1. The emergence of a strong, disciplined, and revolutionary
communist regime on mainland China has radically altered the power
structure in the Far East. With the minor exceptions of Hong Kong
and Macao, American, Japanese, and European power and influence has
been abruptly extruded from the whole vast area between the Amur,
the Himalayas and the Gulf of Tonkin. Simultaneously, Russian
influence has been abruptly advanced southward to areas in which
neither the Czars nor the Soviets have hitherto had more than
passing influence—China south of the wall, China south of the
Yangtze, and Southeast Asia. The primary problem of U.S. foreign
policy in the Far East is to cope with the altered structure of
power which arises from the existence of a strong and hostile
Communist China, and from the alliance of Communist China with the
USSR. (1)2
2. In sum the elements of the problem with which U.S. policy toward
Communist China must cope are:
3. It would be in the interest of the United States to secure a
reorientation of the Chinese Communist regime or its ultimate
replacement by a regime which would not be hostile to the United
States. However, in the absence of further Chinese Communist
aggression or a basic change in the situation, the following
policies are currently unacceptable to the United States:
4. In the absence of further Chinese Communist aggression or a basic
change in the situation, the policy of the United States toward
Communist China should currently be to seek, by means short of war
to reduce the relative power position of Communist China in Asia:
5. To carry out the policy stated in paragraph 4 the United States
should:
[Enclosure]
NSC Staff
Study on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China
the problem
1. The emergence of a strong, disciplined, and revolutionary
Communist regime on mainland China has effected a radical
alteration of the power structure in the Far East. With the
minuscule exceptions of Hong Kong and Macao, American, Japanese,
and European power and influence has [have] been abruptly extruded from the whole vast area
between the Amur, the Himalayas and the Gulf of Tonkin.
Simultaneously, Russian influence has been abruptly advanced
southward to areas in which neither the Czars nor the Soviets
have hitherto had more than passing influence—China south of the
wall, China south of the Yangtze, and Southeast Asia. The
primary problem of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East is to
cope with the altered structure of power which arises from the
[Page 283]
existence of a
strong and hostile Communist China, and from the alliance of
Communist China with the USSR.
elements of the
problem
2. The objectives which the U.S. can reasonably set for itself in
coping with this problem, and the courses of action which it can
prudently adopt to achieve those objectives, are necessarily
conditioned by the elements of the problem. The elements of the
problem to which the U.S. must address itself are: (a) the
present and prospective capabilities—political, economic, and
military—of Communist China; (b) present and prospective Chinese
Communist intentions toward non-Communist Asia and the West; (c)
the nature and prospects of the Sino-Soviet connection; (d)
present and prospective capabilities of non-Communist Asia; (e)
the scope and limitations of U.S. and Western capabilities with
respect to Communist China; (f) the bearing of U.S. policy
toward Communist China on U.S. relationships with the Free
World.
chinese communist
capabilities
Achievements
3. If the Peiping regime is judged solely on the basis of its
achievements, its capabilities must be assessed as formidable.
In the course of half a decade the Chinese Communists have
succeeded in defeating and replacing the National Government of
China on the mainland, in consolidating, extending, and
intensifying the control of the central administration, and in
largely rehabilitating the Chinese economy, while at the same
time undertaking a Communist political and social revolution of
vast proportions. The Chinese Communists have:
- a.
- Conquered all of China except Taiwan, including
Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Tibet.
- b.
- Destroyed organized Chinese Nationalist military
strength on the mainland and reduced banditry to its
lowest level in recent Chinese history.
- c.
- Eliminated most of the Nationalist political influence
on the mainland.
- d.
- Imposed centralized administrative and military
controls on China, including areas that were able to
preserve autonomy under the dynasties and under the
Republic; extended these controls into every aspect of
Chinese life, including the villages, which under
previous forms of Chinese government had only indirect
contacts with the central administration.
- e.
- Executed a radical and often violent redistribution of
land and in the process upset traditional political and
economic patterns, broken the economic power of the
landlords and rich peasants, destroyed the prestige and
leadership position of the rural gentry,
[Page 284]
and established the new
Communist cadres in an effective position of
leadership.
- f.
- Established a system of taxation and state controls
over production and marketing of agricultural products
and gained a firmer hold on Chinese agrarian output than
has been achieved by any previous Chinese
government.
- g.
- Extended state ownership of key industrial enterprises
and established state control over most raw materials
and labor, and reduced the private sector of urban
enterprise to economic and political impotency.
- h.
- Created a massive and centrally-directed apparatus of
propaganda, indoctrination, and terror, involving the
full-time employment of 3–5 million persons and mass
organizations with a membership of over 100 million
persons, to control the Chinese population.
- i.
- Initiated an attack upon basic traditional Chinese
institutions and values, such as filial piety, feminine
subservience, family and clan loyalties, localism, and
philosophical and religious humanism; and achieved
initial successes in replacing these values with those
of the Communist dialectic among important segments of
the Chinese population, particularly the youth.
- j.
- Created numerous Soviet-type institutions: model
agricultural collectives, state farms, and countless
agricultural cooperatives that are designed as
precursors for universal collectivization, as well as
urban industrial combines patterned in organization,
labor practices, and production techniques on Soviet
industry.
- k.
- Attained a position of leadership among Asian
Communist movements and regimes and supported some of
these with aid and technical assistance.
- l.
- Fought a three-year war, confined to Korea, against
UN forces, while at
the same time accelerating the totalitarian organization
of the Chinese polity and economy.
- m.
- Established a close working relationship, based on
common ideology and mutual power interest, with the
USSR in the face of
Chinese nationalism and ethnocentrism.
Political Prospects
4. In the course of these achievements, the Chinese Communist
Party was able to transform itself from a hard-core,
rural-based, peasant-supported guerrilla movement into the
ruling elite of the largest population of the world. It
accomplished this without loss of cohesiveness and discipline
among its top leadership and without loss of standing within the
world Communist movement. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party
stands alone among major Communist movements in having survived
a war and post-war periods without top-level purges and major
shakeups and in having established for itself a position of
prestige and independence within the Communist bloc.
