795.00/5–1353
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under
Secretary of State (Matthews)1
confidential
[Washington,] May 13,
1953.
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- Mr. Hume Wrong—Ambassador of
Canada
- Mr. Peter Campbell—First
Secretary, Embassy of Canada
- G—Mr. Matthews
- FE—U.
Alexis Johnson
[Page 1018]
Ambassador Wrong, at his request,
called today on Mr. Matthews. He
stated that he had received the attached views by Mr. Pearson concerning the Communist May 7
proposal prior to being informed of instructions which had gone to
General Clark on the
subject. He had subsequently heard from Mr. Pearson following receipt of information with regard to
instructions being sent to General
Clark and wanted to add that Pearson was disturbed by the fact that the UNC counter proposal contained ideas that
had not previously been considered such as a requirement for unanimous
agreement of the commission. He did not agree that the counter proposal
“had gone a long way” towards meeting the Communist May 7 proposal and
regretted that at least the Ambassadors of the countries concerned in
Washington had not been consulted, much less the governments, prior to
issuance of instructions to General
Clark. The Ambassador commented that he personally
thought that the question of whether the “hard core” would become more
manageable than in the prevailing atmosphere of the present discussion
was debatable. It could work both ways.
The Ambassador also expressed himself as personally being much concerned
over our position on the unanimity requirement for decisions of the
commission.
Mr. Johnson explained our view in
this regard, pointing out that it avoided adding to the already great
burden that India would be bearing in our proposal. He pointed out that
the substantive decisions being taken by the commission would involve
whether any individuals or group of individuals should be repatriated
and that we are confident that Switzerland and Sweden would apply the
unanimity rule in a fair and equitable manner. If the commission did not
reach a decision that any individual or group of individuals should be
repatriated, it simply meant that those individuals would remain where
they are.
Mr. Matthews mentioned our
position with regard to release of the Korean non-repatriates and the
attitude of President Rhee and the
ROKs on this subject as well as upon
the stationing of Communist troops in ROK territory. The Ambassador stated that our position with
regard to release of the Koreans did not bother him nor did he think
that it would bother the Canadian Government. The Ambassador was also
informed that we had informed the Indian Government of our proposals and
that while Nehru had not
committed himself nor had we asked him to do so, he had not indicated
India would refuse to participate as envisaged in the UNC counter proposal. Nehru had also appreciated the problem
of the armed forces of five nations taking custody of the prisoners as
envisaged in the Communist proposal.
[Page 1019]
[Attachment]
Mr. Pearson’s Views Regarding Communist Proposals
for Korean Armistice
I believe the 8-point proposal advanced by the Communist side goes a
long way to meet the objections to their previous proposals which
have been put forward by the United Nations Command. Indeed, I think
there is only one difference of substance between the new Communist
proposal and the Indian Resolution adopted by the Assembly last
December. Both proposals provide for a reference of the problem of
the prisoners who do not wish to return home to the Political
Conference to be called under Paragraph 60 of the Draft Armistice
Agreement. However, the Communist proposal does not provide for
further reference of this problem back to the United Nations, if the
Political Conference is unable to settle it.
This, in my judgment, is the only significant difference between the
two proposals. I am not too disturbed by the idea of Czechoslovakia
and Poland providing guard troops in Korea, although the detailed
arrangements for this will need working out. I understand the United
States is prepared to accept these two countries for membership in
the proposed Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Indeed, it
would be difficult to adopt any other position as both countries
have already been agreed to as members of similar bodies, under the
terms of both the Draft Armistice Agreement and the General
Assembly’s Resolution of December 1952.
The Communists have made an important concession in no longer
insisting that the prisoners who do not wish to be returned home
should be physically removed from Korea to a “neutral state”.
In view of the above, I think the way is now open for the conclusion
of an armistice, if the United States Administration is seriously
determined to obtain one, as I believe it is. Moreover, I am not too
surprised that the counter-proposal of the Communist Chinese and
North Koreans does not include any mention of reference back to the
United Nations, for the simple reason that neither government is a
member of that body. In my view, it may be necessary for the United
Nations Command to be prepared to consider a compromise on this
point in the interest of obtaining an early armistice.
I also believe that the main thing at present is not so much to
concern ourselves with future points of method and procedure—though
the Communists as we know can exploit these—as to recognize that
there is already adequate agreement by both sides on the principles
which should govern a solution of the prisoners-of-war question, to
provide a reasonable basis for the armistice. The problem of
disposing of the remaining prisoners-of-war will remain a problem,
no matter what methods and procedures are devised. However, once the
exchange of prisoners
[Page 1020]
has actually started, the problem of the “hardcore” prisoners should
become more manageable and less acute than it is in the prevailing
atmosphere of the present discussions. It should also be noted that
there is now agreement by both sides on:
- (a)
- The setting up of a Repatriation Commission composed of
neutral states; and
- (b)
- As a second resort, the reference of this problem to the
Political Conference to be called following the armistice.
This area of agreement is, in my judgment, sufficient for
our immediate purposes of obtaining an armistice.
