Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief Far East (Clark)

top secret
priority

Washington, September 8, 1952—6:59 p. m.

JCS 917910. From JCS. Refs: A. JCS 917260,¹ B. C 54495,² C. C 54499,³ D. Statetel 627 to AmEmbassy Tokyo for info CINCUNC.⁴

Part I.

1. As stated in JCS 917569,⁵ decision was reached not to recommend proposed presidential statement as set forth ref A.

2. However, it is considered that Mex proposal (ref D), while probably not in itself offering a clear resolution of the POW issue in the negots, would, when contemplated publicity is given thereto, provide the Pres with an excellent opportunity to make statement containing the substance of the last 2 paras of draft statement included in para 1, ref A. Draft of the proposed revised statement by the Pres is being transmitted by immediately following radio.⁶

3. It is considered here that up to the present time, UNC proposals have been such as to require Commies to greater or lesser degree to accept publicly principle of nonforcible repatriation. If Commies are seriously concerned with effect on their mil capabilities and civ morale in NK of heavy bombing program as reported in para 4, ref B, they should now be receptive to UNC proposal which offers them opportunity to bring armistice into effect without being required to accept in advance and publicly the principle of nonforcible repatriation, but rather only to agree to continue negotiating about the matter after an armistice with the possibility that they could allow issue to fade out or resolve it without appearing to do so under mil pressure.

4. It is considered that in order to have max impact upon Commie leadership and to provide that degree of face-saving which might conceivably permit armistice to be concluded, it wld be desirable to remove proposal from context of simply another item thrown on table at Panmunjom, and instead to present it in formal statement by Pres. At same time, in order avoid any implication that we desire to remove locus of negots from Panmunjom, it is considered that President’s statement shld immediately be followed by presentation by UNC delegation at Panmunjom in executive session as set forth in part II hereof. We believe exec session at Panmunjom wld reinforce serious nature of President’s proposal and give opportunity for non-propaganda discussion.

5. Re substance of proposal contained in the President’s draft statement, believed here foll reasons argue for its presentation to Commies in some form:

a. Proposal is plausible and reasonable resolution of present impasse on POW question while in no way representing retreat from fundamental UNC position on nonforcible repatriation.

b. Even if rejected by Commies, making of such proposal at this time shortly prior to opening UNGA (scheduled for Oct 14) will enhance support and endorsement UNC position in armistice negots which it is now contemplated will be sought of GA shortly after opening of session.

c. Failure to specify forum for “further negots” ref disposition of non-repatriates considered advantage in that it gives Commies opportunity to propose modification prior to acceptance by counter-proposal in which this point could be more specific. Also, even if Commies do not accept proposal, they might be led into exploring UNC views ref forum for or probable position in “further negots”. If Commies could be brought to discuss question of disposition of non-repatriates, we wld have moved them toward accepting concept non-forcible repatriation which wld advance and improve UNC negotiating position.

d. It is, of course, true that leaving this issue unsettled for later negots might provide a superficial pretext to Commies for renewing hostilities at later time. However, if they determine to renew hostilities in clear violation of paragraph 62⁷ of armistice agreement, there are many other ways in which they could fabricate a pretext quite apart from POW question. Also, if Commies were to renew hostilities in violation of armistice agreement, the “greater sanctions” statement set forth in JCS 91602⁸ wld become operative.

6. Ref para 3 of ref B, any counter proposal by Commies for a percentage exchange in order that they might hold some of our POW as hostages wld, of course, be entirely unacceptable. We do not believe it probable that Commies wld make such counter-proposal in face of UNC willingness to return all POW not forcibly resisting repatriation and absence thus far of any Commie allegations that any UNCPOWs held by them included in their lists are opposed to repatriation. It is considered more likely that Commie counter-proposal wld take form of proposition that armistice enter into effect without any exchange or agreement on POWs. This wld, of course, be unacceptable and we wld make vigorous reply by pointing out senselessness and inhumanity of preventing immediate return to their homes of prisoners held by both sides admittedly desiring such return. Commies can, of course, make such proposal whether or not proposal envisaged by this message is made by the Pres and UNC del as already indicated by Commie press. We wld be in much more advantageous position to counter such a Commie proposal if we had already taken initiative along lines of proposal discussed herein.

7. Shld presidential proposal envisaged by this msg be accepted by Commies, care wld have to be taken re manner of including its terms in an armistice agreement. We are thinking particularly of present agreed wording of paragraphs 51 and 54 of draft armistice agreement, which might leave UNC open to charge of violating agreement by failure to repatriate all POWs in accordance first sentence of para 51. If you think change in wording necessary suggest you submit your proposed rewording and your comments.⁹

8. While there is, of course, no intent by US Govt in any way to compromise basic position on non-forcible repatriation in any subsequent negots and it is not perceived here how Commies cld force such compromise, it wld be important that particularly during period between representation of proposals envisaged herein and Commie reply thereto no public statements in this regard shld be made in order not to destroy face-saving aspect and jeopardize possibilities Commie acceptance.

Part II.

1. It is considered that UNC del presentation of proposal at Panmunjom might be along following lines:

a. Presentation by Harrison such as set forth in para 4, a, b, c, and d, ref C.

b. After Harrison has reviewed previous proposals along foregoing lines, he cld then present foll additional alternatives acceptable to this Govt.

