795.00/4–2253
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)1
Dear Bobby: The copy of NSC 1472 which you sent me as it relates to the problem of additional forces from other United Nations members and the question of reimbursement for logistic support is a big step forward. It, however, primarily states the problem and does not offer any clear solutions. It strengthens my view that the policy of logistic reimbursement followed by the previous Administration was unwise and had the effect of deterring other United Nations members from sending troops to Korea. It is interesting to note that the effect of this policy if continued would be practically to negate the Collective Measures resolution which Secretary Dulles carried through the General Assembly as a member of the United States Delegation.
In the one test of collective security action—Korea—governments have been deterred as much by the economic cost of participation as by the manpower cost. Yet it is clear that the United States is better able to withstand an economic loss than a manpower loss—and it is our basic policy to provide arms for other nations so that our young men will not carry the full load of combat.
Accordingly, it seems clear to me that we should take the action suggested in paragraph 180 of the Report. If we are prepared to extend training, logistic supplies and general economic assistance to our friends under the Mutual Security program as a deterrent against future aggression, we should be even more willing to offer aid when we have through the sacrifices of the lives of their men a concrete demonstration of willingness of other countries to join us in a common cause.
It is clear that the same basic standards which govern the level of our aid to the countries of the free world—their willingness to cooperate in developing defenses and their relative ability to pay for such defenses themselves—should govern the sharing of burdens in Korea. Why shouldn’t we bring the negotiations on Korean logistic support into the general framework of our mutual aid relationships with these countries?
I am determined that we should have greater sharing of the manpower burdens in Korea and in whatever future collective security actions may occur. If we expect other countries to bear these burdens in relationship [Page 929] to the availability of their manpower, then as a corollary we must be prepared to assume a portion of the economic burden involved. We are able to carry a heavier economic burden than some of our allies while they have much greater resources of manpower. We know that the manpower of underdeveloped countries can be trained and can fight well in modern war, for we have done it ourselves in Korea and—alas!—the Soviets have done it on an immense scale.
One final note. I am certain you will find in the bureaucracies a tendency to say this problem no longer needs attention because of the Soviet peace overtures. I believe it is in fact more important. We should be able to move promptly, if the Soviets do not reach agreement with us in Korea, to extend the United Nations participation and to do that we need to get this economic and logistic roadblock out of the way. If, as we all hope, agreement is achieved in Korea, then we should get this mistaken and inherited policy re-examined so that it will not stand in the way of any future collective security action.
Sincerely yours,
Ambassador
- The source text is a copy of this letter which Lodge provided Dulles. On May 5, this letter came to the attention of Eisenhower, who was impressed with its contents and had it sent to members of, and advisers to, the NSC. (Memorandum by Cutler to Dulles, May 6, 1953; 795.00/5–653)↩
- Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.↩