5. It is obvious that Chinese Communist achievements can in large
degree be attributed to factors other than the political
competence of the Chinese Communist leaders. The Chinese
Communists
[Page 285]
have had
the advantage of operating in a fluid and revolutionary
situation. They have benefited from the collapse of traditional
Chinese civilization under the political, economic, military and
cultural impact of the West in the 19th and 20th centuries. They
have benefited from the dislocation and nationalistic impetus
which accompanied the Japanese war and occupation. They have
benefited from the political and military ineptness and loss of
will of the Chinese Nationalists in the post-war period of
political competition and civil war. They have benefited from
the defeat and dismemberment of the Japanese Empire, the wartime
weakening of the European colonial powers, and the immediate
post-war lassitude of the United States. They have benefited
from the Soviet example, from Russian assistance, and from their
alliance with the USSR.
6. It is also obvious that the Chinese Communists are confronted
by political problems of major proportions. Already, in
fastening totalitarian controls upon the Chinese population, in
undertaking the building of an industrial economy on the slim
margins afforded by the agrarian economy, in undertaking their
assault on traditional social forms and values, the Communists
appear to have alienated considerable segments of the populace
since their initial conquest of China. In spite of continuing
Communist success in mobilizing the loyalty of the party, the
army, and the youth, there is evidence that increased taxation
and regimentation has stimulated peasant opposition, that
intellectual and professional groups are disaffected by a drop
in their standard of living and by the campaigns of terror and
intimidation, that merchants and petty shopkeepers are resentful
of the heavy taxes and government competition, and that there is
a widespread repugnance to interference with personal and family
life, enforced frequent attendance at meetings, and the general
atmosphere of fear. The Communists have sacrificed popular
support in the interest of establishing rigid controls, while
retaining the loyalty of certain key groups. Although the
history of modern totalitarian regimes offers us little comfort
as to the consequences of such a shift, the Communists do face
the difficulties potentially inherent in operating on a narrower
base of popular support.
7. The long term holds even more critical political problems for
the Chinese Communists. They face the task of coping with the
slackening of spirit, dedication and unity which almost
unavoidably follows the achievement of power by a revolutionary
party. They are far from conquering, and may encounter perilous
difficulties in overcoming, the tenacious forces of Chinese
traditionalism and particularism. The very magnitude of their
success in erecting a completely centralized administration
poses for them the potential problem of estrangement between an
isolated, highly organized
[Page 286]
central leadership and the vast population
of the broad reaches of China. The Chinese Communists face
eventually that problem of succession to a strongly entrenched
personal leader which the Russians have already encountered.
They face also the complex of internal Chinese political
problems which may arise from continued Chinese Communist
conformity to Soviet policy and guidance—problems stemming from
Chinese nationalism, from the political stature and ambitions of
the Chinese Communist leadership in the international Communist
movement, and from the potential conflicts between Chinese and
Soviet national and party interests. Most important, the Chinese
Communists face the political hazards of attempting to force the
rapid development of an industrialized economy by gross
governmental extortion of the substance of a population which
already is hardly at a subsistence level.
8. It would be foolhardy to prophesy that the Chinese Communists
will successfully surmount the variety of political difficulties
which they will unavoidably encounter if they pursue their
present policies. But it would be equally foolhardy to assume
that they will not. The history of China through the centuries
demonstrates that there is no basic incompatibility between
rigidly orthodox, doctrinal, authoritarian government and the
Chinese temperament. Historically China is accustomed to rule by
bureaucracy and the Chinese have been wont to have standards of
personal conduct and habits of personal thought set by the
bureaucracy. The Chinese Communists have demonstrated
considerable capacity to cope with the political problems they
have thus far encountered, and their monopoly of media, of
information and of instruments of propaganda and terror will
assist them in attempting to surmount their political
difficulties. Unless and until they encounter problems with
which they cannot cope, it is only wise to assess their
political capabilities as formidable.
Economic Prospects
9. Chinese Communist economic effort has thus far been addressed
most importantly to the task of reorganizing and rehabilitating
the economy which they inherited. At the time of the takeover
the levels of agricultural and industrial production, the
stability of the currency, and the general condition of the
transportation system in China had reached a very low point as a
result of eight years of war against Japan and four years of
civil war. Consequently, the mere restoration of peace and order
to the countryside and relief from the accumulated destructive
pressures of war and rebellion would have enabled the
industrious Chinese people to make significant economic gains as
compared with 1949. The Communists have restored agricultural
production to something approximating
[Page 287]
prewar levels. While the rehabilitation of
industry has been less complete, largely due to the dimensions
of the task imposed by the casualties which the
Japanese-developed industrial plant in Manchuria incurred from
Russian removals and civil war, the Chinese Communists have made
considerable progress in the direction of prewar output. The
Chinese Communists have also successfully rehabilitated and
extended somewhat the modest railroad network of China,
facilitating an expansion in domestic trade and a broadening of
local markets. The regime has undertaken a highly publicized,
but relatively modest, public works program, particularly in the
field of flood control and irrigation.
10. While total output has been rising, the Chinese Communists
have instituted fiscal practices which, supplemented by
confiscation, extortion, and political pressure, have restrained
a rise in consumption and enabled the regime to secure an
increasing volume of resources with which to support the
burgeoning bureaucracy, the Korean war, and a modest but
expanding investment program. Some of these resources, such as
the foreign currency, gold and silver hoards which were forced
out of private hands, heavy capital levies on business firms in
the guise of fines, and other revenues from confiscated lands
and holdings of the Chinese National Government and its
officials, are no longer available to fill the coffers of the
regime. Special demands for revenue from now on must be met
largely from current national income. The Communists have taken
over for the state the major portion of industry and
transportation and have organized state controls over the
production and marketing of the products of the remaining
industrial sector of the economy. They have also implemented a
rigorous system of farm tax collections and organized state
controls over the marketing of the products of the agricultural
sector of the economy.
