Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

794A.5 MSP/9–2154: Telegram

No. 299
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

secret

Taipei, September 21, 1954—6 p.m.

208. Department pass Defense and FOA. Taipei’s 192.² President Chiang invited Chase and myself to his office today and continued discussion of topics described in reftel. He asked if we had any news on amount of aid for FY 55 and said detailed proposals for extra $100 million to support expanded reserve training will be handed to Embassy soon. He emphasized urgency of this program and repeated his fear of Communist attrition against CRC forces on offshore islands. Said reserve program should have top priority.

Chiang was told we had no news except recent message from JCS to MAAG that no US support for increase over existing GRC military strength levels foreseen at present. He was obviously disappointed and noted that when Korea or Indochina were attacked US aid was immediately stepped up. Now GRC was fighting only hot war anywhere and US seemed “indifferent”. I replied that this certainly not true. I assumed above JCS position based on assumptions present aid program adequate for defense purposes and that activities around Kinmen of only local significance.

I took this occasion to deplore exaggerated press stories from both Chinese and foreign sources which fostered belief abroad that GRC was carrying attacks on Amoy area beyond anything justified for defense of Kinmen. I said we were highly gratified by fine military effort put forth in response to Communist shelling, but did not want to encourage impression GRC trying to spread conflict. Chase continued with recommendation aggressive air action be toned down while continuing active air and naval reconnaissance.

As he did last Friday President gave unusually strong impression of impatience over what he regards as US indecisiveness and failure to appreciate urgency of situation.³

Rankin

1. Also sent to Manila for Moyer and Brent.
2. Document 297.
3. Telegram 202 to Taipei, Oct. 1, reported that the question of Chinese military force levels had been discussed that day at a State-JCS meeting, but that no final recommendation could be formulated until the NSC review of U.S.–China policy was completed. If the Chinese raised the subject again, Rankin was instructed to reply that the U.S. Government was fully aware of the urgency of the situation and was giving the matter careful consideration. (794A.5 MSP/9–2454)