your discretion to point out that failure to reach understanding with him and his Government on armistice would jeopardize the foundation upon which US Government now examining economic aid requirements for ROK. Unilateral continuation of hostilities by ROK would make it impossible for US and other UN governments continue economc aid to ROK.

5. Strictly for info you and Briggs, President does not intend immediately to reply to Rhee’s 30 May letter.

1. Dated June 2, p. 1132.
2. Supra.
3. Dated May 30, p. 1122.
4. Dated May 22, p. 1086.