Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.90/8–1654: Telegram

No. 253
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Tokyo, August 16, 1954.

374. Eyes only Secretary.

1. I am most disturbed by what, from here, appear to be recent uncoordinated US Government activity in Far East which has resulted to date only in alarming our friends, making it appear as if US was acting from panic and obscuring what I believe is your firm long-term policy for the Far East. I have in mind such things as our instigation of Nationalist Chinese to stop Soviet tankers followed by complete backdown when Soviets made loud noises; our recent Naval demonstration when Admiral Price and Seventh Fleet were told to advance but not shoot and thus led to withdraw in confusion; our determination suddenly to surface Rastvorov² in spite of its bad effect on US-Japanese relations while at same time US Government leaders following apparently concerted policy of telling American public and hence the Japanese and world how important Japan is to US now that Indochina has gone; our troop redeployment policy which will be taken by Far East public as indication we see no immediate danger and are beginning to follow more restrained policy.

2. Coming on top of events outlined above, particularly the last mentioned, I was astonished to learn from reliable source that it has been decided that Seventh Fleet will shortly carry out another demonstration in force around Nationalist-held offshore Chinese islands and that it would be directed by Admiral Stump in person. I understand, also from good authority, that Stump has said Seventh Fleet means to shoot back this time if fired upon. While I certainly agree that US military forces should shoot back if fired upon I wonder if full implications of this action have been weighed by all competent US authorities. Repercussions if anything goes wrong could be most serious. Japanese Government and people could be thrown into panic which only advance preparation could mitigate. Yet I have only learned about these plans by accident and have no authority to explain purpose and to warn appropriate high Japanese officials so they can take necessary steps to reassure public should it be necessary. This comes at time when Department has just agreed on necessity keeping high Japanese officials informed on our Far Eastern policy and actions. In view of almost unanimous Japanese belief that our shooting down Chinese Communist planes off Hainan was deliberate act of provocation it can only be surmised what will be the reaction to US Naval demonstration in force when there is not even any excuse made of a rescue mission.

3. Action described paragraph 2 seems inconsistent with US position outlined to Rhee which, according to General Hull, was that US would not fight to restore unity of Germany, Austria, or Korea. This present plan could lead to fighting Communist China. If our purpose is, through show of strength, to deter Communist attack on Formosa I think it will fail. This will be looked upon as mere aggravation and might well inspire counteraction we hope to avoid in off-shore islands. I should think announcement by President that we have noted recent Chinese Communist statements re Formosa and that we are determined to prevent armed aggression against it would be sounder. Also conclusion of mutual defense treaty would serve similar purpose. This would also be a position our allies could understand which we could without reservation commend to them. Isolated show of force by Navy, unless we are prepared to follow through if need be, is, in my opinion, most unwise and can have results just opposite from which we intend.

Allison

1. No transmission time is indicated on the source text.
2. Yuri A. Rastvorov, a former official of the Soviet Mission in Japan, had requested and been granted political asylum in the United States; the Department of State press release of Aug. 13 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 271.