Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, September 8, 1952—3 p. m.

General Bradley: We have been discussing this proposed telegram to Clark,² and the first question we have is whether or not this represents anything different from the proposal that we discussed before and which we decided against.³

Mr. Nitze: There are two differences—this proposal is pegged on the Mexican statement rather than on the Communist line in the Daily Worker as the former one was, and also the sentence which says that there are other ways in which the matter could be dealt without the use of force gives an indication of the firmness of our position on forcible repatriation which the previous draft did not have.

General Bradley: Our feeling is that Clark will probably come back with exactly the same answers as he gave to the other proposal.⁴ We also wonder whether there wasn’t a possibility that some other country could make the proposal. Maybe the Mexicans or the Canadians or somebody else. Then I had a question as to whether or not this proposal that the President might make wasn’t exactly the thing the Daily Worker and the Communists have been proposing.

Mr. Nitze: No. The Daily Worker has been calling for an armistice with no exchange of POW’s, whereas this proposal really gets all our POW’s back. This telegram also really gives the answer to some of the points that Clark made on a previous proposal, particularly in paragraphs 5 and 6, Part I.

General Bradley: In addition to feeling that this essentially is no change except in form from the other proposition, our feeling was that making this proposal would tend to weaken our position, not that we would be giving up on our stand on no forcible repatriation but that we would be making a proposal on something less than the package deal we put up before.

Mr. Johnson: In substance we would actually get the same results as we would get from the package deal. Under this proposal we really get all our POW’s back and we don’t give the Communists any POW’s who are against being repatriated.

Mr. Nitze: It seemed to us that the only real difference between this proposal and the package deal is that this does leave one issue which is not completely buttoned down with a clear procedure for resolution. This is the point that we deal with in the telegram on page 3, paragraph d,⁵ where we say that leaving the issue unsettled might provide a superficial pretext to the Communists for renewing hostilities at a later time. But it is clear that paragraph 62⁶ of the armistice agreement gives as much protection as you can hope to have from language alone and if the Communists did want to renew hostilities they could find plenty of other pretexts for doing so.

Mr. Allison: It seems to me that this proposal does in effect do what General Vandenberg was talking about last week. It really is a way for finding out whether the Communists do or do not want an armistice.

General Bradley: I am still worried that if we stop pounding them and they build up, they might start it all over again and we would be in a worse position to stop them.

Mr. Allison: We would be in the same position if we got a full armistice.

General Hull: Nevertheless there would be an issue unresolved. They might say that they would stop fighting and talk about the prisoner issue, but then if the prisoner issue wasn’t settled to their satisfaction they could use this as a reason for starting up again.

Mr. Johnson: But this isn’t a proposal for a cease-fire. This proposal calls for a full armistice.

Mr. Nitze: We were clear in our minds that we would have to have agreement to all the articles in the armistice.

General Bradley: We had worries as to whether the language of paragraph 51 would really be applicable under this proposal.

Mr. Nitze: We had the same worries and that’s why on page 4⁷ we pointed out the difficulty that is involved—because of the wording in the first sentence, paragraph 51.

Colonel Matthews:⁸ That article was purposely drafted in vague language with the idea that it would only be agreed to after there was agreement that the lists that were exchanged would represent all the prisoners that would be exchanged.

Mr. Nitze: To meet Hull’s point that we don’t want to leave one issue not clearly resolved in the armistice, it would really be better if we could get the Communists to agree to changed language for those paragraphs,⁹ which said explicitly that certain numbers of prisoners would be exchanged and that the disposition of the remaining prisoners would be the subject of further negotiations.

General Bradley: We had some other points.

Admiral Fechteler: I was worried about one point. I don’t see how we could persuade our negotiators that the statement in paragraph 5a, Part I, is true. It says there that this proposal in no way represents a retreat from the fundamental UNC position. This certainly, I think, is a retreat from our package proposal.

