Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

794A.5 MSP/11–1654

No. 394
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)¹

top secret
limited distribution

[Washington,] November 16, 1954—2:30 p.m.

Subject:

• Mutual Defense Treaty—6th Meeting

Participants:

• Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
• Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
• Dr. Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. McConaughy, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Robertson welcomed Foreign Minister Yeh back from Spain. He said he thought some progress had been made with Ambassador Koo in the Foreign Minister’s absence. He hoped that we could quickly clarify any remaining points at issue and proceed rapidly to a conclusion of the negotiations. He thought that the latest draft exchange of notes, which we had delivered to the Chinese Embassy on November 14,² would serve the purpose of keeping the Communists in the dark as to the scope of our commitment, while providing for the necessary joint agreement between the two parties.

Dr. Yeh said he feared that not much progress had been made. That was his feeling after going over the situation with Ambassador Koo upon his arrival the preceding evening. He said that his Government would want any reference to disposition of forces omitted from the exchange of notes. A difficult problem had been created for the Chinese Government when the U.S. had suddenly brought up the matter of a protocol, after presumably full preliminary agreement had already been reached on the text of the Treaty.

Mr. Robertson said that the issue of joint agreement was not new. It had been basic to every discussion of a Treaty. The need for a provision along this line had been recognized by the Generalissimo when Secretary Dulles was in Formosa in September. It had been recognized again by the Generalissimo when he (Mr. Robertson) was in Formosa in October. There never had been any disagreement on this score. The existing understanding about obtaining U.S. concurrence for offensive action is informal. There is a need to make the arrangement formal and official.

Dr. Yeh said that; he felt the same ground was covered elsewhere. It had long been informally understood that there would be no large scale military action without U.S. agreement. But a restriction on the disposition of Chinese forces within Chinese held territory went beyond any existing commitment. The Chinese Government did not object to a provision for joint agreement as to use of force. But the restriction on the disposition of forces introduced an entirely new element. The Chinese Government considered it uncalled for. The U.S. had sufficient control through the provision for joint agreement on use of force. The U.S. should be satisfied with these explicit assurances. He could not see the need for introducing an “extraneous element” now. If the U.S. had brought up this point earlier in the negotiations, before preliminary agreement had been reached on the language of the treaty, the problem could have been handled with less difficulty and more expeditiously. Apparently the Secretary had thought of this point after the initial negotiations had been finished. This was unfortunate, but it was nobody’s fault. In any event, was it not a fact that U.S. requirements were well covered by the restrictions elsewhere on the use of force by the Chinese Government without U.S. agreement? The limitations on the disposition of Chinese forces would get the U.S. involved in undesirable details of routine Chinese troop orders. Under the terms of the U.S. draft, the Chinese Government could not send five soldiers to Quemoy as replacements without joint governmental approval. He thought Mr. Robertson would appreciate that no Chief of State would like to have his power to deploy his forces within his own territory limited in the way that the U.S. proposed. He felt that the U.S. control over unapproved Chinese military actions was already airtight. Perhaps it was just a matter of drafting the right language. In any event he hoped that Mr. Robertson would ask the Secretary to leave out any reference to disposition of Chinese forces as between Formosa and the off-shore islands. Perhaps the Chinese Government could accept the substance of the remainder of the draft note.

Mr. Robertson said that the treaty envisaged joint operations in defense of the territory included. The arrangement should be as permanent as possible and should not have any reference to specific individuals or officials. We might be certain that there is no need for any additional safeguards in the present situation, but the treaty language should, so far as practicable, provide for the future when the current officials are dead and gone. He could not see how provision for joint agreement as to disposition of forces constituted any infringement of Chinese sovereignty or any affront to Chinese prestige. He recalled that in World War II the forces of many nations on the allied side had been deployed by mutual agreement and were not under the exclusive control of the country to which they belonged. A joint effort and joint responsibility called for joint agreement. There was no reflection on either of the parties. If Formosa were attacked, the matter of the disposition of Chinese forces as between Formosa and the off-shore islands would be a matter of vital importance to the United States. To take an extreme and admittedly remote possibility, the bulk of Chinese forces might be stationed on Quemoy, the Tachens and Matsu at such a time. This would create a serious problem for the United States.

