Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 60 D 330, “Korean Internal Political Situation”

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] June 13, 1952.

Subject:

• General Approach and Possible Active Steps to Meet the Korean Internal Political Crisis.

The Korean internal situation gives the superficial appearance of simmering down since the President’s message to Rhee¹ caused him to hold off dissolving the National Assembly. However, there are no indications that any diplomatic or political representations have actually deflected Rhee and his followers from reaching their target of reducing the Assembly to impotence and gaining complete ascendancy over the Republic of Korea. On the contrary, there are disturbing signs that Rhee will win his struggle by devious means, despite our admonitions. His so-called compromise formula may not be a compromise at all, since it could serve to emasculate the Assembly. Rhee’s agents persist in going after the opposition by individual attrition. Lee Bum Suk is still striving to take over the ROK armed forces. Even so, these trends lack the surface sharpness of last week’s direct assault on the Assembly. With the situation temporarily blurred, while Rhee plays for time, it is more difficult, and perhaps too late, to take decisive steps. Nevertheless, the present stage may only be the calm before the storm. A chief executive must be elected within the next 60 days—that is unalterable. Anything can happen in that time. The crisis hangs on at the breaking point. We must prepare for any contingency. This memorandum discusses the various conflicting possibilities of a policy of aloofness versus a policy of intervention.

The Policy of Non-Intervention

Favorable Aspects

In terms of traditional United States policy and the desirability of not over-extending our commitments, the policy of non-intervention in the crisis has much to be said for it.

(1) It would avoid the inevitable involvement of American troops in an internal political affair in Asia, which the Koreans might openly resist, the Communists would intensively exploit, and other nations in Asia might severely criticize.

(2) A policy of aloofness would not implicate us on behalf of any particular Korean group or personality; it would leave the resolution of the crisis to the Koreans themselves in the hope that they will work out their own problems somehow. Rhee’s victory might actually stabilize the political situation for the next few months, at least superficially. In any event, there are limits beyond which Rhee cannot go in bending the Korean Government and its people to his purposes. He is limited on the military side by the threat of Communist aggression and his written and oral commitments to the United Nations Command not to interfere with the disposition of Korean armed forces. He must realize his long-run dependence on the influence and resources of the governments now supporting the Republic of Korea.

(3) Any policy of intervention may be impracticable in view of the military burdens which the United Nations Command is already carrying or threatened with.

(4) In the long run, this crisis may be merely one of a series that the United States will have to put up with. We should not attempt to settle each hyper-instability which occurs.

(5) Finally, we must not overlook the remote possibility that active intervention in internal Korean affairs would dovetail into any Communist design, to distract and disburse our available ground forces in the Far East Command by the threat of an imminent major offensive, riotous outbreaks of Communist prisoners of war on Koje-do, sabotage and organized violence in Japan, and exploitation of political dissension within the Republic of Korea.

Unfavorable Aspects

On the other hand, NA believes that the immediate and long-range dangers of taking no effective action greatly offset the advantages of this policy. NA believes that, if we let nature take its course in Korea, the United States will be in an exceedingly difficult situation.

Reactions inside South Korea. Unless the political crisis abates and some honest compromise is reached in the near future, success in Rhee’s efforts will permit the most corrupt, incompetent and unreliable coterie of Rhee’s politicians to seize power. Rhee will probably not be able to unsaddle Lee Bum Suk and the others, once they have full control over the main elements of power. This clique is not popular, will alienate important government circles, and has no ability to govern. Rhee’s political opposition will go underground where it will be, to an increasing extent, amenable to Communist exploitation because of Rhee’s personal dictatorship. Of even graver import will be the development of intense dissension within the armed forces and the efforts of President Rhee and Lee Bum Suk to weed out politically uncertain, but capable, generals, who would then be replaced by loyal, and in many cases, incompetent officers. Thus, Rhee’s victory, if we let him run his course, will create seething dissension and will probably lead to violent reaction by his opponents and governmental breakdown. The effects of such a stoppage or breakdown in supporting the United Nations Command behind the lines in Korea are only too obvious. For one thing, it might lead to the unfortunate need to establish military government over the Republic of Korea. Finally, the Rhee–Lee regime would give the Chinese Nationalist officials a good deal more influence on the peninsula of Korea than is now the case and perhaps more within the Republic of Korea than the United States itself would have in spite of its huge military resources protecting the Republic.