(1) Alternative (1) as set forth in para 4 e, ref C. In order to put this alternative into form which wld be more palatable to Commies, it is suggested that it might be presented along foll lines:

“As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all POWs in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of POWs shall begin in accordance with the provisions of Art III of the armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate POWs shall be fulfilled by having each POW brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The POW shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed lists of POWs, if desired in the presence of 1 or a combination of the ICRC, jt Red Cross teams or jt mil teams. The POW shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any POW who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to side by which he had been detained shall be immediately allowed to do so. Such former POW shall thereupon go into the custody of side to which he wishes to go, which shall provide him with transportation from demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual shall, of course, not be detained as POW but shall assume civ status, and, in accordance with Art 52 of the armistice agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.”

(2) Delivery to demilitarized zone of non-repatriates in small groups where, at mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from mil control of both sides and interviewed by reps of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities; such persons being free to go to side of their choice as indicated by such interview. This to be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side, under the observation of 1 or combination of foll:

(a) ICRC;

(b) Jt Red Cross teams;

(c) Jt Mil teams.

(3) Gen Harrison cld then state that UNC is prepared immediately to resolve POW issue upon basis of any of foregoing bases and immediately enter into an armistice. However, if Commies are unwilling to resolve POW issue at this time, UNC is willing to postpone issue of nonrepatriates and immediately enter into an armistice, as suggested by Pres, upon basis of immediate exchange of the 12,000 UNCPOWs held by Commies for the 83,000 POWs held by UNC. Question of remaining persons not included in numbers to be exchanged to be subj of further negots.

(4) In accordance with suggestions made in paragraph 3 b (3) part II of ur CX 51489¹⁰ concerning disposition of Chi non-repatriates, Gen Harrison cld then be authorized to state that if the Commies were prepared immediately to enter into an armistice upon basis of any of the foregoing proposals, UNC wld be prepared to agree that upon signing of armistice, those persons who are not exchanged under armistice and who are not Koreans will be sent to any place or places outside of Korea willing to receive them which may be agreed upon by both sides.

(5) If questioned by Commies concerning forum for the “further negots” mentioned in President’s statement and to be included in Gen Harrison’s presentation, Gen Harrison’s reply shld indicate flexibility on this point while indicating that possible alternatives acceptable to UNC wld be:

(a) Discussions by MAC or sub-group thereof.

(b) Alternatively, or if agreement by MAC not reached at time of convening of pol conf provided for under para 60, that conference cld consider methods whereby such negots cld be carried out.

2. Having submitted foregoing proposals, UNC wld suggest recess of 10 days to 2 weeks to allow Commies ample opportunity for consideration. If Commies do not agree to recess and give no evidence of desire to negotiate acceptable settlement of POW issue, UNC wld unilaterally declare recess of same period.

3. It is considered possible that alternatives of (2), (3), (4), (5) of paragraph 4 e, ref C, all of which involve willingness by UNC to accept decision of another nation or nations on disposition of non-repatriates, might be misunderstood to be retreat from our fundamental position of nonrepatriation. It is therefore felt that these alternatives shld not be presented at this time.

4. If Commies reject proposals envisaged in this radio,¹¹UNC dels posture wld be one of willingness to negotiate but inability to do so in face of Commie unwillingness to put forward constructive proposals for resolution POW issue and at discretion of UNC del, recess of not more than 3 weeks, declared unilaterally if necessary, might be considered foll receipt of Commie rejection. Subsequent meetings of dels cld also be scheduled at intervals of 2–3 weeks.

Part III.

Request your comment on parts I and II.

1. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 467.
2. Dated Sept. 1, ibid.
3. Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.
4. The reference telegram, dated Sept. 4, was a repeat of telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485, with minor changes. The final sentence of the USUN cable was omitted and another sentence, “Copy above communication left with Secy by Mexican Amb Sep 2”, added (695A.0024/9–352).
5. In the telegram under reference, dated Sept. 4, the JCS informed Clark that his course of action recommended in C 54499, Sept. 1, was under study and pending a JCS-State decision he was authorized to continue current tactics. Clark was also informed that the Presidential statement would not be made, but consideration was being given to putting forth the substance of the proposal by another method. As for the release of 11,000 South Korean POWs, the JCS informed Clark that the matter was still under consideration (FE files, lot 55 D 128).
6. JCS 917927 to Clark, Sept. 9, 1952, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128) For a similar statement, see the attachment to the memorandum by Nitze to Matthews, Sept. 3, p. 488.
7. See footnote 6, p. 493.
8. The telegram under reference, dated Jan. 10, 1952, contained a text of the “Greater Sanctions Statement”; see p. 14.
9. Essentially the concern was that the Presidential proposal for partial return of POWs wishing repatriation would mean that not all POWs would be released as soon as possible after the Armistice Agreement became effective and not even within the 2-month time limit envisioned in paragraph 54. CINCUNC’s revised language for paragraphs 51 and 54 can be found in telegram C 55297, Clark to JCS, Sept. 17, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).
10. Dated July 7, p. 380.
11. Radio telegram.