Dr. Yeh said that this was hypothetical and would be inconceivable in practice. He could not see the necessity for basing an exchange of notes on such an unrealistic contingency.

Mr. Robertson said we wanted reasonable terms of reference and reasonable language. We did not want to hamper necessary Chinese military arrangements. Quite the contrary. But the commitment we would be making under the treaty was tremendous, and would make the treaty unpopular in some U.S. quarters. He did not think it was unreasonable to give the U.S. some voice when under the treaty we might have to come into a very difficult situation to assist the Chinese Government. Joint agreement seemed to be appropriate under the circumstances.

Foreign Minister Yeh said he would agree that the deployment of forces on the island of Formosa would be a matter of common concern under the treaty. But the final sentence of the draft concerned the garrisoning of the off-shore islands. The U.S. assumed no responsibility for the defense of these islands. It was solely a Chinese obligation. Yet the U.S. wished to exercise a control over the disposition of troops necessary for the discharge of this Chinese responsibility. The Chinese Government was grateful for the right of self-defense contained in the latest U.S. draft. But the restrictions on the movement of troops to the off-shore islands made it impossible for the Chinese Government to be assured of a free opportunity to exercise effectively the right of self-defense on the offshore islands. It was not appropriate for the U.S. to ask for joint control of movement of forces to the off-shore islands when it had no responsibility as to the defense of those islands. If the islands came under heavy attack, it might take several days to get the necessary clearance from Washington before retaliatory action could be taken. This delay could be very serious. The Chinese Government had to wait for seven hours for the necessary U.S. clearances before it could respond to the attack on Quemoy on September 3.

Mr. Robertson agreed that it was bad for the Chinese Government to lose valuable time after a Communist attack while seeking a Washington clearance. It was his thought that U.S. military commanders in the field might be authorized to give the necessary clearances promptly. He thought the proposed arrangement might be better than the existing one.

Foreign Minister Yeh said he still could not see the need for the final sentence of the draft note. The note would be less objectionable if it merely stipulated that “forces adequate for the defense of Formosa” must be stationed on Formosa at all times. He said he would like to know what the thinking was back of the U.S. proposal—the motivation, the “arriere pensee”—so that he could perhaps seek less objectionable language which might meet the U.S. requirements.

Mr. Robertson said that our thinking had already been explained. We were thinking in long range terms and wanted protection in a situation which might be different from that of today. The Secretary has praised the Generalissimo in high terms and had called him a great ally who has stood steadfastly with the U.S. for many years. But language is needed which would afford adequate protection after the Generalissimo’s time. In theory the Chinese Government could now by its own independent decision move all its forces and equipment to the off-shore islands. We had to envisage a possible situation where we would be at war, and bearing the major share of the free world responsibility. We would need to be sure that Formosa would not be more or less stripped of Chinese forces without our concurrence. We were aware of the importance of “face” considerations to the Chinese Government. It was farthest from our thoughts or wishes to reflect in any way on the Chinese Government. If we were indifferent to these considerations we would not be making a treaty at all.

Ambassador Koo thought that if the question at issue was only removal of troops from Formosa to the off-shore islands, it ought to be possible to work out satisfactory language.

Mr. Robertson agreed and said that we wanted complete reciprocity of language. We were two allied sovereign nations entering into a voluntary association as partners and equals. We did not want any implication of lack of equality. It was our desire and objective to treat the Chinese Government as an equal and draft the treaty on a strictly equal basis. We also wanted to keep the Communists guessing as to how far the treaty commitment extended. The Secretary himself had decided that the original language of Article V was too narrow and should be broadened to read “attack directed against” instead of “attack on”. We wanted to accomplish something through the treaty negotiations, not to obstruct accomplishment.

