Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)

top secret
flash

Tokyo, April 27, 1952—5:17 p.m.

C 67640. Reference JCS 907347¹ and CINCFE CX 67619.²

1. The following are the comments of the UNC delegation on JCS 907347.

• “A. This proposal appears to be based on JCS 906923.³ Since the dispatch of this JCS message the negotiatory situation has been fundamentally altered by the enemy’s unilateral abrogation of the executive sessions on agenda item 4. By this action Communists indicated their intention to try the POW case in open forum before world public opinion. Any attempt now to avoid meeting the enemy in their chosen forum prejudices negotiating position of the UNC.
• “B. A proposal of inter executive session is wholly inconsistent with our objective which is to avoid substantive discussion of the package proposal elements. It is implicit in the idea of executive sessions that full and free discussion will be encouraged, in fact is the very purpose of executive session, which invites fullest exchange of points of view.
• “C. To present the package in an executive session proposed by the UNC tends to indicate we are fearful of public reaction to it in its present form. The enemy would be justified in drawing the inference that the package did not in fact represent our ‘final’ position, and that further concessions by the UNC might be expected.
• “D. All separate elements of the package proposal have been fully publicized individually particularly the POW question, which the enemy has thrown before the world. The nature of the compromise proposed in our package has unfortunately been repeatedly suggested in the press.
• “E. To cover in a cloak of secrecy the equitable solution offered in our package deprives us of the public support induced by its fairness and by the fact the UNC has made a major concession in a sincere effort to reach an armistice. Secrecy of our offer invites speculation by press of free world that UNC may be abandoning its actual POW position, a position which has been strongly supported by US press. Ultimate disclosure of unchanged UNC position in this regard may not correct lack of public support at time it is most needed.
• “F. There is now no particular inducement to the enemy implicit in the executive session, since their acceptance of the package would immediately result in an armistice, with attendant full publicity of the agreement reached.
• “G. There is no guarantee that the enemy would agree to executive session. Yet regardless of whether the enemy accepts or rejects the executive session, the mere proposal of it by the UNC weakens our position.”

2. I concur, but far more than that, I feel the action I am urged to take for the stated purpose of developing the Communist reaction to an approach already rendered meaningless and sterile thru the swift sequence of events since the idea of that approach was first suggested, would gravely prejudice such chances as exist for the successful accomplishment of our mission. All our actions had been carefully planned, coordinated and approved with the clear recognition that each was an essential link in one strong chain connecting our principles with our package proposal. To me delay or hesitation at this stage would expose us to grave loss of confidence by our friends and ridicule by our foes.

3. I therefore urge with all earnestness that you at once grant me full authority to proceed with action as planned, reported and approved prior to receipt of your 907347.

1. JCS 907347, dated Apr. 26, was drafted in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army, at the request of U. Alexis Johnson; transmitted to CINCFE after clearance in the offices of the military service chiefs by Bolte. In it, the JCS advised Ridgway that “belief here is that exec sessions would offer most fav atmosphere for introduction of package proposal. Unless proposal for exec session is clearly rejected by Communists prior to holding of plenary session, we urge that proposal for exec sessions be made at opening of plenary.” (795.00/4–352)

2. This telegram, addressed to Bradley, and sent early in the morning, local time, of Apr. 27 (270210Z April 1952), was Ridgway’s urgent response to JCS 907347. It read:

   • “1. Was deeply concerned over the possible consequences of last minute basic change in our planned course of action, occasioned by JCS 907347. Since I could only interpret last sentence as a directive, and since upon its receipt I had less than two hours to act, following its receipt, I dispatched my CX 67613 [not printed] to UNC Del at once by flash msg, info to you.
   • “2. One hour later, at urgent telephonic request of Adm. Joy, and prior to departure of delegation for Panmunjom, I authorized Joy to request immediately a postponement of today’s plenary session, in order that UNC Del views of what it considers to be the potentially serious consequences of this change of action planned for today, might receive full consideration.
   • “3. Immediately following my receipt of delegation views I shall, I believe, wish to submit recommendations to you as a matter of great urgency.
   • “4. The purpose of this msg is to express the hope that such recommendations can receive immediate action and I be informed ASAP thereafter.” (795.00/4–352)

3. Dated Apr. 22, p. 166.