Communist Reactions. Another possible danger of the Korean internal crisis is the excuse it might give the pro-war faction among the Chinese and North Korean Communists to launch a major offensive now, in view of the armistice stalemate and the build-up of Communist air and ground strength—provided, of course, Moscow permits. A more immediate and probable Communist reaction would be stepped-up exploitation by the Communist underground of political tensions within South Korea. There is already some evidence from North Korea that the Korean Communists are beginning to pay increased attention to the South Korean internal situation. While Rhee’s allegations of a Communist conspiracy may have been chiefly for purposes of screening his own attempts to throttle his opposition, the political tensions within the Republic of Korea may be developing in orthodox pattern of Leninist theory: a so-called revolutionary situation, ripe for Communist takeover, is in the making with a “reactionary regime” supported by “imperialist powers” absolute control, the masses brow-beaten, the liberals impotent, frustrated and desperate. A policy of non-intervention would let this situation fester and ferment. The Communists would be the only benefactors.

International Effects. Whatever his proclaimed goals, the establishment of Rhee’s personal dictatorship by such high-handed tactics would do immediate and lasting injury to the United States position in the Far East, which is our primary objective to advance. It would reduce real support for the United Nations operation in Korea, a most serious calamity. Our reputation and prestige among important Japanese circles would drop, while relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan would become even more seriously strained. In most of the rest of Asia, the United States would again be tarred with Rhee’s brush, which in turn would detract from our moral and political position. The two most likely interpretations in Asia of Rhee’s success would both be uncomplimentary to the United States; either the United States tacitly supported Rhee’s seizure of complete power or the United States is incapable of coping with his defiance. In Europe, support for the United Nations operation and for the reconstruction of the Republic of Korea would diminish as a result of official and popular rejection of the Rhee regime.

Reactions on US Policies and Actions in Korea. US policy calls for the strengthening of Korean security forces as well as Korean political and economic institutions for the purpose of building increasing local strength to supplement the commitment of the US and its major allies. Every possible course of action in Korea includes a strong and stable Korean republic as a key element. A policy of aloofness would nullify this national policy.

Policy of Intervention. For all the above reasons the United States Government cannot permit political civil war in South Korea to jeopardize the collective effort to repel aggression or endanger military operations. Therefore, the United States Government and its principal Allies must take strong measures to end this crisis. Action or inaction will each have great effect on Korea. The degree of intervention will depend on the gravity of the situation at any given time.

I. “Cease and Desist” Measures.

For the immediate future every appropriate agency should continue to strengthen the efforts to date to hold Rhee and his followers back from making irrevocable steps that could only lead to bitter irreconcilable deadlock and disunity. We should capitalize on the effects of the President’s message, on the principal interested governments’ concern, on Ambassador Muccio meetings with Rhee, and on UNCURK. If these diplomatic representations do not influence Rhee to take satisfactory remedies, the United States Government should then use public media for adding pressure on Rhee. At the same time the US Embassy and UNCURK should work with both parties in this dispute to devise a compromise formula for an acceptable and workable reconciliation that will stabilize the political situation as soon as possible, without stifling the National Assembly as a “going concern.”

II. Pressure by Injunction and Sanctions.

If it appears that the above efforts are failing or if Rhee takes some drastic action against his opponents, the UN and US should indicate to Korean leaders on both sides through informal advice that (a) UNKRA will withhold its economic reconstruction projects pending return to legal and democratic processes; (b) Various governments concerned will hold up or reconsider their financial contributions to UNKRA; (c) The US Government may do nothing about payments under the Economic Coordination Agreement pending clarification of the situation; and (d) The United States Government might further indicate that it is in no position to consider additional military assistance or security arrangements with the Republic of Korea until political stability, acceptable to the United States, is restored. The threat of such sanctions could be coupled with the intimation that the United States Government would provide technical and administrative assistance, as well as economic and military aid to the Republic of Korea, once stability is returned.