Foreign Minister Yeh mentioned the sinking of the Chinese destroyer escort Tai Ping by Communist torpedo boats on November 14. He said that this event had made the situation more acute and makes the Chinese more sensitive to any limitation on Chinese freedom to carry on rescue and support operations on and around the off-shore islands. The Generalissimo had pointed out that he had already given explicit commitments to the U.S. as to offensive operations.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that under the proposed language the Chinese Government would be required to give up—or at least circumscribe—its right to send troops to the relief of the off-shore islands. It is true that the troops in question are trained with MAAG help and are largely U.S. equipped and supported. But the Chinese must have the right to use these troops for self-defense in the offshore islands as well as on Formosa. The Foreign Minister said he was ready to formalize the existing commitment to the U.S. but the new proposal amounts to more than the existing commitment.

Mr. Robertson asked if the Foreign Minister could suggest any language which would meet the Chinese objections while taking care of the essential U.S. requirements.

The Foreign Minister then submitted a new Chinese draft of a proposed exchange of notes, providing that “the use of force involving a major operation by either of the parties will be a matter of joint agreement”. A copy of the Chinese draft is attached.³

Mr. Robertson observed that the Chinese draft did not define the term “major operation”.

Foreign Minister Yeh said as he understood it, the Department wanted language which would prevent the Chinese Government from removing all its troops from Formosa.

Mr. Robertson said he didn’t think it was necessary to state the problem in the most extreme context.

Foreign Minister Yeh thought that suitable language could be found if it referred only to the deployment of troops within Formosa. But his instructions from the Generalissimo were very clear to object to any restrictions on the Chinese disposition of forces between Formosa and the off-shore islands. He thought that perhaps agreement might be reached on a provision for keeping certain specified forces on Formosa as a minimum. The Generalissimo had developed a definite aversion to any interference with the stationing of forces on the off-shore islands.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that the Chinese Government had just submitted a new plan to the U.S. Government calling for joint support of enlarged military forces, Army, Navy, and Air.⁴ This would include extraordinary expenditures for an immediate reorganization of the Chinese forces in accordance with a new plan. He said the Chinese Government also hoped for immediate allocation by the U.S. to the Chinese Government of two more DD’s and two more DE’s. This would greatly bolster morale and would effectively offset the anxiety created by the operations of the new Communist torpedo boats. The Chinese Government now has only five DE’s. This is not sufficient to cope with the enlarged Communist Naval capabilities in the area.

Mr. Robertson said that there was an urgent responsibility on both sides to seek mutually acceptable language for the draft note as soon as possible. It was a joint problem. The U.S. Government did feel that when it assumed a commitment to help in the defense of Formosa, it was reasonable to ask that the forces on Formosa be disposed by joint agreement of the two parties.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that it was the restriction on the removal of troops from the Treaty area to the area not covered by the treaty which caused the difficulty. If we were only concerned about disposition of forces within Formosa and the Pescadores, he thought he could accept that, and he would endeavor to persuade the Generalissimo to accept it. The Legislative Yuan would certainly cause difficulty over the present final sentence of the draft note. The members would ask if the treaty and the added commitment in the note as to use of force were not sufficient to establish that the free Chinese could not go back to the Mainland “without a nod from the United States”. The additional provision pinned the free Chinese down unnecessarily.

