Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, May 26, 1953—7:08 p.m.

261008Z. References: A. Dept State 723 to Pusan (2740 Tokyo).² B. DTG 250539Z.³ C. C 62630.⁴

Supplementing reference B. I made random notes of statements made by President Rhee and Pyun during our joint session in Seoul yesterday. Am passing these on as they will give you an insight as to the depth of Rhee’s emotional reaction to our joint presentation. The notes are tabulated below in the order taken. Quotations attributed to Rhee are as I recorded them and are substantially what he said.

1. After I finished informing Rhee of our final UNC position his first comment was “I am deeply disappointed.” He said the US Government changes its position often and that we had paid no attention to the views of the ROK Government.

2. When reference was made to the “greater sanctions statement,” Rhee commented that it meant little to him or his government. What he wanted was a security pact such as America has made with Japan, that the Korean people so far have been a loyal ally.

3. For Min Pyun commented that to permit the Communists to have 6 months access in Korea to the North Korean non-repatriates was tantamount to forceful repatriation. He added the observation that many of these prisoners would commit suicide.

4. Rhee said in effect, “please inform Pres Eisenhower that I am not agitating against an armistice, that it is the popular will of the people. The people will not accept these new terms even if the government tells them to do so.”

5. Rhee stated, “please tell President Eisenhower Indian troops cannot come into our rear areas.”

6. Rhee indicated, “we are at a point where we cannot drag along any longer. If the US wants to save democracy for the world, better do it now. Please do not let President Eisenhower disappoint the anti-Communists and democratic people all over the world.” He continued, “the world requires leadership now. The Kremlin will think twice before starting World War III. Please do not disappoint the whole world.”

7. Rhee continued he thought our approach was a weak one, that President Eisenhower must know his (Rhee’s) point of view for the sake of the United States. “Now is the time, do not turn back and be weak. Democracy is going backwards. Some day the United States will fight alone. Do not wait for that day.”

8. Rhee indicated he did not wish to disagree with our position, but that his country could not wait 6 months and then years for a political conference to be effected.

9. Rhee indicated this is not threat or blackmail. “We will die, we will go alone, one way or the other.”

10. While we were talking in Rhee’s office Pyun interrupted by asking if the new position is actually being presented to the Communists at Panmunjom at this moment while we are in conference. (He knew this to be the case.) He stated this was a threat. The terms would result in forced repatriation of Korean POWs. He said “we cannot accept. It is entirely contrary to views of our government.”

11. When I told Rhee of the willingness of the United States to begin to discuss a comprehensive agreement of military assistance, he indicated he had heard this before back in 1947. If such an agreement is to be convincing to the Communists, it must be concluded now before cessation of hostilities.

12. Rhee said, “Please say to President Eisenhower, please let the Koreans fight on alone. It is the only way they can survive. This is my solemn request to President Eisenhower.”

13. When Briggs indicated it was the intention of the United States to proceed promptly and vigorously in a political conference, etc., Rhee stated, “That’s all right, but what would you think if Korea made its own proposal for settlement of the fighting by demanding the withdrawal simultaneously of Chinese Communists and UN Forces from Korea. (This has already been reported in reference B.)

14. When I communicated to Rhee the substance of paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 (reference A) he was deeply depressed, stating, “This is a great disappointment to me. President Eisenhower has now clearly defined his position. I cannot promise the President my military cooperation without unification of Korea.” It was at this time that Rhee requested in writing the substance of our conversation with him, which has been communicated to you in the suggested aide-mémoire, reference C.

15. After Briggs read the message from President Eisenhower, as contained in part 3, reference A, Rhee made the following comments:

a. “One thing we want is the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists.”

b. “It is up to the United States to decide the strength of the ROK Army. You can increase it or decrease it or take it away. These threats have no effect upon us. We want to live, we want to survive. Leaving the Chinese Communists in our country is impossible.”

c. “You can withdraw all UN Forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us. We made our mistake perhaps in the beginning in relying upon democracy to assist us.”

d. “Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstances.”

1. This telegram was sent to Briggs for his information.
2. Dated May 22, p. 1086.
3. Dated May 25, p. 1097.
4. This telegram, May 26, contained a text of the proposed aide-mémoire summarizing the exposition which Clark and Briggs presented Rhee on May 25, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)