Using the Economic Coordination Agreement as a sanction is a questionable tactic that could easily boomerang. After careful study of this problem, NA strongly feels that we should take no formal action to delay formation of the Board or repayment of the initial check of some $35,000,000.² Such action would constitute a breach of the agreement and exchange of notes. It might do more harm in the long run than any immediate benefits might justify. However, NA also believes that it would be prudent temporarily to delay payment and organization of the Board ostensibly for some administrative reasons, which actually do exist. The Koreans would get the point; it is the money they want, not the Board. There is no legal basis for indefinitely postponing formation of the Economic Coordination Board unless the Unified Command takes the contradictory position that the ROK Government with which the agreement was negotiated is no longer the Government of the ROK, which in fact has not changed in two weeks. Also, there is no legal ground on which payment can be withheld. In all events, handling of this delay should be done skillfully, because it might expose the United States to a charge of violating an international obligation; lead to a ROK counter-sanction by cutting off the won advances to the United Nations Command which would create a serious emergency for it; and delay in implementing the Meyer agreements would be more grist for the hyper-inflation now gutting Korea. However, Congress and United States public opinion certainly would not understand giving $35,000,000 to Rhee a few days after President Truman says he is shocked by Rhee’s actions.

III. The Exercise of Protective Surveillance under UNC Auspices.

If, despite all efforts to temper Rhee’s campaign against his opponents, he takes irrevocable acts to snuff out the duly-elected Assembly as well as other opponents, and the situation in and around Pusan endangers the MSR [MLR?], the United States Government, with the support of its principal Allies, would have to take active corrective measures. For the basis of such action we might consider irrevocable acts by Rhee to consist of any of the following: (a) additional arrests of Assemblymen; (b) dissolution of the National Assembly; (c) prevention of its normal functioning through intimidation, threat of assassination or absence of Rhee’s supporters from regularly held meetings; (d) organization of mass demonstrations in the Pusan area against the National Assembly; and (e) bi-elections to fill seats of Assemblymen under arrest or in hiding.

If Rhee refuses to make any move along the lines of reconciliation and continues his campaign against his opponents through high handed, illegal, and vicious tactics, we should instruct General Clark to support whatever actions are necessary to ensure the continued functioning of the Korean National Assembly and the safety of its members as well as the safety of President Rhee. In effect, we will have to act as an umpire to separate the two feuding parties so they do not tear the Government of the ROK apart. This would represent a grave decision for the United States to take. Only an advanced stage of a political crisis in Korea would justify it, such as a real jeopardy to the Pusan base area and the MSR. However, such a step would be necessary in order to protect the Command and maintain world support for the UNC mission against aggression.

In taking such steps, the auspices, conditions, and timing of such intervention would be terribly important. We must associate ourselves not only with UNCURK, but also with as many participating states as possible. Detailed consultations with at least the Commonwealth countries would be necessary. If they will not share the responsibility, we can hardly intervene. If at all possible, the administration of security in the Pusan area should be undertaken by reliable and well-trained Korean troops under Korean leadership with full support and endorsement of the Korean Chiefs of Staff, CINCUNC, and the Governments represented in his command. One method of surveillance might consist in the rotation of police units in the Pusan area. Another would be the use of ROK forces, now in training, as security patrols for the Pusan area, under the control of the Second Logistical Command, as General Lee,³ ROKA Chief of Staff has suggested. At least, the chain of command should be reestablished from the ROKA Chief of Staff to all military officials having anything to do with martial law in Korea.

As to the legal aspects of such actions, it would appear tentatively, on preliminary advice from L, that legality is not relevant if martial law or police powers are exercised for reasons of military necessity, that is force majeure. UNC martial law should be avoided; instead the action should be considered the exercise of police powers or security control.

Protective surveillance would be put into effect by a letter from Clark to Rhee on behalf of the United States, and by an order to General Lee and the Second Logistic Command. Extensive military and diplomatic preparations would be required.

