320/12–652: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State


Delga 334. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Korea. Re State–Defense conversations Korea December 4,1 and as result meeting today at which Gross, Ross, Wainhouse, Emmons, Allen and Babcock present, following is our estimate situation here and possible course of action for Dept’s consideration.

[Page 707]

We believe now necessary consider what steps, if any, should be taken by Assembly before December 23 in event Pearson reports Commie rejection proposals contained Indian res. We assume GA President will not adjourn session, but will merely adjourn final meeting December 22 or 23, leaving Seventh Session subject to call by President. It assumed, barring emergencies, President will not reconvene Assembly or first comite prior to February 1953.

December 3 res, although sponsored by India, resulted from Brit-Canad-India “coalition” developed during past few weeks and in final phases supported by Austral, New Zealand and France. We cannot safely assume this “coalition” has been dissolved nor that it may not again attempt assume further initiative.

We believe it undesirable to reopen debate on Korean item prior to December 23.

However, it is quite possible that, in event of Commie rejection December 3 res, Indians will introduce new res watering down and weakening their previous res or will attempt accomplish same result by seeking amendment 21-power res. There is also hint that Indo del might table a res, substance of which would undoubtedly be in direction of appeasing Commies. Nor should we discount possible support for moves such as appt of good offices group, which may develop. These possibilities should be considered as major factor in our immediate planning.

21-power res, along with Mex and Peru drafts, technically remain before comite. There have been hints dropped by both Canadians and British that in event Commie rejection Ind res, some pressures may develop to vote 21-power res substantially as written. As we have already advised Brit and Canads, this would be retrogressive step further delaying more positive approach.

We believe it neither desirable nor feasible prior to December 23 to attempt to press res calling for “additional measures”; considerable high-level diplomatic preparation would be necessary before this can be done with prospect of success, and undoubtedly new administration should, without advance commitment, be given opportunity fully to consider question.

From standpoint maintaining or reasserting US leadership in UN forum on Korean item, we believe that some of our colleagues should be informed, on selective basis, of our view that if any further res on Korea is introduced at this time, it should be confined to fol elements:

Reaffirmation of principle of non-forcible retention on repatriation POW’s;
Expression of regret that Commies rejected fair and reasonable proposals set forth in Indian res;
Affirmation of determination GA, as expressed in prior SC and GA resolutions, to take all practicable action to resist aggression and to restore international peace and security in area.

Draft res along foregoing lines would be useful as basis for discussion and could be introduced in comite if serious likelihood develops of Indian, Indo, or other initiative along lines referred to above. It could also be used to counter-pressure for action on 21-power res, if such should develop.

  1. No record of these conversations has been found.