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  4. Document 126

795.00/5–3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief Far East (Clark) 1

top secret
operational immediate
Washington , May 19, 1952—6:04 p.m.

JCS 909231. From JCS. Reur CX 686422 and JCS 909111.3

1.
We concur in need for breaking tight control Communists have over POWs on Koje and appreciate difficulties of carrying this out. We consider your plan to be sound though it is not possible from this distance to gauge its details. You are authorized to proceed as you deem essential.
2.
In view definite possibility violence stemming from actions contemplated, we consider it essential that we maintain solid support of domestic and international opinion. Accordingly, your views are requested on folg:
A.
Degree participation by ICRC, if any.
B.
Handling news media.
C.
Feasibility of “internationalizing” POW guard detachment on Koje by employing reptv proportion UN Forces along with United States in this capacity. Having forces from other UN countries share this responsibility has definite polit advantages; however, we recognize that practical considerations in field may be overriding.
3.
We note with appvl your careful and thorough approach to this delicate problem. It would be helpful if you continue keep us fully informed of progress of program.
  1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.↩
  2. In the telegram under reference, dated May 17, Clark submitted for concurrence Van Fleet’s plans for establishing and maintaining uncontested control of all prisoners in South Korea by their dispersal to new enclosures on Koje-do and Cheju-do Islands as well as the South Korean mainland, if necessary. Also included were interim measures to prevent further outbreaks prior to the implementation of the plan (795.00/5–3152).↩
  3. In the telegram under reference, dated May 17, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan for dispersal of the POWs for planning purposes, while it assessed the full implications of the scheme (795.00/5–3152).↩