793.022/5–1154: Telegram
No. 188
The Ambassador in the Republic of
China (Rankin) to the Department of
State
614. Department pass CINCPAC. On invitation of Foreign Minister I accompanied him in visits to Kinmen and Tachen Islands May 4–6. President Chiang returned from short visit to Tachen yesterday. Current Chinese interest in off-shore islands stimulated by beginning of “invasion season” and Army reorganization plans which include replacement of ill-equipped under-strength units on Kinmen and Matsu with MDAP-equipped and MAAG-trained divisions as was done last year on Tachen.
Yesterday Foreign Minister revived proposal made in memo of July 20, 1953 (Embassy telegram 51, July 22, 1953) and rejected in Department’s 90, August 61 that as “psychological deterrent” to enemy US should make public statement to effect “Seventh Fleet is continuing and strengthening its patrols and surveillance of waters surrounding islands along Chekiang-Fukien coast which are held [Page 416] by Chinese Government Forces, or by (other) friendly elements, view significance of these islands to defense of Taiwan and Pescadores.” Chinese believe Communists are convinced US intends take no action whatever happens to these islands. While understanding American reluctance assume any formal commitment to participate in their defense, Chinese believe statement along above lines would have healthy effect.
My impressions during above visits included following:
- 1.
- Forces on both Kinmen and Tachen seem competently commanded but situation on latter clearly demonstrated superior results of MAAG training and advice.
- 2.
- Neither position can be made impregnable and both would be difficult to reinforce or supply during hostilities. This suggests size of forces and amount of equipment should be limited to rendering them “hard nuts to crack” without risking unnecessarily large losses. Present strength on Tachen, which is naturally strong, probably is about right, while improved defense dispositions on Kinmen might permit reduction in present large garrison there.
- 3.
- While air support for Kinmen and Matsu could be provided from Formosa, Tachen being nearly twice as far away and close to enemy air bases can expect little assistance in air. No satisfactory location for operational airstrip exists on or near Tachen.
- 4.
- Psychological and intelligence gathering advantages of these islands may be even more important than their strictly military value. Radar stations located on these islands make them extremely valuable to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores as part of early warning system.
- Not printed. (793.00/8–653)↩