FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 31: Telegram
The Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) 1
HNC 1255. 1. a. On the assumption that our assigned objective remains to obtain an armistice at the earliest possible date, it is the unanimous conviction of the delegation that we could not make a worse tactical error than to continue daily plenary sessions.
b. We are constrained to go on record as saying that in our judgment and in the light of months of personal experience in dealing with the Communists, our inability to accept the Communists challenge to suspend negotiations has convinced them that our psn is not in fact firm. We believe that by far the strongest move we can make is to emphasize the finality of our stand by recessing the plenary sessions until the enemy is ready to accept our proposal of 28 April. It is obvious that Communists will not accept the prisoner of war situation unless they want an armistice badly, and the mere fact that they would have to so indicate by calling a plenary session would not in our opinion be controlling. On the other hand, daily meetings subject the UNC and the nations it represents to a stream of vituperation and abuse which, although unfounded, leaves the delegation with the only alternative of becoming mired in a propaganda morass which the JCS in their 9073782 indicate a desire to avoid. The stand of the UNC has been firmly and fully stated and is well known to the free world. It can be reinforced but little by repetition. In contrast, the Communists, unhampered by any considerations of truth or scruples, have every advantage in the propaganda exchange and will exploit it to the utmost. The KojeDo situation has played directly into their hands and gives them a plausible basis on which to build propaganda which, however false, will by sheer force of repetition work to the eventual detriment of the UNC position.
c. In summary, we believe that only by the display of determined strength can the situation be salvaged; and that the strongest act we can perform now is to proceed as recommended in HNC 1236.3
2. This is being forwarded in advance of our meeting at Eighth Army, 20 May as Harrison and I wish to discuss this subject with you.
- This telegram, which was sent to the JCS for their information, was Joy’s last comment as Senior UNC Delegate; he was succeeded by Harrison effective May 23, 1952.↩
- Dated Apr. 27, p. 178. A marginal notation by Young at approximately this point read as follows: “How complete is his understanding of situation and inability to handle it propaganda-wise [?]”↩
- Dated May 12, p. 193.↩