Matthews files, lot 53 D 413

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark)1

top secret

My Dear Gen Clark: In the course of our conversation, in the afternoon of 28 Apr 1953,2 we discussed, among other subjects, the feasibility of a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Chinese Communists and United Nations Forces from Korea. I have turned the matter over in my mind since and certain connected ideas have crystallized, which I think it advisable to communicate to you without delay.

My personal preference is, without ques somewhat selfish, still that we retain, if we can at all, the United Nations Forces, particularly United States Forces, to the last, for the Korean morale would be better maintained and we could be more assured of log and other sup by having them alongside with us than otherwise. Furthermore, the Communist chicanery and propaganda would have less chance of getting between this hard-beleaguered nation and the rest of the free world and thereby doing fatal damage to the whole free world as well as to this country.

It is only proper that the United Nations Forces committed to the present “police action” should remain in Korea until peace is assured, irrespective of the withdrawal of the illegal Chinese Communist invaders. In the absence, however, of any other means of getting the Chinese Communists out of Korea as you suggested, the simultaneous withdrawal of both the Chinese Communist and the United Nations Forces from Korea is preferable to the remaining of the former on the Korean soil. Furthermore, it is not our desire to ask our friends to remain and fight for us more than they have done already.

I believe this simultaneous withdrawal naturally involves certain risks and even perils against which safeguards must be found. For the sake of my own nation and the free world as a whole, I do not feel prepared to agree to risk it, unless the fol points are satisfied or provided for:

1.
A Korean-American mutual def pact should be concluded in adv of the withdrawal of the United States Forces from Korea.
2.
A buffer strip should be created on the other side of the Korean boundary, to be supervised by the United Nations and maintained until a permanent peace is established in the Far East.
3.
While no Korean force should step over the Korea boundary, no Chinese or any other foreign army should invade Korea.
4.
No agreement should be made between the United States and the Soviet Union to the effect that the mil preparation on either side will be hampered or limited.
5.
In case of the Soviet Army, Navy or Air Force attempting to invade Korea, the United States Forces shall come back immediately to help defend Korea without international negotiations or conferences for taking such a step.
6.
Under no circumstances, Japanese trps shall be made to fight in the Korean theatre of action.
7.
The Naval blockade around the Korean coast and air def shall cont until the peace in the Far East is firmly established and thoroughly assured.
8.
The United States should cont to increase and strengthen the land, sea and air forces of Korea in order to guarantee the peace and security of the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee
  1. This letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information by Clark in telegram CX 62220, May 2.
  2. For a report of this conversation, see telegram C 62143, Clark to Collins, Apr. 28, p. 947.