Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–2253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 22, 1953—7:30 p.m.

2489. Personal for Murphy. Following for your general guidance and background in carrying out your duties assist CINCUNC in analyzing and assessing political implications armistice negotiations. Basic negotiating instructions which have been approved by President are being transmitted to CINCUNC by JCS.² You will be guided by those instructions as supplemented by guidance contained herein. However, nothing in these or any subsequent instructions shall be construed as modifying or amending in any way basic or other instructions from JCS to CINCUNC. Normally all communications incorporating views yourself and CINCUNC with respect to negotiations, should be by message from CINCUNC to JCS, which messages are promptly made available to and replies coordinated with Department. However, you are authorized your discretion communicate directly with Department on political matters, furnishing copy CINCUNC. US Ambassador ROK will continue advise CINCUNC and US on ROK political implications armistice negotiations.

Consultations with foreign governments will, as in past, be carried out by Department in Washington. Those governments will be fully informed through their representatives here upon course of negotiations.

Except that you should not at any time accompany UNC delegation to Panmunjom, your location is left to discretion yourself and Clark. Travel between Japan and Korea as required authorized.

Your assignment this duty does not in any way indicate any change in US Government position that armistice negotiations Panmunjom are essentially military in character and are solely between military commanders concerned and not proper forum for introduction or discussion of any political questions. Any necessary public relations aspects your assignment will be handled accordingly.

As stated in instructions to CINCUNC it is desired he be given broad negotiating latitude order that to maximum possible extent he may promptly reach decisions with regard conduct negotiations thus expedite their course. Thereby should be possible quickly test Communist intent good faith with regard acceptable armistice and avoid renewed involvement in inconclusive and drawn-out negotiations. As stated in President’s address April 16³ first step toward peace such as outlined by the President must be conclusion of honorable armistice Korea. US Congressional and public opinion will not tolerate prolonged and inconclusive armistice discussions.

Except for Nationalist China which abstained, all non-Soviet bloc members of UN supported and affirmed principle non-forcible repatriation as embodied in UNGA resolution December 3, 1952.

The 15 other governments who have armed forces participating in action Korea, particular UN, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France, take a very active interest in events Korea and, particular, UNC conduct armistice negotiations. All these governments have publicly supported principle non-forcible repatriation. UK Government particularly sensitive to its small majority Parliament and opposition criticism UNC policies in armistice negotiations. Foregoing governments also sensitive opposition criticism that decisions respecting Korea taken unilaterally by US without prior consultation.

There is tendency on part most above-mentioned governments as well as foreign public opinion uncritically assume Chou En-lai statement regard prisoners represents such major concession on part Communists to UNC position non-forcible repatriation that only few details remain to be worked out Panmunjom. If in fact course negotiations indicates Communists do not have genuine intent enter into armistice acceptable UNC it will be important publicly demonstrate and bring out this fact in negotiations. This event important it be clear Chou En-lai “proposal” was simply forcible repatriation another guise. This should be accomplished to maximum possible extent by statements elicited from Communists during course negotiations.

If you need additional information or background inform Department.

Department will keep you informed on political developments and official views of 15 other governments mentioned above regarding armistice negotiations.

You should furnish CINCUNC copy these instructions which have Defense concurrence.

You should, in consultation CINCUNC, make arrangements keep Briggs⁴ informed on behalf CINCUNC concerning all developments armistice negotiations bearing upon ROK attitude so that Briggs in best possible position anticipate and meet problems arising with ROK Government re armistice.

Smith

1. This telegram was drafted by Young and cleared by Johnson and with Charles Sullivan, Chief, Northeast Asian Section, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
2. The instructions under reference were transmitted in JCS 937205, supra.
3. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188.
4. In telegram 633 to Pusan, personal for Briggs, dated Apr. 22, the Ambassador was informed of Murphy’s appointment and told that as Ambassador to Korea he retained responsibility for U.S. relations with the ROK and for advising CINCUNC and the U.S. Government on political developments in South Korea bearing on the armistice negotiations. The Department of State emphasized that Murphy’s assignment did not alter the essentially military character of the negotiations, which were not a proper forum for introduction or discussion of political questions. Briggs was to make this clear to ROK authorities when Murphy’s assignment was made public. (795.00/4–2253)