795.00/6–1352

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)1

secret

Subject:

  • Continuing Political Crisis in Korea

We continue to be concerned about developments in Pusan. President Rhee, instead of being chastened by protests and démarches, persists in his disregard for the ROK constitution and democratic processes, for world opinion and for the views of the United States and the United Nations. He has, in effect, rejected President Truman’s protest of the other day.2 He has proceeded to make clear publicly that he will dissolve the Assembly in the very near future unless the Assembly capitulates to him. Instead of calling off the demonstrations in Pusan he has issued a statement which, in effect, invites the demonstrators, cautioning them only to wait for his signal.

Ambassador Muccio’s report on his conversation with President Rhee upon the Ambassador’s return to Korea reveals no basis for optimism that President Rhee will be deflected from his present course. It is little encouragement that Ambassador Muccio believes that President Rhee will probably not dissolve the Assembly for a few days.

We are convinced that the interests of the United States and of the United Nations require that Rhee be prevented from achieving his goal in violation of the ROK constitution and of democratic processes. The United States was the prime mover in bringing constitutional democracy to Korea. We brought the Korean problem into the United Nations and made Korea, in effect, a ward of the United Nations. When aggression came, we called for United Nations action and have made great sacrifices to safeguard the Republic of Korea. Our association with the ROK is such that whether we take effective action or refrain from [Page 327] taking action we will not escape a major share of the responsibility for what happens.

Already the governments and peoples of United Nations Members participating in the Korean action, many of whom have been highly suspicious of President Rhee, are asking whether it is this for which they have been sacrificing. The American people are raising the same question—including those whose sons have fought in Korea. If Rhee succeeds the United States will be constantly embarrassed in the future by the character of Rhee’s conduct, and the Communists will have a rich source of material for attacking the United States and the free world generally. The blot on the record of the United Nations action in Korea will affect any future attempt to obtain United Nations action to resist aggression. It will also impair the position of the free world as an exponent of democratic government, particularly in Japan.

Within the United Nations we will have the following: a very damaging UNCURK report; continuing Communist propaganda attacks; pressure in certain countries to withdraw forces from Korea, and certainly to prevent the contribution of any further forces; increased difficulty in obtaining contributions for UNCURK; greater reluctance, in case there is no armistice, for obtaining additional measures such as a United Nations embargo or blockade; lack of support for the Rhee Government in any plan for a unified Korea after an armistice; and little support for ROK membership in the United Nations.

If the present crisis is to be resolved in a manner consistent with US–UN interests, as well as of the Korean people, the first, essential and immediate step must be the restoration of constitutional government. A “Compromise”, forced on an unwilling Assembly through martial law and threats to the persons of the Assemblymen, would be essentially capitulation to Rhee and a blow to US–UN interests and prestige in Korea. Only after constitutional government has been restored should steps be taken, in accordance with Ambassador Muccio’s present instructions, to get the factions together, with the aid of the United States and of UNCURK, to seek an arrangement which would assure stability as well as democratic government in Korea.

We therefore urge that:

1.
Supplementary instructions should be sent to Ambassador Muccio instructing him to call upon President Rhee immediately to lift martial law, to release members of the Assembly and to restore constitutional government. Ambassador Muccio should state that if President Rhee fails to do so, a grave situation would arise which, in the view of the United States Government, would endanger the United Nations action in Korea and would have to be dealt with accordingly.
2.
If Rhee complies and democratic processes are restored and the Assembly allowed to meet freely without fear, Ambassador Muccio should, in cooperation with UNCURK, continue efforts to bring about a compromise solution consistent with the principles of representative [Page 328] government and with the interests of the Korean people, of the United States and of the United Nations.
3.
We should discuss with other participating nations and with UNCURK the steps which might be taken if Rhee refuses to restore constitutional government, proceeds with further arrests of the Assembly, and presses ahead with his plans to dissolve the Assembly. If UNCURK and the other participating nations approve such a course, we should, as a last resort to prevent Rhee from gaining his ends, instruct General Clark to assume responsibility for the situation in Pusan, and through use of Korean forces under Korean command, to take over martial law in the Pusan area and assure the continued safety and effective operation of the National Assembly. Such action should be designed to create conditions which would allow a fair compromise between the opposing factions.

  1. This memorandum was also addressed to Allison, Johnson, and Nitze.
  2. Hickerson is presumably referring to Rhee’s reply, June 5, p. 316, to Truman’s letter of June 2, p. 285.