IV. Political Rehabilitation of the Korean Government.

UNCURK and United States agencies should do everything possible at every stage in the Korean political crisis to encourage reconciliation among the opposing groups. To be worth anything, such reconciliation must start with unreserved respect for the constitutional framework of the Republic of Korea by all factions. The three most essential factors in any political rehabilitation are: the future status of President Rhee, the integrity of the National Assembly and the attitude of the Korean armed forces. If our policies in Korea are to mean anything, we must inevitably take a stand on each of those factors.

Rhee’s Future

Our policy should be to circumscribe Rhee’s position and eliminate the Lee–Yim–Yun trio.⁴ If a program of political action is practical, we should either endorse Rhee’s reelection after he has been politically sterilized or indicate support for some respectable alternative.

During the past six years, Rhee has eliminated many capable Korean leaders because of their opposition to him. His present terroristic raid on the National Assembly is merely the most high handed and dramatic episode in his obsessive drive to establish a personal machine which henceforth will stifle all opposition. It is hard not to conclude from his recent statements and actions that he is an incorrigible autocrat with little virtue or stature left to devote to the real welfare of his country, however redoubtable an anti-communist he is. By his obstinate assault on the legislature, he has deceived and maligned his friends who saved him from extinction. He is playing right into political bankruptcy and communist receivership.

The question of an alternative may be less important than the difficulty of finding an answer might imply. Let us recognize that there is now no national “brand” name to substitute for Rhee in the Republic of Korea. But let us also acknowledge that the need for a national figure, for another man with Rhee’s national standing, or for Rhee himself, is not overriding. The important thing for the United States is the development of a healthy, constructive, stable regime in the Republic of Korea that can hold its own—with some well-placed props—in the years ahead against communist subversion. In that sense, it is high time we started thinking about alternatives, since nature, if not politics, will inevitably force that decision on the Koreans themselves. Right now, any alternative to the Rhee–Lee regime would be much less objectionable to our interests. If most of the civil and military leaders want to make a fresh start under new management, they should be encouraged to do so.

There are difficulties in carrying out the above policy. The chief handicap is Rhee’s control of the police and the provincial political machinery. However, these he might lose if CINCUNC can find ways to gain operational control over the national police and ensure the authority of the Korean Army Chief of Staff over martial law, if a government of “national patriotic unity” can be formed, and if the armed forces, the press, and the intellectuals unite. Rhee’s grip would probably collapse if his henchmen were ousted from positions of control in the Government. Rhee’s popular backing seems to be synthetic. Most of the rural masses are apathetic. If this analysis is correct, as DRF tentatively indicates, the control of “political machinery” may be only an apparent asset. In any test of strength with a new regime, the control of the governmental apparatus will determine the outcome. Rhee would have difficulty in sabotaging or frustrating an energetic and more competent successor.

He continues to defy the United Nations and the United States. Our efforts to date have merely modified his methods, and perhaps delayed his timing. We must carefully scrutinize Rhee’s compromise plans. Any reconciliation that in effect cancels out his opposition will amount to a capitulation to Lee Bum Suk and his crowd. They will then be firmly in the saddle, with all that it unhappily implies for United States policies and prestige, particularly in the military field. They will move in to take over the Korean armed forces. United Nations support for the Republic of Korea will fade.

The National Assembly

Therefore, a program of political rehabilitation must begin with insistence on the integrity of the National Assembly because it has become the symbol of democratic processes and the rule of law in Korea. Admittedly, many of its members are incompetent and corrupt; some may be even subversive. The National Assembly probably has not handled its feud with Rhee too skillfully. It may not fully represent the “will of the people”. However, its liquidation will lead to all of the inimical consequences discussed above. We must not be too sensitive over the substance of representative, government in Korea in view of political realities there. However, the policies of the United States and the mission of the United Nations will be nullified if even the facade of representative government and due process of law are tramped on with impunity. These are the irreducible essentials for the United States and the United Nations in Korea. Their suspension is sheer mockery of a real effort at collective security.

Furthermore, the Assembly may die of attrition if it is not effectively defended on grounds of basic principles. The other nations of the world will be watching to see what happens. The United States and the UN must insist on the release of the Assemblymen and the guarantee of the Assembly’s constitutional integrity as a condition for any compromise with Rhee.

