793.00/11–954
No. 388
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and
Security Affairs (Bond)1
eyes only
Subject:
- China Item: Consultations with New Zealand
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
- Mr. Niles W. Bond, UN Political & Security Affairs
- Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
- Mr. G.R. Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
Ambassador Munro and Mr. Laking called on the Secretary this afternoon to discuss further developments relating to the subject item. Ambassador Munro stated that his Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Webb, had given consideration to the views of Australian Prime Minister Menzies and Foreign Minister Casey regarding the proposed mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and Nationalist China and the proposed New Zealand resolution in the Security Council, but that Mr. Webb was anxious to proceed, “without any delay if possible”, with the exercise. The Ambassador said that his Government’s view was that the continued absence of diplomatic activity on the subject of the offshore islands increased the chances that the Chinese Communists would persist in their probing activities, with the danger that these activities might at any moment be expanded into large-scale hostilities. Conversely, it was felt that such a development might be headed off if we could get our exercise under way. He added that his Government was very anxious that the divergences between the U.S. and the U.K. on this subject be removed, in order that we could all go forward together.
The Ambassador went on to say that his Government was anxious to know the terms of the proposed U.S. announcement concerning its treaty negotiations with the Nationalist Chinese. He then expressed the opinion of his Government that such an announcement should emphasize as much as possible the defensive nature of the proposed treaty, and that it should be followed without substantial delay by the introduction of the New Zealand resolution. He added that if this were not the case he feared that the consequences might be prejudicial.
The Secretary pointed out that the UK was reluctant to proceed further with the New Zealand resolution until it knew more about the proposed treaty and the form of its presentation. He recalled that the UK representatives had on more than one occasion emphasized that their Government could not finally commit itself to the exercise in question unless and until it felt that our treaty undertaking would be compatible therewith.
With reference to our negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists, the Secretary said that although it had been agreed that the treaty would not include the offshore islands, we were now endeavoring to find a mutually satisfactory formula which would ensure that Chinese Nationalist military activities in defense of those islands [Page 884] would not prejudice our commitment to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. He said, for example, that we would wish to avoid a situation in which the Nationalist Chinese might send all of their troops to defend the offshore islands, while leaving us to defend Formosa alone; also, he said, we would wish to protect ourselves against a situation in which the Nationalist Chinese, in the name of defending the offshore islands, could engage in military operations of a nature which would provoke a Communist attack on Formosa. The Secretary said that this problem of the relationship of the defense of the offshore islands (which would not be covered by the treaty) to Formosa and the Pescadores (which would be covered) was a particularly difficult one. He added, however, that we hoped to be able to work out the answer to this problem within two or three days, although there was always the chance that it would take more time than that. He said that if this problem could not be worked out to our satisfaction, we would not conclude the treaty, since we could not under any circumstances give to Chiang Kaishek the power to plunge the U.S. into war with the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said that our difference with the Chinese Nationalists on this point was one more of form than of substance, and that the real difficulty which the Chinese Nationalists faced was the problem of how to present an undertaking along the desired lines to the Legislative Yuan and the Chinese people. He added that there was a substantial measure of agreement between us as to what had to be done, but that the Chinese Nationalists were urging that the self-restraining provisions which we were asking them to agree to be kept secret, at least for the time being, whereas it was our view that such an understanding would have to be made public in view of the necessity of explaining it to the UN, the Senate, and American public opinion in general. This, he said, was the nub of the difficulty. The Secretary said that we had been negotiating with Chinese Foreign Minister George Yeh and Ambassador Koo on the assumption that they were speaking for the Generalissimo, but that we could not be absolutely sure that any agreement which we reached with them would be accepted by the Generalissimo.
For the foregoing reasons, the Secretary expressed the hope that the New Zealand Government could wait a few more days in order to give us time to complete our negotiations with the Chinese. He added that if we could work out an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists along the lines which he had outlined, he was confident that the UK could go along with us, unless the UK insisted on assuring itself of the prior approval of the Chinese Communists. In the latter connection, Mr. MacArthur recalled that the UK representatives had indicated that they might not be willing to go along [Page 885] with any procedure unless they were sure that the Chinese Communists would not oppose it. He said that if they insisted on this point of view, the whole exercise would be frustrated. Ambassador Munro remarked that the UK representatives had denied that this was in fact their Government’s position. The Secretary reiterated that if we could persuade the Nationalist Chinese to accept our formula for meeting the one outstanding point at issue, he believed the UK would be able to go along with us.
- Approved by Secretary Dulles, according to a handwritten note by O’Connor attached to the source text.↩