795.00/4–352: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
priority
C 67603. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 1190.
“There follows the opening statement which I intend to make in presenting the package proposal in plenary session. This statement is substantially as approved by you, except for major additions (fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs) made essential by recent events in item 4 staff officers’ meetings.
“For more than 9 months our 2 delegations have been negotiating for an armistice which will bring a cessation to hostilities in Korea. We have progressed to the point where only 3 issues remain between us and final agreement on an armistice. These three issues concern first, whether there will or will not be restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields; second, the basis of exchange of prisoners [Page 174] of war; and third, the nations to compose the neutral nations supervisory commission.
“As for the first issue, for many weeks the United Nations Command delegation has stated that in order to maintain the stability of the armistice and prevent the creation of tension which might lead to a resumption of hostilities it is highly desirable that restrictions be placed on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. Your side has opposed this limitation on what would be a manifest increase of offensive potentiality upon the ground that it would constitute interference by one side in the internal affairs of the other. Yet, if your side is moving in good faith toward an armistice, you should have no hesitation in agreeing not to build up your military air potential.
“As for the second issue I have referred to, for many weeks the UNC delegation has stated that all POWs must be released but that only those should be repatriated or turned over to the other side who can be delivered without the application of force. Your side has opposed this principle and has, instead, insisted that certain POWs must be repatriated even if physical force is necessary, asserting that to accord respect to the feelings of the individual prisoner is unprecedented and deprives a prisoner of war of his rights. Your current attitude on this question is inconsistent with the historical facts that during the Korean war your side has followed the practice of inducting captured personnel into your armed forces, and that you have in this and other ways disposed of approximately ⅘ of the military personnel of our side who fell into your custody.
“The UNC holds as POWs some 116,000 North Koreans and Chinese People’s Volunteers. 59,000, or more than 50 percent of this number held by our side will return to your side without being forced. In addition, some 11,000 citizens of the Republic of Korea, now in our custody, have elected to go to your side under the principle of free choice. This is in marked contrast to the 12,000 captured personnel of our side whom you have stated you will repatriate, a figure which is less than 20 percent of those you have admitted having taken into custody.
“The foregoing figures are now a basic factor in the prisoner of war question. It was with the full concurrence of your side that the POWs in our custody were screened to determine their attitude as regards repatriation. Once screened, POWs had to be segregated in accordance with their individual determination. No action can now be taken by either side to alter materially this situation. It is an accomplished fact. For you to pretend otherwise would be completely unrealistic.
“Moreover our side has indicated our willingness to send to your side any prisoners of war who may change their views on repatriation between the time of the initial determination and the completion of the exchange of POWs. We have also informed you that, if you wish, you may verify the results of our screening processes after the armistice is [Page 175] signed. Your side can at that time interview those persons held by the UNC who have indicated that they would violently oppose being returned to your side. If any indicate that they are not still so opposed, the UNC will return them promptly to your side.
“Lastly, in regard to the third issue, although both sides agreed to nominate mutually acceptable nations to compose the neutral nations supervisory commission, you have continued to insist on membership for a nation which the UNC will not accept.
“The issues are clearly drawn. The discussions of the past several months have clearly defined the differences on the issues, but such discussions have failed to develop any common ground for resolving these differences. Within the limit of these discussions each side has indicated that its position is firm and unshakeable. We believe that because of the strong views already set forth by both sides in the respective meetings, we will only prolong the stalemate on each of the three differences if we attempt to discuss them further or to settle them separately. Therefore, we believe it absolutely essential that the three remaining issues be settled together. It is evident that if both sides remain adamant in their present position on the three issues, these negotiations will be deadlocked indefinitely. If an armistice agreement is to result from our efforts here, if we are to bring about the long-awaited cessation of hostilities in Korea, if we are to build the bridge which is to lead to a solution of the Korean problem, the three issues must be resolved at the earliest practicable date. There are two ways to accomplish this objective: Either one side could concede on all issues, or each side could accede to the position taken by the other side on some of the remaining issues. The only alternative to the foregoing is for these delegations to admit that they have failed to accomplish their mission.
“I state categorically that the United Nations Command will not accede to your demands on all matters at issue. I assume that you would make a similar statement on behalf of your delegation. It is clear, then, that unless you are willing to accept the entire responsibility for the failure of these negotiations, you must join us in seeking a compromise solution which both sides may accept in the interest of reaching an early agreement on an armistice.
“The United Nations Command has carefully reviewed the positions taken by both sides on the three issues. It remains our conviction that the stability of an armistice would be increased by restricting rehabilitation and reconstruction of military airfields. We are fully aware that you consider that any such restriction constitutes interference in your internal affairs. We utterly disagree with your contention in this regard, since this is a military armistice, designed to freeze the military situation in status quo pending a final peaceful settlement. However, in the interest of reaching an early armistice agreement, we are willing to accede [Page 176] to your stand that no restriction be placed on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields.
“I must make it absolutely clear however, that our acceptance of your position regarding airfields is contingent upon your acceptance of our positions regarding prisoners of war and the composition of the neutral nations supervisory commission. As you know, our position regarding prisoners of war is the exchange of 12,100 prisoners of war of our side for approximately 70,000 of your side. You also know that our position regarding the neutral nations supervisory commission is that this commission shall be composed of representatives from the four neutral nations which are acceptable to both sides.
“The United Nations Command delegation submits a draft wording for the entire armistice agreement.1 This draft wording incorporates all the agreements hitherto reached on agenda items 2, 3, 4, and 5. It omits any restriction on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. It provides a specific agreement on the nations composing the neutral nations supervisory commission. Lastly, it provides a practical and realistic basis for the exchange of prisoners of war.
“We formally proposed that this draft armistice wording be approved in toto by our delegations and that the liaison officers be directed to prepare the formal armistice agreement for signature by our respective commanders. Our liaison officers will be prepared to discuss details concerning minor changes in wording and necessary administrative matters.
“The United Nations Command has now made its final offer in an effort to reach an armistice. The UNC delegation desires to make it unmistakably clear to you that we will not agree to any substantive change in this proposal, and that we are absolutely firm that this proposal must be considered as a whole. The fate of this armistice conference, and future peace in Korea, now rest fully and exclusively with you. Signed Joy.”
- Not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 76a).↩