11. The Chinese Communists have secured for the present a stable
economy with the capacity for a moderate investment program.
Although there are indications that Peiping already has had to
scale down initial objectives, barring the dissipation of
resources through major agricultural disasters, involvement in a
large-scale war, or misallocation of resources through an
over-ambitious investment program, it would appear that the
regime could be expected to embark on a modest 5-year program
without major economic mishaps. Despite a moderate investment
program, several factors suggest that the Chinese Communists
within this short-run period may secure respectable increases in
output. With the skill and ruthlessness in manpower organization
demonstrated by the Chinese Communists, it is not unlikely that
the underemployed labor in agriculture can further be drawn into
production through expanded public works and other programs
without large inputs of
[Page 288]
capital. Moreover, with Communist China’s present obsolete
and underdeveloped industrial plant, a relatively high return of
output for investment may be expected if investment is directed
at modernization and consolidation of the existing industrial
complex. The pronouncements of the Chinese Communists on their
5-year plan suggest that this is the sort of program they have
in mind, and on this basis a realistic appraisal of Communist
China’s economy five years hence, even with continued Western
trade controls, might well be that an increase in output,
although with little change in the structure of the economy,
will have been achieved, and that the capacity for capital
formation will have improved.
12. Over the long-term period, however, Communist China faces
several major economic obstacles. Demography poses for the
Chinese Communists a major economic and political hazard. The
population of some 475,000,000 has been limited in its growth by
the classic Malthusian checks of disorder, pestilence and
famine. The political necessities of the Chinese Communists have
impelled them to restore order, to undertake extensive campaigns
for mass literacy and public health which reduce the efficacy of
the mass killers, and to devise for governmental purposes
methods of accumulating and distributing food which also tend to
counter famine. The Communists are willy-nilly intensifying the
problem of population growth.
13. Chinese Communist attempts at industrialization will
necessarily place upper limits on population increase.
Investment capital must primarily come out of agricultural
production, and capital formation will necessarily impose limits
on consumption and thus upon population growth. But present and
continued increases in population will obviously create
difficulties for the process. At best, by reason of increased
numbers of mouths to feed, the task of capital formation will be
more costly. Almost unavoidably the effort to mobilize
investment capital for the state will increase requirements for
widespread and costly security controls in the countryside. And
there is always the political hazard that the increased
extortions of the state and forced limitations on consumption
will lead to rural resistance or peasant revolt.
14. The ambitious schemes of the Chinese Communist regime for
industrialization must also reckon with the relative paucity of
China’s natural resources. Although China possesses large,
high-grade coal deposits, iron ore reserves are relatively
modest and much of these deposits is either low-grade ore or
poorly situated in relation to coal deposits. Moreover, China
appears to be deficient in oil and (with the exception of tin,
tungsten and antimony) other essential minerals. Apart from
minerals, there are no large amounts of uncultivated arable
land, while timber resources, located primarily
[Page 289]
in Manchuria, are meager. The
limited nature of these resources indicate, first, that although
China may industrialize greatly over its present level the
prospects are unlikely that China will become a major industrial
power, and second, that the process of industrialization will be
relatively costly owing to the high developmental and operating
costs involved in exploiting limited and low-grade resources and
owing to the limitations of Chinese technical and managerial
skills.
15. In assessing the economic prospects of the Chinese
Communists, and the political implications of those prospects,
it is wise to admit that the Communist regime has thus far shown
adeptness in attacking its economic problems. The Communists
have managed to secure effective control over the agricultural
output, and in the process have avoided methods which would
provoke violent resistance. They are moving ahead with a variety
of rural cooperative organizations which step by step they are
guiding in the direction of collectivization, particularly in
the grain growing and industrially important region of
Manchuria. In general, however, they have avoided forcing the
pace to a point where they prematurely arouse the constant
sensitivity of the peasant about his ownership of land. They
have proceeded more ruthlessly in the direction of complete
state control of trade and industry, but have timed their
confiscations and encroachments according to a judicious
calculation of the diminishing political risks which they
encounter from the increasingly impotent middle class. They have
concocted ambitious plans for industrial development, but have
not hesitated to trim them as the costs or risks appeared too
great. The Communists face Herculean tasks in the economic
field. It seems unlikely that they can soon achieve a modern
economy or major economic capabilities. And if the Communists
move too fast their victories may well be Pyrrhic. As yet,
however, there is not sufficient ground for estimating that the
regime will encounter insuperable economic difficulties or that
its political control will founder on the reef of economic
obstacles.
Military Capabilities
16. The achievement of the Chinese Communist regime in Korea has
been a military feat of no mean proportions, and instructive as
to the extent of Chinese Communist military capabilities. The
Chinese Communists, with Russian assistance, were able to
organize, train, equip, supply, and commit massive ground forces
in the Korean peninsula. These forces fought with courage,
aggressiveness, and with notably few desertions. They
demonstrated skill and energy in camouflage and entrenchment. As
the war progressed the Communists demonstrated increasing
capabilities and proficiency
[Page 290]
in the artillery arm. They accumulated
considerable capabilities and limited experience in air warfare,
although the bulk of air combat appears to have been undertaken
by the Russians. The Communists devised means, frequently
primitive, for logistic support of their front line units in the
face of uncontested air and naval superiority on the part of the
UN Command. Towards the end
of the war Communist ground-to-air anti-aircraft capabilities
were extensive.
