Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.5 MSP/12–1354

No. 440
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)¹

secret

[Washington,] December 13, 1954.

Subject:

• “Hsieh Plan”

Participants:

• Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
• Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
• Dr. Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. McConaughy, Director—CA

Dr. Yeh asked if Mr. Robertson had seen the recent Chinese note² regarding the Hsieh Plan and the request for additional naval vessels?

Mr. Robertson said he had seen the note, which had just been acknowledged. The requests had been transmitted to the Department of Defense and to FOA, which had primary responsibility in those fields, and they were receiving careful study.

Dr. Yeh said that his Government wished to obtain U.S. assurances of logistic support for the defense of the off-shore islands. He had instructions from the Generalissimo to seek an understanding on this point. The Chinese Government felt that a request for a firm understanding as to logistic support for forces defending the off-shore islands was reasonable, since it was directly related to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. Robertson said that this question was getting into the military sphere, where he tried to avoid encroachment.

Dr. Yeh said that the Chinese Armed Forces were already getting logistic support for defense of the off-shore islands.

Mr. Robertson said he was aware of this. Hence he wondered why the Foreign Minister wished to raise the question. If the present arrangement was satisfactory, he felt it was psychologically a mistake to raise a question about it.

Dr. Yeh said the Generalissimo would like a more explicit understanding. He would like an agreement in principle that such logistic support as was required would be forthcoming.

Mr. Robertson said he felt that the support of troops on the offshore islands was an integral part of the overall program. There was no technical differentiation between support of the forces on the off-shore islands and support of the forces on Formosa.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that legally there was some question in this respect. The MAAG Agreement of 1951³ contained the rather peculiar phrase “for the legitimate defense of Formosa and the Pescadores”. Neither Amb. Rankin nor the Chinese Foreign Office knew exactly what “legitimate” was supposed to mean in this context, nor had anyone been able to explain it satisfactorily. He assumed it was a mere euphemism inserted because it made the sentence sound better. However it had caused some difficulty with MAAG. MAAG officers in the past held up some shipments of military equipment and supplies to the off-shore islands on the grounds that “the Agreement did not allow it”. The difficulty had been at least partially resolved after talks with Admiral Radford and Amb. Rankin. MAAG was now more sympathetic and was inclined to relax the restrictions. But the matter was arguable under the MDAP language.

Mr. Robertson said he would transmit the request for a clearer understanding as to logistic support of forces on the off-shore islands to Defense, if the Foreign Minister asked it. But personally he questioned the advisability of doing it. There is a mutuality of interest following signature of the treaty which should insure satisfactory resolution of questions such as this without resort to formal written agreements.

Amb. Koo said that the Chinese Embassy would probably send Mr. Robertson a letter suggesting that the matter be taken up locally with the Pentagon.

Mr. Robertson said he doubted the wisdom of raising up straw men to be knocked down. We have just concluded a very successful Treaty negotiation. The Communist reaction to the Treaty has been vitriolic. This is good evidence that the Treaty is serving an effective purpose. It is not wise to create hypothetical problems which in practice do not exist.

Dr. Yeh asked if he could be assured that the “Hsieh Plan” would be carefully considered?

Mr. Robertson replied that it would.

1. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.
2. See footnote 1, Document 395.
3. Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement effected by an exchange of notes at Taipei on Jan. 30 and Feb. 9, 1951; for the text, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1499; TIAS 2293.