FE files, lot 55 D 338
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Ambassador in Japan (Murphy)1
personal
Dear Bob: Your good letter of June 202 was brought to me by Colonel Larson Saturday night.3 It certainly jarred me to find that at this late date we still do not have a meeting of minds between myself and Tokyo, and also to find that we are against Rhee.
At this phase we are still governed by the Department’s 907,4 delivered to me there in Tokyo, a copy of which was passed to CINCUNC. You will recall that (2) thereof specified that we continue to look to Rhee for leadership and that our best interests would be served were Rhee to remain “under some controls and in a more chastened mood.” This decision was made at the top-level meeting we had in the Secretary’s office the day I left Washington. It was further discussed at the Pentagon later that day.
I arrived here on the afternoon of the 6th to find Rhee seething and fulminating against the United States and against the United Nations for having thwarted him.
When I saw Rhee, after making the points elaborated in the instruction, he asked me what I thought should be done. I told him that it was not up to the United States or the U.N. to tell him what to do, but that I felt that it was essential for the good of Korea’s present and future for the Koreans to get together and come up with some solution to the political turmoil that would be plausible and acceptable in the eyes of the American people and of the American Congress, and of the free world generally. I felt, I went on, that his proposed amendment and the proposal of the National Assembly (I left with him Stan Carter’s A.P. article) were such that they should be able to combine the two. Since then, he has told me time and again that he must have (1) direct election of the President, although he says that this could become effective after this election; and (2) a bicameral system. He further has told me repeatedly [Page 350] that he is prepared to accept the provision regarding the appointment of the P.M. and of the rest of the Cabinet. I saw the Prime Minister, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Assembly, and several other leaders, including the active head of the DNP. I emphasized in each case that the military situation was so critical and enemy capabilities so great that we could not afford the luxury of “politics as usual” and of the political turmoil that was going on. I again emphasized that it was not up to me, or any other foreigner, to indicate how to solve the impasse, but that to avoid the growing misunderstandings around the world, particularly in the United States and the United States Congress, it is essential for the Koreans to get together and work this thing out. All of these leaders indicated that they were prepared to work towards such a solution. In view of Rhee’s and the leaders’ reaction, I felt that it should be possible to arrive at a compromise. But jockeying is still going on.
Briefly, the situation here is that Rhee is more and more exhausted physically and mentally. A group that he himself dismissed in the spring of 1950 has been moving in on him. Many of the more sordid acts in the last few weeks have been by this sinister group, and I think it is essential for the United States somehow to make the “Princetonian” realize that this group is “taking him in”.
I am the last one to want the Military to get enmeshed in this situation. Rhee, however, has been left with the impression, or he has taken that guise upon himself, that General Clark and General Van Fleet don’t care what happens here so long as there is no upheaval. At one time he told UNCURK that Van Fleet had gone along with imposing martial law in Pusan. As regards the international ramifications of the alleged conspiracy, please see No. 4 of 907. The idea here was not to have our CIC work with ROK CIC and police. I certainly feel that this would lead to a mess. However, I think that if General Clark or General Van Fleet, or if their G–2’s, had made an approach to Rhee for data on the international ramifications of their conspiracy outside of Korea so that the resources of U.S./U.N. could be used to ferret them out, he might not be able to come up with anything, and this might help make Rhee less convinced that this is a clear-cut case. I know that Rhee himself has misgivings in this regard and has told me and Plimsoll that his whole record and reputation depend on this case. Anything that we can do to open Rhee’s eyes to the machinations of Lee Bum-suk, et al., would be helpful to us.
With Rhee in his present mood towards me and towards the United Nations Commission, I pressed for a good word from General Clark and/or General Van Fleet. This was the idea behind my 342 of June 16.5 My 349, of June 18,6 was motivated by my fear that the wrangling [Page 351] that is going on here may lead to open bloodshed at any moment. The ROKA has been out of it thus far, except for the Martial Law Commander General Won. But the sinister group has been using the police and the Youth Corps, with its numerous affiliated goon squads.
If we are forced to take action, we must have complete understanding of the mechanics between the Military and ourselves. I would be very glad to come over and talk to General Clark there. My suggestion for a meeting with General Clark on the 16th was made under the impression he was on the peninsula. However, any intervening that we might be forced to do should be done in the name of the UN—in other words, UNCURK must be brought into the picture.
I understand Big Jim7 is coming down tomorrow and I look forward to the opportunity of having a talk with him then.
I may be a bit of an ostrich, but I still feel that this thing should work out without blowing up in our face, but it is absolutely essential to have a meeting of minds all the way around in order to get the best end result.
Sincerely yours,