Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

FE files, lot 64 D 230, “Operation Oracle”

No. 393
The British High Commissioner in India (Clutterbuck) to the Commonwealth Relations Office¹

secret

[New Delhi,] November 10, 1954.

Quemoy and Formosa

I had an hour with Prime Minister yesterday evening and explained present position to him using arguments developed in your recent telegrams.

2. Prime Minister took this explanation calmly but said that the situation was clearly a delicate one. Formosa had, of course, been one of the main topics raised by the Chinese during his talks in Peking. It was the only topic on which they had shown themselves (?excited) [sic]; on all other issues they had been quite calm and dispassionate. Beyond urging restraint he had not offered advice but he had, he thought, gained an insight into their thinking.

3. In the first place he said one had to go back to the Truman Declaration of 1950. This, in effect, “froze” Formosa since under it the United States 7th Fleet had the duty both of protecting Formosa from attacks from the Mainland and also of preventing the Mainland being attacked from Formosa. This order was, however, changed by Eisenhower who relieved the 7th Fleet of the second of these duties, thus in effect letting Chiang off the leash and enabling him to harry the Mainland from his United States protected base. It was hardly surprising that the advantage taken by Chiang of this one-sided state of affairs had aroused the deepest indignation and resentment. “Taiwan” had now become an emotional rallying cry throughout China.

4. The question, Nehru continued, really fell into two parts:

(1) Quemoy and the Coastal Islands;

(2) Formosa itself.

As regards (1) Chinese had told him that some 34 islands were concerned and had shown him a map of the area indicating the use made of them by the K.M.T. for nuisance raids and interference with shipping. Chinese had carefully listed and tabulated the various incidents that had taken place and he had been interested to see that of the oceangoing ships interfered with the great majority had been British. There had also been a certain number of droppings by parachute on the Mainland and the Chinese said that they had captured 15 Americans who had landed in this way. Air sorties were of common occurrence and his own plane had been diverted inland in order to avoid risk of a chance encounter.

5. Chinese were thus faced with continuing pin-pricks and irritations of cumulative effect and he had the definite impression that they were determined not to tolerate this situation any longer. On the other hand he was equally sure that they had no intention of “doing anything big”. In other words their aim was to get control of the Coastal Islands, but they would certainly not wish to get embroiled over Formosa itself since they knew very well that any attack on Formosa would lead to war.

6. As regards Formosa itself he thought their thinking was quite realistic. They did not expect Chiang to disappear overnight and realised that it would take time to achieve restoration of Formosa to Chinese sovereignty. He thought that they would be quite prepared to wait for some break in events which would open up chance of settlement. They (?were) [sic] accustomed to think in longer terms than most people. (For instance, in discussing economic prospects Mao had told him that they had sketched out four 5–year plans and that after the fourth—i.e. after 20 years—a foundation would have been laid for a solid socialist economy.) But one thing they would never do, namely to enter into any sort of discussion or negotiations which would involve treating Chiang on equal terms, or admitting even indirectly that he had any right at all to be lording it in Formosa.

7. Thinking aloud against this background Prime Minister said that idea of a United States Defence Treaty with Chiang, if accompanied by declaration making it clear that there would be no further attacks on the Mainland (thereby putting paid to Chiang’s hopes and showing the world that he was on his way out), might have much to commend it. Trouble was, however, that Chinese would never believe such a declaration, especially after the change of United States policy over the Truman Declaration, they would immediately suspect a ruse to bolster Chiang’s position and their reaction would certainly be fiercely resentful. We should, therefore, have to expect a violent outcry and a new spate of abuse. In his view even the most careful explanations beforehand (which would, of course, be very necessary) would not avoid this result. He thought, however, that when with the passing of time, it was seen that the declaration really meant what it said and that attacks on the Mainland no longer took place these reactions would die down and the Chinese (though they would never admit it) would adjust themselves to the position with some relief. He felt therefore that, provided we were prepared to face the dangers of the initial outburst of indignation and see it through, the step might prove in the long run a useful one. But clarity over the initial declaration (i.e. in regard to the cessation of attacks on the Mainland) would be of prime importance.

8. As regards Quemoy and coastal islands, while not feeling sanguine that reference to the Security Council would achieve the results looked for, he appeared to agree that the exercise would be worth trying, the Chinese, he said, often did the unexpected thing, and in spite of indignation over the Treaty proposal they might well decide that it would be in their best interests to send spokesmen to New York, as they had done once before.

9. I told him of our own representations to the Chinese and expressed hope that he would similarly feel able to use his influence with them with a view to the lowering of the present tension. He replied that he had already done his best in this direction. He was similarly noncommittal when I said that the Foreign Secretary would hope for his support when the time came to explain the Treaty proposal etc. to the Chinese. But he was clearly deeply interested and I should think myself that, provided initial United States statement lives up to our expectations of it, he will be prepared to help. It is evidently the cardinal point in his mind that it should be unmistakably clear from the outset that the defence treaty is only to be entered into on condition that there will be no further attacks on the Mainland. Without this, the whole operation, which will be delicate enough in any case, would, he feels, be doomed to failure and land us all in a very dangerous position.

1. The source text, a typewritten copy, headed “Telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in India to the Commonwealth Relations Office, dated November 10, 1954,” bears a note in McConaughy’s handwriting stating that it was delivered by Michael Joy at 5 p.m. on Nov. 12 with the request that it be treated as “Eyes Only” for the Secretary.