Mr. Robertson said the thought was not to pin the Chinese down, but to provide for consultation and joint agreement.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that joint agreement as to the disposition of forces stationed on Formosa under Article VII was agreeable. It was the interference with the necessary flow of troops between Formosa and the off-shore islands which was questioned.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the U.S. has made, and is making, a heavy investment in the training, equipping and supplying of Chinese forces. It hardly seemed fair for the Chinese to have a completely free hand to move these forces out of the treaty area without any regard for the U.S. viewpoint. The Department of Defense after some earlier questions has now agreed to the text of the treaty and draft note as it stands. It cannot be said how they would react to a revision. He hoped that the Foreign Minister would cause the Generalissimo to understand that it was a real problem for the United States. In an emergency full cooperation and joint action would be necessary. The element of consultation cannot be removed.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that before he left Formosa he was twice asked by the Legislative Yuan if the U.S. Government had advised the Chinese Government to abandon the off-shore islands. He had replied “not to my knowledge”. Admiral Stump had said that the off-shore islands do have military value, of varying degree. The Foreign Minister said he did not want to give the impression in his reports that the U.S. was indifferent to the importance of the retention of the off-shore islands by the Chinese Government.

Mr. Robertson said that any such impression would be false and certainly should be avoided. The U.S. considered the retention of the principal islands important and had encouraged the Chinese Government to hold them. The U.S. had been very careful to keep the Chinese Communists in the dark as to the action we would take if the islands were attacked. We certainly did not want to give the Chinese Communists the impression that we were willing to write off the off-shore islands.

Dr. Yeh said that to be realistic, the military value of the Tachens seemed to him to be somewhat doubtful. From a military standpoint Quemoy was a different matter. From a political and psychological standpoint, they were both of utmost importance. The Chinese Government must not again yield anything to the Communists. The Chinese Government must put up a valiant fight for every inch of free soil. The resolve of the Chinese to fight must be clearly proved. The Chinese Government was willing to sacrifice lives if necessary in defense of the islands. If the free Chinese showed irresolution, morale would collapse and the structure of free China would fall.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that he saw the U.S. viewpoint and that he and the Ambassador would work hard overnight on language designed to meet both the U.S. and the Chinese requirements. It was agreed that another meeting would be held on the following day⁵ in view of the importance attached by both sides to early agreement. The Foreign Minister said he would stay in the United States as long as necessary to conclude the negotiations.

Afterwards the Foreign Minister said he understood Mr. Robertson had been disturbed by reports of the dinner given by the Chinese Ambassador and the Foreign Minister for the Press on November 3, after which the correspondents had asked the Foreign Minister a number of questions regarding a treaty and other matters.

Mr. Robertson said that he had been informed by a correspondent who was there that the Foreign Minister had talked fairly freely about the treaty. This was a matter of surprise to us since we had gone to great lengths to treat the matter as absolutely top secret and had followed the difficult course of refusing to give the Press any information.

Foreign Minister Yeh said he wanted to assure Mr. Robertson that he had not divulged any classified information to the Press about the treaty negotiations or anything else. He admitted that he had talked to the Press at some length, but insisted that he had made only vague references to treaty negotiations in exactly the same vein as Secretary Dulles had done in his Press conference. The Foreign Minister said he had merely stated that tentative discussions had been held intermittently and that negotiations had not even entered a formal stage. He offered to give Mr. Robertson a tape recording of the Press interview.

Mr. Robertson said this was unnecessary since he, of course, accepted the Foreign Minister’s word. However, the correspondents were extremely clever at piecing together bits of information, and extracting information by pretending that they knew more than they did.

The Foreign Minister said he was positive he had not given the Press any unauthorized information. In fact his refusal to give them anything definite except on deliveries under the aid program had caused some criticism on the part of the Press. Howard Handelman had been rather rude, stating that in his opinion nothing that the Foreign Minister had said was true outside of the reference to the aid programs.

1. Revised and initialed by Robertson.

2. The U.S. draft under reference, dated Nov. 12, is attached to a Nov. 14 memorandum of conversation by McConaughy; it reads as follows:

   “The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI and other territory and it possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI without joint approval.” (794A.5 MSP/11–1454)

3. Not printed.
4. See footnote 1, infra.
5. The next meeting was held on Nov. 19.