Mr. Allison: It is not a retreat from our position on non-repatriation.

General Bradley: It really is just putting our position on non-repatriation in new language, but I think Bill has a point and I would be happier with language which said that this in no way represented retreat from the fundamental UNC position on no forcible repatriation.

Admiral Fechteler: It still seems like a retreat to me.

Mr. Nitze: Clark’s telegram put forth a number of propositions which were not in the package.

Admiral Fechteler: This still is a departure from the package deal.

General Bradley: Clark’s proposals are also just a different way of spelling out our position on no forcible repatriation. But I would feel better with new language in the paragraph.

Mr. Nitze: I think the change that you have suggested makes sense.

General Bradley: We have another point. In the first sentence on page 5,¹⁰ where it says prisoners should be entitled to release and repatriation in accordance with provisions of the Geneva Convention, is our position on POW’s really in accordance with the Geneva Convention? The Commies have always been making the point that it isn’t.

Mr. Johnson: Well, we have rationalized our position in a way so that we can at least say that it is in accordance with the Geneva Convention. We say that POW’s have a right to release and repatriation under the Geneva Convention but they have no obligation to exercise that right and that the Geneva Convention doesn’t call for the use of force to make them exercise their right. But, admittedly, the position is a little fuzzy.

Mr. Nitze: I don’t think we have any reason why we couldn’t avoid the problem by just omitting language with reference to the Geneva Convention.¹¹

General Bradley: I had trouble with the next sentence where it says it should be presumed all POW’s decide to be repatriated. We have known damn well for eight months that they all don’t want to be repatriated. Can’t we say something different, maybe assumed, or something like that.

Mr. Allison: I don’t see why we can’t cut out that part of the sentence too.¹² It really isn’t necessary.

Colonel Matthews: This language is really just a sop to the Communists because it follows what Chou En-lai was supposed to have proposed. It really is just a play on words, and if the Commies agree to it, I don’t think it would cause us any trouble. But it is confusing and Chou En-lai’s proposal has, after all, been pretty much discredited.

Mr. Nitze: I have a different worry about this sentence. It says that exchange of POW’s should begin in accordance with provision of Article 3, which is paragraph 51 that we were talking about. But this makes no mention of lists of prisoners which is the only saving provision in paragraph 51.

General Bradley: We have given them a list of the 132,000 but this brings up still another point. Clark wants to turn loose the South Korean POW’s that he has.¹³ If we are going to make this proposal, shouldn’t we tell him to turn them loose right away. If the Commies agree to this proposal and the South Koreans haven’t been released, they will be a subject of further negotiations and we might have them on our hands indefinitely.

Mr. Johnson: There is one thing to consider. If we release the South Koreans now, we may make it difficult in the future to fuzz the question of the North Korean prisoners who don’t want to go back by claiming these North Koreans are really South Koreans.

General Hull: But if we make this proposal and they do accept, we are frozen on the South Koreans.

Mr. Nitze: We were concerned about the timing. According to Clark’s message, it would take 70 days to get the South Koreans released.

Colonel Matthews: That could be streamlined considerably even under Clark’s proposal. The actual time for releasing the South Koreans could be shortened to 25 days.

Mr. Johnson: But even 25 days would be too long. We were thinking of this proposal being made as soon as possible and preferably at one of the next two meetings.

General Hull: I should think that Clark could just announce that he was turning loose the whole gang, then do the screening afterwards.

Mr. Ferguson: Couldn’t Clark just say that he was continuing to screen out the civilians?

General Bradley: Another question I had was in paragraph 4, page 6,¹⁴ where it says prisoners who are not exchanged will be sent to places willing to receive them which may be agreed upon by both sides. I just don’t see how this will work. This really means you have to get four different people to agree on where they are going. We have to agree, the Commies have to agree, the country that they are going to has to agree, and after all the prisoners themselves have to agree.

Mr. Johnson: This is really just a backhanded way of saying that we won’t send them to Formosa.

