Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, April 29, 1953—10:43 a.m.

CX 62150. Refs: A. Z 36387 (HNU 4–46). B. C 62103 (HNC 1642).¹ C. C 62022.² D. JCS 937205.³ E. DA 924551.⁴ F. State Dept 251300S (intel) NOTAL. G. DA 379286.

1. After a careful analysis of Communist proposed manner of implementing the Chou proposal, I feel the issues are capable of resolution provd agreement can be reached by:

a. The neutral state to rec custody of non-repatriated POWs, and,

b. That NK non-repatriates held by the UNC be either released in Korea upon signing an armistice or the selected neutral state assume custody of this group in Korea.

2. Communist failure to make known their choice of neutral states may indicate that they will attempt to secure agreement on other pertinent issues prior to nominating any state. This procedure would permit them to name a state which could well be prepd to immediately assume the prevly agreed upon responsibilities. With this sit existing and the desire of the free world for peace, excessive international pressure might be brought to bear on us to acpt a “neutral state” whose rejection by us would otherwise be supported. I believe our prev experience in resolving the composition of the neutral nations supervisory com, should serve as a guide to us in this sit. In view of the foregoing, I have directed Gen Harrison to press the Communists as a mat of first business, for their nomination of the nation to be the neutral state. At the same time, he will cont to set forth the reasons why Switzerland should be selected for this psn. I consider my guidance on this to be adequate. However, as set forth in ref c, a list of those nations acceptable to us which might be nominated by the Communists would be desirable, in addition, knowledge and auth to immediately reject any other nations deemed unacceptable would be of assistance in establishing the firmness of our psn. I realize the acceptability of any nation is dependent upon many factors and appreciate that the foregoing additional guidance may well be incapable of determination at this time.

3. As pertains to the mvmt of and the type of custody to be exercised by the neutral state over the non-repatriates, I consider that our psn on this subject must be divided into two parts; our psn on North Korean non-repatriates and our psn on the Chinese Communist non-repatriates. I will discuss each in turn.

a. North Korean non-repatriates. In light of ROK opposition to mvmt of this group out of Korea, ROK opposition to an armistice, Communist prev psn on this group, and rqmt upon and demands of our nominated neutral countries, I firmly believe that our initial and interim psn on this group must be one of strong insistence that they be released to civ status immediately upon an armistice becoming eff and being permitted to be returned to their home as civs in accordance with article 59 of the draft armistice agreement if they so elect. Such a psn and disposition of Korean non-repatriates would:

(1) Nullify to some extent ROK antagonism to the armistice.

(2) Largely overcome problems of ROK-neutral state relations by limiting “neutral state” detention of the Chinese to Cheju-Do, or if nec, to the demilitarized zone.

(3) Greatly reduce neutral state detention function.

(4) Permit full rather than tech “neutral state” custody of CCF non-repatriates which should be much more palatable to the Communists.

(5) Greatly reduce the need for enemy mvmt in our rear areas.

(6) Preclude the strong probability that any mvmt of UNC-held Korean non-repatriates would be violently opposed by the ROK population as well as the prisoners themselves.

(7) Be fully justified by enemy disposition of 50,000 ROKA pers for whom they have never acctd.

I consider that our final psn on this group must be one which provs for the neutral state to assume preferably only tech control, but failing in this, full control within Korea.

b. CCF non-repatriates. I plan on taking an initial and interim psn on this group which would prov for the neutral state assuming tech control, if nec, full control in Korea. As a final psn and if only the CCF non-repatriates are involved, I recm that we should accede to Communist insistence that they be physically moved to the neutral state. If other than CCF non-repatriates are involved, i.e., Korean non-repatriates not having been disposed of as above, our final psn must be the same as our initial and interim psns.

4. I consider Communist demands for six months access to non-repatriates to be excessive. I further believe that the actual length of time after an armistice is signed until final disposition of non-repatriates cannot be determined until agreement has been reached as to location at which neutral state will exercise custody of non-repatriates. At an aprop time I propose to suggest to the Communists as our initial psn, that dlvr within Korea of non-repatriates to control of the neutral state be effected simultaneously with the direct repatriation; that this dlvr be accomplished within 30 days; and that each side be allowed access for the folg 30 days. I consider that our interim psn should allow access for a pd of two months, and that as a final psn, the pd of access should be left to my discretion, but not in any case to exceed four months.

5. a. I consider that our initial, interim and final psn pertaining to who determines final disposition of those non-repatriates remaining at the end of the pd of access must be the same; to wit, non-repatriates shall be free to proceed to an aval destination of their choice in accordance with nec and approp arrangements made by the neutral state.

b. I consider unacceptable the Communist proposal that final disposition of the non-repatriates, remaining at termination of the pd of access, be effected by the political conf (para 2K, ref A). In this connection, however, in order that we not lay ourselves open to charges of inconsistency, attn is invited to our various stands with respect to the Indian Resolution. Ref E stated an initial US psn in conformity with my view expressed above. Ref F, passed to CINCFE, indicated US prepd as max to agree to 30-day political conf discussion on final disposition, with all remaining non-repatriates released to UNKRA or designated UN agency if no decision reached at end 30 days. Ref G, para C 17, shows that State Dept psn (ref F) became in effect offl US psn. In spite of this compromise I still consider that our final psn should be as expressed in para 5 above.

6. At such time as it may become an issue, I will endeavor to secure Communist agreement to the presently agreed upon demarcation line. Should we fail to secure agreement to this, we will renegotiate a new line as rapidly as possible and to the best possible advantage of the UNC based on actual line of contact.

7. I consider that all positions, as set forth above, are within present guidance except as pertains to final psn set forth in paras 3b and 4 above. To accommodate the final positions proposed herein, I recommend that para 3b of ref D be changed to permit phys mvmt of Chinese non-repatriates to the neutral country, and that the time limit set forth in para 3c (1) of ref D be extended to 120 days.

1. In these first two reference telegrams, dated Apr. 26, 1953, neither printed, Clark transmitted to the JCS the record of the substance of the plenary sessions of Apr. 26 at Panmunjom. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
2. Dated Apr. 22, p. 922.
3. Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.
4. The last three reference telegrams, which are summarized in CX 62150, are not printed.