17. But the Korean hostilities are also instructive as to the
present limits of Chinese Communist military capabilities. All
of the aircraft, and perhaps some 90 per cent of the ground
force equipment and munitions of the Chinese Communist forces
appear to have been supplied by the USSR. Chinese Communist military capabilities are
thus in large degree derivative rather than primary. The Chinese
Communist air force appears to have borne only a minor share of
defensive air operations; and conducted almost no offensive
operations. The Chinese Communists demonstrated no amphibious
capability. In spite of the proximity of North Korea to the most
highly developed communications system in all of China—the
Manchurian system—the proximity of North Korea to the Soviet
supply centers in the Maritime Province, the freedom from attack
which these areas were vouchsafed by UN self-denial, and the limited length of the
communication lines which had to operate under Allied attack
(200–250 miles)—in spite of these advantages the Chinese
Communists were never able to provide sufficient logistic
support to enable their forces to undertake sustained offensive
operations. Chinese offensives, in which the Communists enjoyed
considerable numerical superiority, repeatedly ground to a halt,
checked in part by skillful Allied resistance, but also by
logistical deficiencies. The Chinese Communists also
demonstrated marked tactical deficiencies, foregoing maneuver
and deception in favor of repeated frontal mass assault with
consequent acceptance of heavy losses for minor gains.
18. On the basis of the Korean experience, and of our
intelligence as to the level and quality of Chinese Communist
forces not committed in the Korean theater, it may be estimated
that the Chinese Communists, with continued assistance from the
USSR, have a considerable
capability for defending mainland China against amphibious or
ground assault; modest defensive and offensive air capabilities;
limited amphibious capabilities; and negligible naval
capabilities. However, within their own borders, on terrain
favorable for mechanized maneuver, and with their lines of
communication subject to all-out air attack, the numerical
superiority of the Chinese Communists would lose much of its
effectiveness. The Communists do have major capabilities for
offensive military action against
[Page 291]
areas adjacent to them on the mainland,
but Chinese logistical deficiencies place upper limits on the
magnitude of these capabilities. It might be estimated that in
circumstances where the Chinese were to be opposed, outside
their borders, by major, modern military forces, the Chinese
Communists would not have sufficient capabilities to achieve
decisive victory.
chinese communist intentions
toward non-communist asia and the west
19. In its relations with non-Communist Asia and the West,
Peiping is motivated by interacting factors derived from the
concurrently Chinese and Communist nature of the regime. As a
nationalistic Chinese regime, Peiping wishes to reassert China’s
position as an Asian and a world power. As a Communist regime,
it assesses its enemies and friends and its objectives in terms
of the objectives of world Communism and the Marxist analysis of
history. Related to these basic ingredients are Peiping’s
recognition of the value of the Soviet alliance, its desire
nevertheless to exercise leadership in Asia generally and in the
Asian Communist movement specifically, and its desire to
complete by its own means the Soviet-type revolution it has
initiated in China.
20. To promote its position and power from both the domestic and
world (especially Asian) standpoints, Peiping apparently feels
that it must convince Chinese and Asian opinion that Communist
China is becoming a great and progressive nation. It appears to
believe that expansion of Communism and of China’s leadership in
Asia, as well as the regime’s internal popularity, depend to a
considerable extent upon propagating the idea that Communist
China is making dynamic progress in industrialization, popular
welfare, and strength. The importance attached to these
considerations is indicated in the tremendously organized
efforts for self-advertisement to Asia that the regime is
making, in its extreme concern of maintaining prestige, and in
its sensitivity to setbacks in its industrialization program
from the standpoint of psychological consequences.
21. Peiping’s foreign policies, however, are not motivated purely
by an aggressive urge. The psychology of fear plays an important
role. Peiping suffers from traditional Chinese suspicion and
fear of the outside world and is keenly conscious of the
ideological hostility of the West. The difficulties inherent in
the defense of its extensive frontiers have therefore made
Peiping doubly sensitive to the development of potentially
hostile military powers or coalitions in the Far East,
particularly based on Japan.
22. Peiping appears to believe that in the area of foreign
relations the above factors can best be served by dynamic
policies directed
[Page 292]
ultimately at a Communist seizure of power in other Asian
countries. However, Peiping recognizes that in specific local
and world contexts this ultimate aim may involve risks and costs
that the regime is not able to assume. Without abandoning the
ultimate aim, Peiping’s policies are therefore often directed at
intermediate goals of an economic, political, or security
nature. These short-range goals usually fall within the
framework of a world Communist strategy aimed at neutralizing
sources of Western support in Asian countries, preventing the
rise of stable, firmly anti-Communist governments wherever
possible, encouraging “neutralism,” and perverting to Communist
purposes Asian strivings for independence, progress, and
peace.
23. The balance of Peiping’s policy emphasis between long-range
and short-range goals, and its willingness to assume risks and
costs, varies from time to time and place to place. In 1949–50
Peiping proclaimed itself the fountainhead of an Asian policy of
“armed struggle” and direct seizure of power by Communist
groups—a policy that saw its climax in the north Korean attack
on the Republic of Korea in June, 1950. With the growing
stability and military capability of non-Communist governments
in such countries as Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and Japan,
and with the defeat of the Communist offensives in Korea in the
spring of 1951, this shifted to one of limiting rather than
expanding existing warfare and of emphasizing in many areas
“peaceful” rather than violent methods, thus conserving
Communist potentials for the future. As part of this policy,
Peiping became the center of the Asian “peace” movement and
encouraged Communists throughout Asia to seek out the broadest
possible alliance with all potentially anti-Western elements. At
the present time, with the Korean truce, Peiping’s policy
emphasis is for the moment predominately on “peace,” with the
conspicuous exception of Indochina, where military methods
appear to the Communists to hold a promise of maximum gain at
minimum risk.
24. Within the above framework of foreign policy objectives, a
number of specific goals of Peiping’s current Asian policies can
be discerned:
- a.
- For both security and prestige reasons, Peiping is
anxious to restore Chinese sovereignty over all
historically Chinese areas with the possible exception
of Outer Mongolia. This aim was largely accomplished
with the conquest of the Chinese mainland, including
Tibet, and with the establishment of at least a
temporary modus vivendi on the
Sino-Soviet Asian frontier which recognized Chinese
sovereignty in these areas. However, Taiwan remains in
the hands of the anti-Communist U.S.-supported National
Government; Hong Kong remains British; Macao remains
Portuguese; and the naval base of Port Arthur remains
under Soviet military control. Ultimately,
[Page 293]
the Chinese
Communists will hope to regain full sovereignty over all
those areas. Peiping’s other possible territorial
aspirations appear less important. On the undemarcated
sections of the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian borders,
Peiping will presumably advance at least the traditional
Chinese claims—current Chinese Communist maps of these
areas indicate Chinese Communist claims well beyond any
put forth in negotiations by the National Government,
but none of these claims has been formally advanced by
Peiping.
