795.00/5–2653: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State
4295. Repeated information London 212, Tokyo 47 from Mills. I saw Prime Minister at 11:30 May 26 (Deptel 2934, May 231). He said he [Page 1105] had studied Embassy’s May 24 aide-mémoire2 upon his return New Delhi May 25. It would be difficult, he added, for him form final judgment on new proposal without seeing complete text. I replied I had asked for complete text and hoped receive it shortly. I added, however, I believed aide-mémoire outlined UNC position on principal point at issue.
Nehru said he had instructed Indian Ambassador in Peiping to keep close touch with Chinese. Without quite stating so clearly, he indicated India might bring “gentle pressure.” He said from studying aide-mémoire he judged there remained only one important point of difference which he considered procedural, namely what is done with those unwilling be repatriated following 60-day period of custodial commission. I pointed out new proposals provided for 30 days for political conference attempt deal with problem, following which we offered alternatives, either release or referral to UN.
Prime Minister talked at some length about differences in Chinese and UNC approaches to repatriation. He stated that legally under Geneva Convention prisoners of war should be repatriated but he could see problem went good deal further. I expressed personal view many Americans were greatly troubled by repatriations to Russia following World War I [II?] and moral aspect of problem certainly was big factor in US.
I recalled that in conversation with Ambassador Allen, Prime Minister had stated India did not want to get into middle of dispute but its role might be that of catalyst. I asked whether it possible and useful for India to serve as catalyst now. He did not reply directly. Trying another approach I recalled that in his May 15 statement to Parliament he welcomed Communist proposals as useful since they followed closely Indian resolution. I asked whether it possible and helpful for him make similar statement now regarding UNC proposals of May 25. Prime Minister referred again to fact he did not have full text these proposals. He then said in three days will be in London conferring with Commonwealth Ministers (he departs New Delhi 1240, May 28 by air).
Prime Minister did not bring up any of “difficulties” which apparently troubling R.K. Nehru (Embtel 4282, May 253). He asked, however, [Page 1106] why name of Commission was changed from repatriation to Custodial Commission. I replied I did not know but could not believe hidden motive of any kind involved.
Prime Minister most friendly but cautious and somewhat elusive. He appeared pleased that UNC had modified May 13 proposals. He talked at some length about Syngman Rhee saying latter and Chiang Kai-shek two persons ready bring on world war to gain their ends. I replied that Rhee naturally wished unite Korea. Nehru asked if there had been any decisions about composition and tasks of proposed political conference. I replied I did not know but assumed this would have to be considered when armistice concluded, that we must consider matters one at a time and big problem now is to achieve armistice.
I have impression that if he feels he can usefully take action vis-à-vis Communists, he will do so but not before he reaches London. I told him his Parliamentary statement May 15 without doubt had influenced our side and similar statement now might influence other side. He did not comment. He said he had learned Churchill would endorse new proposals and asked if this done. I told him I did not know. Later UK High Commissioner informed me he did not know why public endorsement by Churchill had been delayed.
- In this telegram, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to brief Nehru on the UNC proposal and provide him with a summary of the essential UNC concessions while emphasizing that this proposal was as far as the UNC was prepared to go. The Department of State did not wish the terms of the proposal to be made public, but Nehru might wish to announce that he had been consulted and fully supported the proposal or, alternatively, he might wish to make a private approach to Peking to the same effect. Either course of action would, in the Department of State’s view, destroy any Communist hope “that division in the free world will lead to further concessions cutting into the principle of non-forcible repatriation.” (795.00/5–2553)↩
- On May 24, Chargé Sheldon T. Mills saw Indian Foreign Secretary R.K. Nehru and gave him an aide-mémoire embodying the substance of telegram 2934. (Telegram 4263 from New Delhi, May 24, 1953; 795.00/5–2453)↩
- As reported in this telegram, R.K. Nehru raised the following points: China might not accept the change in name from repatriation commission to custodial commission; the Chinese might be unwilling to agree that India alone should provide troops to guard POWs; and Chinese leaders might find it difficult to accept either UNC alternative on disposition of POWs not repatriated. (795.00/5–2553)↩