794A.5 MSP/11–954
No. 387
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
limited distribution
Subject:
- Mutual Security Pact—Fourth Meeting
Participants:
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wellington Koo, called on Mr. Robertson at his own request.
The Chinese Ambassador said that he wished to confirm that his Counsellor, Dr. Tan, had told Mr. McConaughy on November 8, that Foreign Minister Yeh had made certain points as to the proposed exchange of notes, just before he had boarded the plane for Spain in New York on November 6. (See Memo of Conversation between Dr. Tan and Mr. McConaughy dated November 8.)1 The Foreign Minister thought it was important to sign the exchange of notes on a different day from the signature of the Treaty so that they would not seem to be directly connected. This would avoid difficulties with the Legislative Yuan. It would be preferable if the Chinese Government did not have to submit the exchange of notes to the Legislative Yuan in connection with the Treaty. It was also important that the exchange of notes be treated as confidential so as to avoid embarrassment to the Chinese Government. It was also [Page 882] important to draft the language of the exchange of notes very carefully so that it would not be offensive to the Chinese. While there was no question about the nature of the commitment, it might be possible to draft language which would be smoother than that contained in the existing draft. He said that the Embassy was working on proposed alternative language and would transmit its draft to the Department in the near future.
Mr. Robertson observed that he did not see any way whereby the commitment could be treated as confidential. It would be necessary to reveal the exchange of notes to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to obtain Senate consent to ratification of the Treaty. Without divulging the general nature of the exchange of notes, it would be impossible to show that adequate precautions had been taken against the possibility of our being drawn into a war situation without our consent. Mr. Robertson said he doubted the possibility of arranging the signature of the notes a week or 10 days after the signature of the Treaty as suggested by the Ambassador. The time element was very important. Some undesirable resolution as to Formosa and the off-shore islands might be introduced into the General Assembly at any time. Also the New Zealand Government might wish to proceed promptly with its proposed resolution. The Generalissimo had emphasized the importance of announcing the Treaty before the New Zealand resolution was introduced. Hence it was important to expedite action on the Treaty. The unfortunate Chalmers Roberts article in the Washington Post had forced our hand to some extent. He hoped that progress could be made perhaps even before the return of the Foreign Minister from Spain at the end of the week. The exchange of notes would be an integral part of the arrangements for the Treaty. It seemed it would be necessary to sign the notes at or near the time of signature of the Treaty.
- Not printed. (793.5/11–854)↩