- b.
- Beyond the historically Chinese areas, Peiping
apparently feels it has preeminent security interests in
certain border areas, particularly North Korea, North
Burma, and Northern Vietnam. Peiping would presumably go
to considerable lengths to prevent the establishment of
strong Western military forces in these areas. (It is
significant that the primary reason advanced by Peiping
propaganda in its Korean intervention was the security
of Manchuria—a factor that certainly weighed heavily in
the Chinese decision to intervene.)
- c.
- In Southeast Asia, Peiping’s interest is two-fold.
Like any Chinese government it is interested in
cultivating the sizeable Chinese minorities, whose
status reflects on China’s prestige and who are a useful
source of trade and foreign exchange, as well as
potential instruments for present and future Communist
operations in these areas. As a leader of Asian
Communism, Peiping is interested in expanding its
influence among Southeast Asian Communist movements and
in providing these with aid and guidance.
- d.
- In Northeast Asia, Peiping’s interest is to insure the
safety and potential for future expansion of the North
Korean regime and to attempt to neutralize the threat of
Japan. In this area, short-range policy may emphasize
Korea but in the long run the Peiping regime is most
deeply concerned over Japan, which alone of Asian
countries could be a military threat to Communist China
even in the absence of substantial Western military
forces.
- e.
- In the field of economics, Peiping is anxious to
extend its commercial contacts throughout Asia,
particularly with Japan, not only because of the need
for trade in China’s five-year program of
industrialization, but also because trade and trade
offers are considered by the Communists to be powerful
weapons in neutralizing the anti-Communist posture of
many Asian governments.
- f.
- In the field of diplomacy, Peiping is interested in
occupying China’s seat in the UN and in establishing formal relations
with Asian countries (with the exception of the
Associated States of Indochina, which Peiping cannot
recognize because of its relationship to Ho Chi
Minh3). In the case
of Japan, Peiping is restricted by having to coordinate
its activities with those of the USSR and by its untempered
opposition to the San Francisco treaty4 and the present U.S.-oriented
government.
- g.
- Peiping’s domestic policies—centered at present around
the programs of industrial and military modernization
and social and
[Page 294]
political sovietization—must compete with the foreign
policy objectives described above. As international
Communists, the Peiping leaders are acutely aware of the
importance of the international environment to their
domestic program and of the “threat of capitalist
encirclement.” They have not, therefore, demonstrated
any willingness to sacrifice major elements in their
foreign policy, such as their Asian leadership role,
their security considerations in bordering countries
(such as North Korea and Vietnam), or their status in
the Soviet bloc, merely to further a domestic program or
to prevent repercussions unfavorable to domestic
programs (such as economic sanctions). Where shifts in
foreign policy have taken place, these usually seemed to
have been based primarily on changing international
conditions.
25. From the viewpoint of Peiping, Western (i.e., U.S.)
opposition and a Western (U.S.) threat is in evidence in
relation to every objective of Chinese Communist foreign policy.
The Chinese Communists see obstacles to their policies in
British retention of Hong Kong, U.S. protection over and
assistance to Taiwan, U.S. participation in the defense of
Korea, U.S. aid to Indochina and other Asian countries that are
resisting Communist inroads, U.S. participation in the military,
political, and economic resurgence of Japan, and U.S. support of
political pressures and economic restrictions against Communist
China. Many of these specific foreign policy objectives of the
Peiping regime, whether territorial, political, or economic,
would be shared by any strong, independent, nationalistic
Chinese government. However, of importance from the viewpoint of
U.S. policy is the fact that Peiping’s adherence to Communist
doctrine alters not only the intensity but also the direction of
Peiping’s policies. In the case of the Chinese Communists,
ultimate opposition to the West would not be reduced if
individual sources of friction were removed, since Peiping
shares the world Communist objectives of placing under Communist
control not only Asia, but the West as well. Peiping opposes the
West not only where Western power is in evidence, as in Japan,
but also where Western influence has been virtually destroyed
and no longer represents an immediate threat to its rule, as in
the field of Chinese education, because it is the West—not only
as a military, political, and economic system, but also as an
ideology—that is antithetical to the foundations of the Chinese
Communist system. No settlement of individual issues, no
compromises, could in Chinese Communist eyes resolve the basic
conflict between the two systems.
natures and prospects of the
sino-soviet connections
26. The relationship between the Kremlin and the Peiping regime
is clearly distinct from the relationship between the Kremlin
and the other Communist states. The distinction has been
frequently
[Page 295]
described
as consisting of the difference between a junior partner and a
satellite relationship. The essence of the differentiation in
the relationships is that whereas in the satellite states the
Kremlin rules in detail, lays down precise instructions for
particular actions, and administers the internal hierarchy of
personalities and power, with Communist China the Russians
appear to act almost entirely on the basis of state to state
negotiation, assistance, and advice. “The great Chinese
people”—to use the constantly reiterated Russian phrase—appears
to be dealt with as a unit which is authoritatively represented
by the Peiping government, and the collective Chinese Communist
leadership. In the satellites, on the other hand, the channels
of authority appear to run from the Kremlin to varying,
individual Communist leaders. The Russians handle the satellites
through disciplinary control over individual Communist party
members. They appear to deal with Communist China as a close,
but relatively independent ally.
