Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

C 62247. Refs: A. JCS 938041.1 B. JCS 937205.2 C. CX 52284 (21 July 52).3

I do not share the optimistic view expressed in para 4, ref A: “If the agreement reached that some other state and Switzerland or Sweden should jointly exercise responsibilities of neutral state, phys mvmt of non-repatriates from Korea is clearly impracticable and ques should be capable of ready resolution upon basis of custody being taken within Korea.”
However in order to maintain the psn promulgated in para 4 of ref A, and para 3b of ref B, believe we must obtain maximum support possible. I recm, if it has not already been done, that consideration be given to acquainting potentially eligible neutral states with the many disagreeable problems that 50,000 unwilling non-repatriates, and the fanatical Communist orientation pers (ref C) would represent if acpt within neutral state territory. By stressing these unpleasant aspects of the task, in addition to other known difficulties, it may be possible to encourage all reasonably sat neutrals to qualify their acceptance of the neutral state role by insisting that the non-repatriates must remain in Korea as a prerequisite to their assuming custody. If such efforts succeed our negotiatory psn would be greatly strengthened, and public support at home and abroad for our psn might be assured.
  1. Dated May 2, p. 962.
  2. Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.
  3. Ante, p. 415.