The ROK Armed Forces

It is equally essential that Rhee and his followers not be allowed to infiltrate the ROK armed forces at any level with their stooges or incompetents. CINCUNC and the Ambassador must insist that Rhee leave these forces alone. As a recent G–2 summary has indicated, the leaders of the ROK armed forces appear to be solidly against Rhee’s tactics. This is the most important asset we have in this crisis. Whatever political settlements are made, they should bear the endorsement of Korean military leaders. At the same time we should take care not to stimulate involvement of the ROK armed forces in politics, after General Van Fleet and KMAG have put so much successful effort into taking them out of politics.

In any event, if Rhee should rescind his letter of July [15] 1950⁵ putting all ROK forces under UN operational control, we would be forced to intervene out of military necessity. Such an attempt on Rhee’s part would constitute irrevocable, intolerable defiance of the UN, even though he is commander-in-chief of Korean forces. It is probable that Korean military leaders would ignore such an act and remain loyal to the UNC. Its threat to Korea’s long term interest might serve as a pivotal rallying point for civilian and military leaders.

Constitutional Amendments

In theory there is merit in President Rhee’s desire for a reformed governmental structure to make it more responsive to the views of the Korean people. A combination of various constitutional amendments might strengthen and stabilize the governmental process in Korea. The difficulty is not in drafting the terms of such an amendment, but in settling the underlying political issue: Is Rhee to remain in power or not? Until the Koreans resolve this dilemma, constitutional compromise is somewhat academic.

A Political Program

In summary, the United States, in its own interest, should encourage Korean efforts to (1) remove Lee Bum Suk and General Won, (2) install a competent Defense Minister, (3) reestablish an unbroken chain of command from CINCUNC through the ROK Chief of Staff to all military and police units, (4) develop a united cabinet and a national patriotic coalition for the duration of the war, and (5) formulate sound constitutional reforms to take effect after August 15, 1952. The United States should give full backing to such a program and be prepared to extend assistance of many kinds to an ROK government comprised of the above elements. The United States should support Rhee only if the above items are put into effect with his full cooperation. At some point he might conceivably reach out for a constructive program to save him from utter frustration and defeat at the end of his career. If such a program fails, Rhee continues his defiance, and disturbed conditions threaten the Pusan base area, the United States will have to resort to the ultimate measure of military government unless the situation becomes so chaotic with Koreans actually fighting themselves and UN forces that the UNC can not fulfill its mission. Although such a project is unlikely, and the establishment of a military government extremely distasteful, the Departments of State and Defense should continue to consult informally on tentative plans for UNC martial rule and interim government administered by Korean agencies to the greatest extent possible.

Conclusion

The justification for intervention rests on the intimate and unusual relationship among the United States, Republic of Korea and the United Nations since V–J day. This association has become so interlocked that we cannot disclaim all responsibility for the past or the future of the ROK. We are involved in whatever happens there. We would even be implicated in the establishment of a personal dictatorship, even though we might strongly disapprove of it.

1. Dated June 2, p. 285.
2. By the terms of the Economic Coordination Agreement, a result of the Meyer Mission’s negotiation with the ROK, the UNC agreed to settle all won advances made between Jan. 1 and May 31, 1952 at the existing conversion rate of 6,000 won to the dollar; for a summary of the agreement, see p. 238.
3. No record of General Lee’s suggestion has been found. In a meeting with President Rhee and Van Fleet on May 28, Lee made it clear to Rhee that he was opposed to use of the ROK Army for political purposes. Lee fully expected to be fired and perhaps even imprisoned for his opposition, and Rhee was prepared to replace him, but Van Fleet successfully insisted that such a move would be “absolutely unacceptable” to the United States (telegram 1178 from Pusan, May 28, 1952; 795B.00/5–2852).
4. The trio referred to was made up of Lee Bum Suk (Yi Pom Suk); presumably Louise Yim (Im Myong Shin), former ROK Cabinet minister; and Yun Kyong (Yun Ch’iyong).
5. On July 15, 1950, President Rhee assigned to General MacArthur command of the ROK armed forces. (UN document S/1627)