795.00/6–353: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
1390. Department pass Tokyo; repeated information priority Tokyo 413 (for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark).
President Rhee’s May 30 letter1 does not give me confidence that offer of mutual security pact will reconcile him to armistice based on United Nations proposal or gain us other assurances we would require from him in return for such a pact (paragraph 2, Department Army cable 940241, May 302). Although I agree with Clark that we are now technically authorized to meet three out of Rhee’s four demands, and consideration can be given to possibility supporting his fourth and most important requirement—withdrawal of Chinese Communists—if Communists do not accept May 25 proposal, Rhee at moment appears to be speaking in entirely different context from ourselves. His requirements are for certain agreements from us prior to a cease-fire based on withdrawal Chinese Communist and United Nations forces, not on basis armistice along lines May 25 proposal and assurances to be obtained in accordance DA 940241. This is wide gap to be bridged. Rhee’s proposal implies Koreans would be left to themselves in solving thorny armistice problems such as POW repatriation (presumably non-repatriated North Koreans would be immediately released by ROK) and in dealing with problem of unification of Korea. I doubt whether he anticipates US would commit itself to security pact, support of 20 divisions ROK Army and provision of naval and air support without limitations or conditions on ROK freedom of action, but that is position from which he now appears to be negotiating.
It is my impression Rhee expects Communist acceptance of UN proposal at June 4 Panmunjom meeting and is readying his proposal for [Page 1135] this eventuality. As indicated in Rhee’s letter his proposal may be made public at time he considers most advantageous to him. Chances of negotiating compromise along lines authorized DA 940241 would be correspondingly diminished by publication ROK proposal.
I therefore believe Clark and I should not defer further approach to Rhee beyond June 5 and, subject to outcome June 4 Panmunjom meeting, would present position authorized DA 940241 as our final position (which I assume it to be since he will be informed there can be no change in May 25 proposal). In event Communist rejection UN proposal I agree with Clark we should immediately review entire situation and consider action vis-à-vis Rhee in this context.
One subject which has not been discussed (except in general terms and with specific reference to 20 ROK divisions) is economic aid that might be forthcoming from US for Korean reconstruction and assistance. Although President Rhee must recognize that such aid may well be largely withheld or at any rate considerably curtailed in measure in which Rhee fails to cooperate in immediate future I suggest it would be useful in order for Rhee to have full understanding of direction his opposition to armistice is leading for subject to be broached at next meeting that General Clark and I have with him.