795B.00/2–2752
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
official-informal
Dear Alex: On your recent brief visit and in several recent telegrams,1 I discussed the trying period we are going through due to the Princetonian’s2 increasing obstinacy and emotional outbursts. If he keeps on the way he is going and the present dispute with the National Assembly is not solved before the next presidential elections, there [Page 65] might be Hell to pay. The situation would also be acute for a while should he pass out of the scene before the National Assembly gets around to electing his successor. The fact that the Vice President is completely an invalid makes prospects more fickle. I discussed this briefly with General Van Fleet some time ago and intend to go into it further with him in a few days. I have also discussed it with Bedell’s representative here.
In the event of the Old Boy’s taking things into his own hands or in the event of his sudden disappearance from the scene, the key to the situation would be the attitude of two forces, the army and the police. I have no doubt that we can count on the army under its present leadership to uphold law and order and the constitution. I have grave misgivings regarding the police under the present Home Minister. Furthermore, as reported, the Princetonian has revived and reinvigorated his Youth Corps, whose “goon squads” are becoming more and more evident in the current struggle between the executive and the National Assembly. The key to the problem is knowing what the Home Minister, the Youth Corps, and to a lesser extent the National Guidance Group, is doing. In these three groups, Rhee personally issues the orders, selects all key officials and relies on them for direct action and as his principal sources of information. There is no doubt in my mind that they all distort reports in favor of their own respective interests. There is also some question in my mind as to whether the Princetonian realizes and is capable of checking up on the methods used in carrying out his orders.
With the army, it would be difficult to carry out activities unknown to us in view of the widespread internal ramifications of KMAG. As you know we have a few KMAG officers with the police also. However, they are not numerous and their main function has been the coordination of the use of the police in collaboration with the military. We have no one in the Home Ministry itself, the Youth Corps or the National Guidance Group.
Interwoven with all this problem is the part being played today in Korea by the Chinese. We have here the general distinction between those Koreans who spent all their exile in China and those who spent their refugee period elsewhere. We know a lot of the Chinese as we have groups of interpreters, translators and CI&E personnel brought here by our military. We also have a recently greatly augmented Chinese Embassy, military attaché and air attaché organization. It is difficult enough keeping tabs on these divergent, overt groups but in addition I am sure there are covert activities being carried on both from Taipei and from the mainland also, which our Embassy is in no position to follow. I hope somewhere along the line here or in Tokyo or Washington that some U.S. agency is aware of these numerous tentacles. I personally have a hunch that the Chinese have influenced the course of [Page 66] events at Koje-do and at Panmunjom. (I am not referring to the most recent riot among the ROK internees.) I also feel very acutely that if certain ambitious and unscrupulous Koreans manage to take over Rhee’s mantle, we may as well turn the peninsula over to Taipei. In other words as regards the Chinese, I am not satisfied as to who is using whom vis-à-vis the US and who eventually is going to get the gravy (Korea).
In discussing the importance of getting in and knowing what is going on behind the scenes among the several power groups, Bedell’s representative here and I both feel that it is essential in view of the delicacy of the work to be done that his agency promptly be given broader directives and the necessary staff to tackle the job. Specifically the needs are for: (1) competent language officers; (2) a few more mature, senior, stable, experienced operatives. It is high time the strategic importance of this region be recognized and that the agency in question gear itself for something other than order of battle targets.
My suggestion is, if you agree, that you discuss this problem directly with Bedell Smith in order to get things moving as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours,
- Johnson was in Korea from Feb. 17 to 18 as part of General Hull’s mission. For a list of telegrams relating to this issue, see footnote 1 p. 61.↩
- The “Princetonian” was Muccio’s nickname for Syngman Rhee, a doctoral graduate of Princeton University.↩