Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/11–354

No. 379
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

[Washington,] November 3, 1954.

Participants:

• Sir Robert Scott, British Embassy
• Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
• Mr. Merchant

On the Secretary’s instructions, I asked Sir Robert Scott to come in to see me this morning. I told him that the Secretary wanted Sir Anthony Eden to know that he was worried over the latest developments around the off-shore islands. He also desired Sir Anthony to know that the U.S. has been exercising a restraining influence on the Chinese Nationalists to keep retaliatory action to a minimum. I said, however, that if the attacks continued or were stepped up it would presumably be impossible for the Chinese Nationalists not to react strongly since they obviously could not just sit there and take it. I told Sir Robert that our information in the last 36 hours was that not only had the Tachen Islands been again bombed but that the rate of artillery fire against Quemoy had been stepped up and there had been a bombing of a third island named, I believed, White Dog Island. I said that our Intelligence people believe that there was some evidence to indicate that this might be the development of a new pattern foreshadowing an all-out attack by the Communists against the Islands.

Sir Robert was obviously not informed of the recent new activities in the area and he asked that FE pass on to him or Mr. Joy any intelligence reports or a summary of them covering this situation. I said that I would speak to Mr. Robertson concerning this.

Sir Robert said that he was extremely concerned over the situation in the off-shore islands and had been since last summer. His own view was that the seizure of the Soviet tanker last June was the incident which started the present chain. He then asked me what effect this increased activity had on our present thinking concerning the Treaty and the Security Council. I said that my own personal view was that it argued for speed.

Sir Robert then said that he had just received this morning a copy of a letter from Sir Pierson Dixon to Denis Allen of the Foreign Office, in which Dixon emphasized his concern that there should be an agreed understanding between Ambassador Lodge and himself on the tactical handling of the Security Council matter. Dixon listed three points which would be supplementary to the agreed minute of understanding and on which he believed he had an oral understanding with Ambassador Lodge. Scott seemed to think that these 3 points which I gather would be interpretive to the agreed minute of understanding (one of them, for example, was the statement that there was no commitment as to further action than to leave the matter on the Security Council agenda in the event that a veto was encountered) should be in writing in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. At my suggestion Sir Robert said he would put them on a piece of paper and bring or send it in to Mr. Robertson or Mr. Key.¹

1. A memorandum of conversation by Bond, dated Nov. 3, recorded a conversation later that day between Bond and Barbara Salt, in which she stated that the British had decided that the proposed paper should include additional points which they had not had time to formulate but that the Embassy did not have in mind any commitments beyond those which had already been given orally in conversations with Secretary Dulles. (793.5/11–354)