27. Granted that we know very little as to how and why things
happen in the murky recesses of the centers of Russian and
Chinese state and party power, the evidence as to the basic
nature of the Soviet-Peiping relationship is reasonably
conclusive. Pertinent indications include the special mention of
China as distinct from the “Peoples Democracies” in all Russian
statements; the unique distinctions reserved for Mao Tse-tung and Chinese
Communist revolutionary theory and tactics in Russian political
literature; the relative deference with which the Russians treat
the Chinese representatives on all public occasions; the
relatively independent role of Chinese Communist representatives
in the few international gatherings in which the Chinese
Communists have thus far taken part. There is also scanty but
convincing intelligence as to the manner in which Russian
personnel in Manchuria appear to have deliberately avoided
intervention in Chinese Communist internal affairs and, even in
cases where enterprises were still jointly owned and operated,
confined themselves to technical advice, leaving all such
problems as personnel, labor management and political
indoctrination to the Chinese. Perhaps most important, there is
no good evidence in the high command of the Chinese Communist
party of those shifts of personnel which in the Satellites
indicate direct Soviet intervention in local party affairs. The
apparent stability of the roster of the Chinese Communist top
command is in itself the strongest indication the
Russian-Chinese relationships are on a state-to-state basis.
28. The bases of the Russian-Chinese partnership are varied. The
Soviets and the Chinese Communists share the vocabulary and
substance of a system of political thought, and the forms and
practices of a pattern of political action. Ideological affinity
provides cement
[Page 296]
for
the alliance. Both Russians and Chinese Communists believe
themselves confronted with the common threat of hostile power
based on Japan. The Chinese Communists and the Russians share
the grand objective of eliminating Western power and influence
from the Far East—the Russians because their global purposes
call for a weakening of the West; the Chinese because in
addition to their communist aspirations, their nationalist
drives center on the recovery of Chinese territory, the removal
of Western threats to their borders, and the extension of
Chinese influence throughout the Far East.
29. The profits which have already accrued to both the Chinese
and the Russians from their partnership augur well for
continuance of the connection. The Chinese Communists have
secured from the Soviets matériel and training assistance for
creation of a sizable modern army and a fair-sized air force.
They have benefited from Russian technical advice in the
rehabilitation of Chinese industry, mining, power production and
transportation. They appear to have received assistance from the
Russians in capital goods. They have received USSR support for UN membership and acknowledgment of
their status as a great power. Up to the present, they have,
because of the Russian connection, remained immune from hostile
attack while conducting a major war against the United States
and its Allies. The Russians have profited from Peiping’s
intervention in Korea which preserved the Communist state of
North Korea, forestalled the installation of hostile forces on
the Soviet borders, and prevented a major defeat for the Soviet
bloc. And the Soviets have benefited from the assistance which
Peiping has given in spreading communist influence and
propaganda, and in projecting the Soviet peace offensive into
East Asia. The alliance must seem invaluable to both Soviet and
Chinese Communist leaders.
30. Yet there are major potentials for tension and discord in the
Sino-Soviet partnership. In the long term, too great success on
the part of the Chinese Communists might produce in the Russians
real concern. The Russians could hardly view with equanimity the
development of an independent China on its frontiers which was
powerful, well armed, industrially competent, and politically
united. Chinese Communist successes in achieving reduction of
Western power and influence in the Far East might confront the
Russians with a partner whose ambitions could be achieved at
cost not to the West but to the Russians themselves.
31. And in the shorter term there are potential hazards for the
partnership. From the inception of the Peiping regime there have
been a number of problems not fully resolved; these center on:
the degree of Soviet intervention and control in Manchuria,
Mongolia,
[Page 297]
and
Sinkiang; the status of Mao
Tse-tung in world Communism; the degree of
conformity of Chinese internal policies to a world Communist
“line”; the extent to which the Chinese should dominate or
influence the Communist Parties of South Asia and Japan; the
questions of the volume and Chinese repayment for Soviet
military and economic aid; the basic anti-foreign feelings of
the Chinese people. Any or all of these problems may come to
plague the partnership.
32. It may, moreover, become increasingly difficult for the
Russians to maintain the circumspection which they have hitherto
displayed in dealing with the sensibilities of their junior
partner. The men of the Kremlin are not in the habit of dealing
with their lessers in any terms except those of strict control.
New strains within the Kremlin leadership might prompt the
Chinese Communists, confident of their own regime’s stability,
to adopt an attitude of arrogance and greater independence. As
the inevitable differences in interest, viewpoint, or timing of
actions develop between the Russians and the Chinese; as the
Chinese tend to become importunate in their demands for Russian
assistance or support; or as the role of the Chinese as
viceregents for international communism in the Far East becomes
too independent and self reliant—there will be strong temptation
for the Russians to attempt to move in the direction of greater
disciplinary control over the Chinese Communists. If the time
ever comes when the Russians feel impelled to contest with the
Chinese Communist leaders for primacy in the domestic apparatus
of control of the Chinese regime, the alliance will be
critically endangered. For, as has been stated before, the
Chinese Communist leaders are Chinese as well as Communists.
33. It seems evident that the potential difficulties of the
Sino-Soviet connection will stem primarily from the internal
workings of the partnership and only secondarily from the nature
of external pressures or inducements. The West to be sure can
strive to create those pressures or inducements which might be
most apt to provide the context for increase of tension in the
partnership. But short of inflicting on the Chinese Communists
an outright military defeat it seems improbable that the West
can through its pressure alone break the alliance. It also seems
improbable that the West can through accommodation create a
situation in which Chinese conflicts of interest with the
Russians are greater than Chinese conflicts of interest with the
West; the initial Chinese Communist choice of partnership with
the Russians in 1949, when the Western powers, including the
United States, had obviously reconciled themselves to the defeat
of the Nationalists and the supremacy of the Communists in
China, and were making gestures of accommodation, has already
given some indication of the limited efficacy of
[Page 298]
appeasement as a weapon against
the continuation of the alliance. In the last analysis the
continued strength of the Chinese connection with the Russians
will depend primarily on the degree to which the Chinese are
successful in conforming their particular courses of action to
the general outlines of Russian policy, and above all on the
degree to which the Russians are successful in restraining
themselves from attempts to exert direct disciplinary control
over the Chinese Communist leaders. Thus far there has been no
evidence that either partner will fail to pursue courses of
action that will preserve their present relationship.
capabilities of non-communist
asia
Present Capabilities of
Non-Communist Asia
34. It is evident that the capabilities of the non-Communist
Asian countries vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists are for the
moment almost purely defensive. The Chinese Communists may have
cause to worry about the degree to which these countries may
serve as channels or instruments for aggressive action on the
part of the U.S. and the West. The existence of the Chinese
National Government on Taiwan poses a potential military threat
to the Chinese Communists; the potential development of Japan or
India may give them major concern. But as of now no country of
non-Communist Asia poses in its own right a major political or
military threat to Communist China, and for the U.S. and the
West the central immediate problem is the capacity of the
non-Communist countries to hold against or to be assisted to
hold against the political, economic, and military thrust of the
Chinese Communists.
