795.00/6–2852: Telegram
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)
operational immediate
JCS 911932. From JCS. Personal for Gen Clark further to JCS 910520.1 Folg from State fwdd for ur info. Circulation info in this msg shld be kept to minimum.
- “1. UK Emb has informed State of conversation held by Panikkar, Indian Amb to Peiping, with Chou En-lai, 15 June.2 While UK has received two reports of conversation, one from UK High Com, New Delhi, one from Indian High Com in London, they are generally in accord. It should be kept in mind, however, … and accounts made [Page 348] available to State are based entirely on Panikkar’s recollection his own conversation.
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2. According to report, Chou En-lai stated Chi People’s Govt (CPG) is willing to consider two alternative proposals for solution of POW question:
- a.
- CPG prefers round figure 20,000 Chi and 90,000 Koreans (or perhaps total of 100,000 provided 20,000 Chi included). Such a solution wld eliminate necessity discussing principle which is difficult agree upon.
- b.
- UNC wld accept in principle, all POWs on conclusion armistice cld return to their homes; those who elected otherwise cld be brought to Panmunjom, not under mil escort, and interviewed there by committee from neutral states agreed upon plus Red Cross from both sides. Chi and NK wld abide by views of POWs as expressed in these interviews. Chou wld discuss such a proposal if United States (presumably UNC) agreed that prima facie all POWs must be assumed to desire repatriation and only those who oppose, after being freed of mil influence and control of Kuomintang and Rhee agents, shld be interviewed by independent body.
(Other report of this conversation also includes in alternative ‘b’ that there must be agreement in principle of provisions of Geneva Conv, with proposed procedure described as being in implementation these provisions. Other report also contains no mention Red Cross, speaks of ‘neutral place’ instead of mentioning Panmunjom specifically as place for interviewing POWs not desiring repatriation, and speaks in terms recommendations by neutral comm instead of determination by comm POWs desires.)
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3. In conversation between State and UK Emb reptvs, State spokesman agreed that alternative ‘b’ has interesting possibilities and, if Commies desire armistice, might be reasonable basis for achieving it while saving face. State spokesman agreed that matter shld be followed up ‘cautiously but promptly.’ He added, however, that several points require clarification and elaboration and initial question is what is best way of getting it.
State agreed it wld be desirable to let India Govt determine best way of getting msg to Peiping and suggested text msg which might be put Chi Commies without stating origin but with indication is substance of United States reaction in which UK concurs. UK Emb spokesman suggested it might even be better if msg were represented as UK reaction in which United States concurred. State indicated this wld be agreeable. Text which UK Emb agreed to pass FornOff with recommendation it be transmitted India Govt foils:
‘Alternative proposal “b” which Chou En-lai is reported to have offered as possibility for breaking deadlock in armistice negots is interesting and wld seem to offer possibilities for progress. There are, however, number of points in regard to this proposal which require [Page 349] clarification and elaboration. It would be desirable to know what channel of machinery wld, in Chou En-lai’s view, be appropriate for such clarification and elaboration.’
- 4. Matter being handled with utmost secrecy and shld be handled similarly by you. You will be informed of further developments.”