General Bradley: We will have them on our hands forever.

Mr. Ferguson: This is essentially General Clark’s proposal.

General Bradley: I realize this is Clark’s proposal, but wouldn’t it be simpler just to say that we won’t send them to Formosa.

Mr. Allison: We might put it in the negative and say that they won’t be sent to any place to which either side objects.

Mr. Ferguson: The positive statement ties better into the Mexican proposal.¹⁵

Admiral Fechteler: Has the Mexican proposal actually been made, and if so what has the Communist reaction been?

Mr. Johnson: It has been made but it is still being kept confidential by Trygve Lie.

General Bradley: That was one question we had. Why not let the Mexicans make this proposal?

Mr. Johnson: The proposal that we are making here goes well beyond what the Mexicans are actually proposing.

General Bradley: What about Allison’s suggestion of putting the language into the negative.¹⁶

Colonel Matthews: It does make it very much clearer that you were saying you won’t send them to Formosa, and I should imagine that you might have some trouble with quite a few congressmen if you make it that clear.

General Bradley: I realize that we might be in some difficulty over it. I have another question. Top of page 7¹⁷ it says that further negotiations might be handled through discussion by the same delegations now discussing the armistice. I don’t see why we would have to have the same people talking. They wouldn’t get anywhere. I have some question as to whether this should even be discussed by the MAC.

Mr. Nitze: I think I am responsible for the suggestion that the question be discussed in the MAC. We thought that since the political conference wouldn’t be held for 90 days, we ought to have some forum where we could settle the issue right away if the Communists were ready to agree. I do agree though that Alternative A should be omitted.¹⁸

General Bradley: Another question we had was the last sentence paragraph 4 on page 7¹⁹ which calls for a recess of not more than three weeks if the Communists reject the proposal and for subsequent meetings at intervals of 2 to 3 weeks. We rather liked Clark’s position on this. In his telegram²⁰ he said that if the Communists reject the proposal it would be essential to demonstrate firmness in our position by unilaterally declaring a definite recess.

Mr. Nitze: I think we should look at this a little differently. If we had some alternative course of action that we wanted to pursue if the Communists reject our proposals, some new line of military action, then I think we would agree that the proposals should be put up on some kind of take it or leave it basis. But since we don’t have any alternative course of action that we really want to pursue and since the military situation will continue to be the same even if the Communists reject this proposal, it wouldn’t seem to us that we should not invite the pressures on us to do something different which might come out of calling off the talks. We would certainly be under pressure from our Allies, if the talks at Panmunjom are called off, to discuss Korea in what might prove to be more dangerous forums, such as the UN. It is difficult to keep from talking about things in the UN that other people want to talk about, and we can’t tell if the armistice question is transferred to the UN what pressures we would be under from our Allies or from people like the Indians to give up more of our position than we are willing to concede.

Mr. Johnson: The UN would probably try to set up a good offices committee, which would be difficult to handle.

General White: But doesn’t our willingness to meet them again, even after they have rejected our proposal, indicate to them that we are weak on our position.

Mr. Nitze: I don’t think that by this time they can have any doubt about the firmness of our position on forcible repatriation.

General White: To my mind this is a question of Oriental bargaining and anywhere in the Orient if you really want to make a purchase at your price you start walking out of the door after you have made your final offer. If the merchant wants to sell, he’ll run after you and grab you.

Mr. Allison: But if we did stop the talks, how long could we stay in that posture without doing something else.

General Hull: There isn’t anything else that we can do but we can at least make it clear that this is our final proposal by not going to meetings unless they have something to offer.

General Bradley: I think that sums up the questions we had on the telegram. I haven’t yet had reaction from Mr. Lovett since we just got this today.

Mr. Nitze: Let’s see if I can recapitulate your questions. First, how do we deal with articles 51 and 54 and second, the question of the Geneva Convention and the word “presume” and third, the Formosa problem and finally the question of indefinite recess or continued meetings.

