Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/9–2254

No. 300
Memorandum of Conversation, by Roderic L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[New York,] September 22, 1954.

Subject:

• Quemoy

Participants:

• H.E. Sir Pierson Dixon, United Kingdom Delegation
• Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom Delegation
• The Hon. P.E. Ramsbotham, United Kingdom Delegation
• Mr. M.D. Butler, United Kingdom Delegation The Secretary
• Mr. David McK. Key—USDel
• Mr. David W. Wainhouse—USDel
• Mr. Roderic O’Connor—USDel

Sir Pierson, at his request, came to the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers to say that Mr. Eden is interested in the idea which the Secretary had raised with him in London last Friday. Sir Pierson said that Mr. Eden had a number of questions regarding which he would like some clarification:

1. What kind of a resolution would the Secretary be aiming for in the Security Council? Would it be one leading to settlement, i.e., the demilitarization of Quemoy, or would it be one asking the United Nations for military support? The terms of the resolution would be of considerable importance for they would have a strong bearing on what the Chinese Communists might accept. If the Chinese Communists did not accept the resolution, what would we do?

2. Would the Chinese Communists be invited to participate? To Mr. Eden, Sir Pierson said, this would be indispensable.

3. Who in fact would bring this into the Security Council? Would it be the United States or some other Member? London, Sir Pierson said, feels it would be preferable if it were not the United States.

In replying to Sir Pierson, the Secretary said that the Chinese Communists would, of course, be invited to participate. With respect to who would bring the action in the Security Council, the Secretary said that he has not developed a clear opinion on the matter, nor has he come to any definite view. His thinking has been that the United States perhaps might bring the matter in the Security Council. He went on to say however that he has an open mind on the matter and the purpose of these exchanges is to develop the best approach.

The Secretary went on to say that the purpose of going into the Security Council would be to try to eliminate what he regards as a threat to the peace. If the Chinese Communists propose to take Formosa with Quemoy as the first step, then the Tachen Islands such action on the part of the Chinese Communists would likely lead to war—general war, in which the United States would bring to bear its military power against the Chinese Communists.

If the United States initiated action in the Security Council it would be in terms of alleging that the Chinese Communists are engaging in military action, and what we would be seeking would be provisional measures with a hope of stopping the fighting. The Secretary stated that he realized that the Security Council would not confine its action merely to our request, but would call upon the Nationalists to refrain from military action likewise. These provisional measures would suspend military action and this in turn would provide us with a possibility of exploring ways and means of a comprehensive settlement. This process would have to be painstaking and would unquestionably take a long time. High emotions are involved in this matter, and a cooling off period during which the fighting might be suspended is most desirable. This cooling off period would perhaps lead to a solution more far reaching than is possible in the initial stages.

The Secretary referred to the possible rejection of the invitation to participate in the Security Council debate by the Chinese Communists, or to a veto by the Soviet Union which, he said, would then raise the question of whether we go into the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. However, on this aspect of proceeding in the General Assembly, we have as yet no definite views. The Secretary pointed out that he has no idea at all of whether the Nationalists would go along with this idea. No exploration with the Chinese Nationalists was thought desirable until such exploration had been had with the United Kingdom.

Sir Gerald stated that Formosa and the Pescadores belonged to Japan which [had] renounced its sovereignty;³ that under Chapter 7 of the Charter, with the Chinese Communists claiming Quemoy as their own territory, the Chinese Communists would assert that they are being accused of invading their own territory. This would certainly provide an excuse for the Soviets to veto. Under Chapter 6 of the Charter, the juridical status of Quemoy would not be brought into question.

Commenting on the dangers and risks involved and the nature of the delicate operation alluded to by the Secretary, Sir Pierson stated that the Chinese Communists are undoubtedly aware of the seriousness of the matter and might grasp the Security Council gambit as a face-saver.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by stating that he appreciates Mr. Eden’s interest in the matter and requested that the highest degree of security be maintained in this matter. He expected to resume the discussion of this with Mr. Eden when he arrives in London next week.

1. Secretary Dulles was in New York for the opening of the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly on Sept. 23. For text of his address given before the General Assembly on that date, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 471–477.

   Previously unidentified participants listed below are Sir Pierson Dixon, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office.

3. In the Japanese Peace Treaty, signed at San Francisco Sept. 8, 1951; for text, see TIAS 2490; 3 UST (pt. 3) 3169.