No. 252
Editorial Note
During a meeting of the National Security Council on August 12, during an intelligence briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, the following exchanges relating to China were recorded:
“Mr. Dulles displayed a map showing the extent of the floods in the Yangtse Valley of China. He said that whereas the Chinese Communists had previously refused to admit that disaster had occurred, they were now willing to announce that the flood extended for 500 miles from east to west. Mr. Dulles said that the flood was the worst in modern Chinese history, even worse than the flood of 1931. The damage totalled $1.5 billion already and might increase, especially if the dikes went out at Hankow. China was buying rice from Burma already in recognition of the fact that there would be a great food shortage.
“The President said the American public had apparently not followed this news very closely, since he was not asked any questions about the disaster at his press conference. Secretary Dulles noted that the Department of State had been considering an offer by the United States of surplus food to China, but had concluded that such a step would be inadvisable at this time for three reasons: (1) China was still exporting food to Ceylon in exchange for rubber; (2) ignorance in China was so widespread that it would be hard to gain a propaganda advantage from such an offer; and (3) Japan would [Page 522] regard such an offer as a softening of our policy toward China. The President said these reasons appeared to be conclusive. Mr. Allen Dulles wondered whether a possible U.S. offer of food should not be kept under advisement. He felt that such an offer could have great propaganda value in the free world, and it might be made known to the Chinese by dropping leaflets. The Vice President found it difficult to see what advantage we would gain in China by such an offer. Mr. Allen Dulles said this would be one opportunity to drive a wedge between the Chinese people and their government, and show that the American people have great sympathy for the Chinese people. The Vice President said he supposed such an offer would help discredit Chinese Communist propaganda against the United States. Governor Stassen felt that the best chance of overthrowing the Communist government in China would be by creating economic chaos. He did not, therefore, favor offering food to China. Mr. Allen Dulles said that the Chinese government would regard the loss of 50 million people as a gain. The President said he had also observed the peculiar attitudes of the Chinese toward human life.” (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, dated August 13, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)
Following the intelligence briefing, in NSC Action No. 1201–b, the Council:
“Agreed that an offer of surplus agricultural commodities, to alleviate the suffering caused by the floods in China, should not be made at this time, but this situation and possible effects of such action should be kept under review by the Director of Central Intelligence.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)