General Bradley: On paragraphs 51 and 54 it seems to me that we might add a sentence to paragraph 7 on page 4 to the effect that on this question we would particularly like Clark’s views since after all he and his people have been closest to the actual working out of the armistice language.

Mr. Nitze: And we might add that if he thought the language in paragraphs 51 and 54 should be changed, we would hope that he would suggest language which would be desirable.²¹ There is a further question which you raised of releasing 16,000 South Koreans.

General Bradley: It seems to me this is purely a question of timing. If we are going to make this proposal, I should think it would be essential that Clark go ahead with releasing the South Koreans before we make the proposal.

Mr. Nitze: There might also be the question of the impact on the Communists of releasing the South Koreans and whether or not that would prejudice the possibilities of their accepting the President’s proposal.

General Hull: I don’t think that would have any effect on the Communists. It’s been clear all along that they weren’t interested in the South Koreans.

Mr. Allison: Why don’t we work out a draft telegram and see if it’s possible to get the South Koreans released in a short enough period of time.

General Bradley: Since this telegram is really just for the purpose of getting Clark’s views, I think we should get it out as quickly as possible. It really doesn’t involve any final decisions. I will have to check it with Mr. Lovett and the President.

[Here follows a brief discussion on preparations for military talks with Yugoslavia.]

1. A note on the title page read: “State draft. Not cleared with any of participants.” Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Hull. Nitze headed a five-man Department of State contingent and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. In all, 17 persons were present. With the exception of a brief discussion at the end of the meeting on military talks with Yugoslavia, the meeting dealt entirely with Korea.
2. The proposed telegram to Clark was drafted by Johnson on Sept. 4 and copies were circulated to the Secretary, Matthews, Nitze, Sandifer, Bonbright, Phillips, and Young as the basis for discussion with the Secretary; a copy of the draft, attached to a memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, is located in file 795.00/9–552. A slightly revised version was used as the basis for discussion at the State-JCS meeting of Sept. 8; a copy of the draft, attached to a memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, is located in file 795.00/9–552.
3. See the memorandum of the discussion at the State-JCS meeting of Sept. 2, p. 477.
4. See telegram C 54495, Clark to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 467.
5. The reference was to numbered paragraph 5, subparagraph d, part I of the draft attached to the memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).
6. Paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement read: “The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by a provision in an appropiate agreement for peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.” For a full text of the revised draft Armistice Agreement of Aug. 29, 1952, see UN document A/2228, Annex.
7. The reference was to numbered paragraph 7, part I of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).
8. Lt. Col. Jack B. Matthews was a member of G–3.
9. In the final text of the telegram to Clark, JCS 917910, Sept. 8, 1952, infra, Clark was asked to comment on whether he believed rewording of paragraphs 51 and 54 of the proposed armistice was necessary.
10. The reference was to numbered paragraph 1, subparagraph b (1) of part II of the draft attached to the memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).
11. In the telegram sent to Clark, infra, reference to the Geneva Convention was omitted.
12. In the telegram to Clark, the first part of the sentence, “It shall be presumed that all prisoners of war in the custody of each side desire to be repatriated,” was omitted.
13. Clark made this request in telegram CX 54177 to JCS, Aug. 25,p. 456.
14. The reference was to numbered paragraph 1, subparagraph b (4), part II in the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9552).
15. For the text of the Mexican proposal, see telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485.
16. In the telegram to Clark, infra, the language which General Bradley questioned was retained.
17. The reference was to paragraph 1, subparagraph b (5), part II of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).
18. In the telegram to Clark, infra, alternative (a), paragraph 1, subparagraph b (5), part II was not omitted.
19. The reference was to paragraph 3, part II of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).
20. The telegram under reference was C 54499, Clark to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 470.
21. This language was incorporated in the telegram to Clark; for its text, see infra.