Office of the Historian

793.5/12–1354

No. 441
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wainhouse) and the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] December 13, 1954.

Subject:

  • Report of Tripartite Working Group on Operation Oracle2

Attached is the agreed “working paper” of the Tripartite Working Group set up to recommend timing and procedures for Operation Oracle. The Working Group was not instructed to consider the advisability of proceeding with Operation Oracle, and no recommendation to proceed is implied in the report. The paper is designed solely to cover the contingency of a decision to undertake the operation.

The working paper in view of the publication of the Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China provides for a revised “Agreed Minute”3 which would remove some of the tight restrictions of the earlier “Agreed Minute” on discussion of China issues in the course of debate on the New Zealand Resolution in the Security Council. The publication of the Treaty probably makes more likely a heated Communist reaction in the Security Council. It was considered that it would be both difficult and inadvisable to fail to meet false Charges and misrepresentations in the course of the debate.

The draft Resolution is amended to mention the “area of the Tachens” as well as the “area of Quemoy”.

It was recognized that it would be undesirable to proceed with the operation during any period when Secretary General Hammarskjold might be negotiating in Peiping. India and Pakistan would [Page 1024] be notified by the UK before the operation begins, and it was agreed that it seemed desirable to notify the Soviets and perhaps the Chinese Communists, shortly before the first public steps are taken. The various notifications in New York should take place on the same day and should be followed by the filing of the letter to the President of the Security Council and simultaneous press statements issued in New York, London, Washington, and Wellington, later on that day. Advance agreement among the three Governments as to the content of their press statements is recommended.

It was agreed that the three Governments’ UN Delegations in New York should have a voice in determining both the technique of inviting a Chinese Communist representative to New York, and the timing of the introduction of the Resolution.

Certain contingencies are pointed out which are believed to deserve attention from a policy standpoint before a final decision is made on the launching and timing of the operation. These include: 1) Refusal of the Chinese Communists to come before the UN; 2) Possible adverse effect on the issue of the 11 imprisoned U.S. airmen; 3) A Communist attack on the off-shore islands while the item is before the Security Council; and 4) Failure of Operation Oracle and a Chinese Communist attack thereafter on the off-shore islands. It was agreed that in the last named event there would be substantial pressure for General Assembly action under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.4

  1. A handwritten notation by O’Connor on the source text states that it was noted by the Secretary.↩
  2. The attached paper, headed “Possible Action by the United Nations Security Council in Respect of the Situation of the Chinese Off-shore Islands (Working Paper prepared in Washington by officials of the Governments of New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States)” and dated Dec. 11, is not printed.↩
  3. The revised draft, incorporated in the working paper, stated that the three Governments would, unless they agreed otherwise, make every effort to prevent any amendment of substance to the draft resolution and, during the UN discussion of it, to prevent enlargment of the discussion to include the questions of Chinese representation in the United Nations and the respective claims of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China to domestic sovereignty and international status; they would be at liberty, however, to make it clear that if the hostilities in the offshore islands could be terminated, it would increase the possibility of peaceful adjustment of the other problems of the area.↩
  4. UN Resolution 377 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950.↩