35. Militarily, no one of the countries on the mainland whose
geographic position makes them the immediate potential targets
of Chinese Communist aggression, (Korea, the Associated States,
Thailand, Burma) has the military strength to counter
independently Chinese Communist armed forces. South Korea with
the U.S. assistance has developed major military forces, but has
obviously not reached and never can reach the point of being
able to defend itself alone. The French and Associated States
are hardly able to hold their own against present Vietminh
forces, and could not withstand a Chinese Communist
intervention. The military capabilities of Burma and Thailand
are minor.
36. Of the countries protected by sea or distance from Chinese
Communist attack, Nationalist China and India have presently the
largest and best developed armed forces. Without U.S. naval and
air protection, however, Formosa could probably not defend
itself against Communist attack; and Indian capabilities to
withstand Chinese Communist attack through Burma would be
questionable.
[Page 299]
Japan,
while having the capability to develop indigenous military
strength, does not presently appear to be willing to create the
forces necessary to defend itself from an external attack.
37. With the possible exception of Indochina, the non-Communist
region of East Asia does as a whole appear to have the
capabilities—under conditions of continued U.S. and Western
assistance—to cope with the present range of internal and
external Chinese Communist and local Communist pressures.
Communist rebellions are slowly but perceptibly being suppressed
in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Communist parties and
front groups do not presently present a serious threat to the
position of any of the governments except in Indochina and
possibly in Indonesia. Instabilities arising from political
inexperience, apathy toward political processes, remnant
colonial issues, and economic distress weaken the governments of
most countries of the area but not to the point of making them
so vulnerable to Communist political warfare as to threaten
their existence.
38. Economically, there is no country in non-Communist Asia which
is presently closely tied to the Communist bloc or which is in
immediate danger of falling under Communist economic domination.
There are, however, throughout the area vulnerabilities to
Communist pressure for expanding trade. The falling markets for
agricultural and mineral exports create specific vulnerabilities
in the case of Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and Ceylon; and the
general over-all drive for trade and foreign markets impels the
Japanese to seek for expanded trade with the Communist held
mainland.
39. In the non-Communist Asian region as a whole, there are
factors which make it possible for the U.S. and the West to
exert influence and provide effective assistance. Throughout
most of the area there is a fear of Chinese expansionism which,
provided Western support continues, can be expected to produce
increased efforts against Communism rather than ostrich-like
immobility. Despite the attraction of Marxist theory through
most of the region, there is considerable evidence that at least
among some of their most influential political leaders there has
been increasing disillusionment on the part of such Asian
“neutralist” countries as India, Burma, and Indonesia with
respect to the Chinese Communists. Leaders of these countries,
while for various reasons maintaining their aloofness from power
alliances, seem to be more wary of Chinese Communist intentions
towards their countries and more seriously concerned with
Communist activity within their borders than when the Peiping
regime was first established. The reaction of the overseas
Chinese community to the Peiping regime has also been influenced
by these factors and by the ruthlessness of the regime’s
economic policies on the mainland particularly those directed at
private
[Page 300]
enterprise. It
seems safe to say that the regime is less popular with the
overseas Chinese now than during its first year. In the absence
of sharp changes in the general conduct of the Chinese
Communists both at home and overseas it can be fairly estimated
that the attitude toward the Peiping regime both on the part of
the Asian countries on its periphery and on that of the overseas
Chinese as a whole will continue to harden.
40. Conversely, there is a considerable appreciation of many
aspects of Western culture and technical achievement, and a
growing appreciation that many facets of U.S. behavior and
policy toward the underdeveloped countries are compatible with
their own objectives. In the “neutralist” nations, this
realization seems to be emerging alongside continuing opposition
to any appearance of “colonialism,” and a belief that U.S.
policy is, despite the best of motives, governed more by the
necessity of preserving the Western coalition with the colonial
powers than by the interests of the Asian countries.
Prospective Capabilities of
non-Communist Asia
41. In the absence of direct Chinese Communist military
intervention, it may be expected that non-Communist Asia as a
whole will in the course of the next few years, show some
improvement in terms of political stability, domestic economic
development, and controls over internal subversive elements. A
considerable increase in the strength of the non-Communist
position would arise from the defeat of the organized forces of
the Vietminh in Indochina, but such a defeat would be likely
only if considerably increased external assistance were placed
in support of the Associated States, and the people became
convinced they were fighting in their own behalf. There are no
immediate prospects of rapid development of strength in the two
countries which, potentially, can contribute most to a
restoration of balance of power in Asia—Japan and India. There
is an obvious ceiling on the potential power of Taiwan and there
are no immediate prospects for rapid development of regional
cooperation for the purpose of mutual defense.
42. The Chinese Government on Taiwan is a considerable asset to
the U.S. position in the Far East. The existence of the Chinese
Government on Formosa offers an at least symbolic alternative to
Communist control of the mainland, and helps to frustrate the
Communist objective of gaining international acceptance as the
sole representative of the Chinese people. Taiwan also offers
material competition to Peiping as a center for the loyalties of
the overseas Chinese. The military forces of the Nationalists
constitute the only readily available strategic reserve in the
Far East and as such assist in discouraging the Chinese
Communists from further military
[Page 301]
adventures. Despite the fact that these
forces are inexorably aging, they provide, for the short term, a
valuable deterrent force and one which could be used in a
variety of ways in the contingency of further Chinese Communist
aggression.
43. Japan, by reason of its developed industry, and the
relatively advanced technical training and aptitudes of its
population, is the one Asiatic power which has the potential of
becoming an independent military threat to the Chinese
Communists. But even assuming rapid progress toward rearmament,
the Japanese will not be independent of U.S. military support
for a considerable period. Japanese cooperation with U.S.
defense planning will probably continue, but collaboration with
respect to over-all objectives in the Far East will be tempered
to some extent by the strong Japanese desire to restore
commercial relations with the China mainland. Japanese leaders
seek—and appear to consider feasible—a modus
vivendi with Communist China which will leave internal
and external security unimpaired; some leaders have indicated a
conviction that Japan could usefully function as a bridge
between China and the West. Although import and export
requirements make Japan vulnerable to economic pressures
affecting her access to the world market, even assuming a
continuation of U.S. assistance, Japanese susceptibility to
Communist overtures or threats will probably be overshadowed by
the prevailing belief that its national interests are best
served by close relations with the West. The Japanese Communist
Party will preserve its ability to conduct sabotage operations
but will not be capable of seizure of power. All in all it will
be some time even under optimum conditions, before Japan
possesses the capability of exercising leadership in Asia.
44. India, by reason of its size and population, its potential
for economic and military growth, and the political leadership
and prestige of Nehru in
the other countries of Southeast Asia, also offers a potentially
important counterpoise to Communist China. But India’s domestic
and external problems make it unlikely that in the near future
there will be rapid development of India’s capabilities
vis-à-vis Communist China. Barring Nehru’s death or disability, the Congress Party
over the next few years may be expected to retain control of the
government, or to dominate a coalition if its majority should be
cut. The Communist Party will probably not soon become a serious
threat to the internal security of the nation or to the position
of the government. Continuing economic and social backwardness,
however, will be difficult to remedy. India can be expected to
maintain its policy of non-alignment with either East or West,
to continue to play an active role, in concert with other
members of the Arab-Asian group when possible, in efforts to
reduce tensions and to settle specific problems among the great
[Page 302]
powers and to take
measures in defense of its own territory if necessary. Indian
contributions to the security of the non-Communist area against
Communist China will be heavily contingent on the status of the
still unresolved dispute over Kashmir, a problem which currently
pins down the major portion of both Indian and Pakistani armed
power.
45. Prospects for regional cooperation in non-Communist Asia are
inhibited by the conflicting purposes of the various Asian
nations with regard to collective action. On the one hand, the
strongly anti-Communist states of Korea, Nationalist China, the
Philippines, and Thailand share an interest in the development
of mutual security arrangements, but the attraction derives more
from the possibilities for U.S., or Western, participation and
assistance than from the prospects of effective collaboration
among these geographically separated states. On the other hand,
the independent states of the “neutralist” group—primarily
India, Indonesia, and Burma—share a desire to play an active,
but essentially political role, as a third force operating apart
from the major power constellations and their conception of
Asian unity probably still embraces Communist China. There seems
to be little common ground, therefore, on which the shared
aspirations for security from external aggression can develop
into collaborative arrangements for defense either with or
without the participation of Western nations. U.S. efforts to
promote such arrangements might prejudice the “neutralist” group
even though individually they might be willing to accept U.S.
military aid. There is, however, a potential for further
extension of regional cooperation, along economic and cultural
lines, among the independent states of Southeast Asia, which, in
time, might lead to a sense of common purpose sufficiently
strong to dictate common efforts for defense.
u.s. and western cabilitiesi
vis-à-vis communist China
46. In the military field it is hardly necessary to say that the
United States and the West possess very considerable offensive
capabilities for action against the area controlled by the
Chinese Communist regime. The United States alone has naval and
air power adequate to establish an effective close-in blockade
of the China coast, and to undertake naval bombardment of
coastal areas. United States air power exerted against mainland
China in sufficient force and employing all available weapons
could impose decisive damage on the Chinese Communist air force
and its facilities, destroy the essential elements of the modern
industrial sector of the Chinese Communist economy, and inflict
heavy and perhaps crippling damage on the Chinese transportation
net. U.S. sea and air power would make it possible for the
United States to effect
[Page 303]
lodgement of U.S. or Allied ground forces on the mainland and
to support large-scale land campaigns.
47. It is not possible to forecast precisely the end result of
full exercise of U.S. military capabilities against Communist
China because of the variables which would be introduced by
USSR counteraction. It is
highly probable that an all out U.S. military effort against
Communist China, undertaken with the design of overthrowing the
Peiping regime, would result in Russian military intervention,
and quite possibly in global war. Such an undertaking would in
any case bear high costs for the U.S., probably including full
U.S. mobilization, would commit to the China theater a high
proportion of U.S. forces, might absorb a considerable
proportion of the U.S. atomic stockpile and of U.S. atomic
carriers, and would probably result in the splitting of the
U.S.-led coalition.
48. The United States and the West also have considerable
capabilities for countering possible future Chinese Communist
aggression against areas not now occupied by Chinese Communist
forces. The U.S. and its Allies have already demonstrated in
Korea the capacity of the West to stop a full scale Chinese
Communist military thrust. U.S. offensive capabilities described
above could be exerted against the areas of Communist China, and
the U.S. and the West have capabilities for putting ground
forces and tactical air into any locality which the Chinese
Communists might attack.
49. It is probable that the United States and the West do have
the military capabilities to force the Chinese Communists to
cease and desist from any particular aggression which the
Chinese Communists might undertake outside their present areas
of control. The cost would probably be high. But it is possible
that actions against Communist China which might be taken in
such a contingency, provided they were obviously directed solely
toward forcing the Chinese to halt aggression, would not result
in formal USSR military
intervention or general war, even though it is probable that the
USSR would lend the Chinese
important military assistance. Such an action would not
necessarily weaken, and might in fact strengthen, the U.S.-led
coalition.
50. The U.S. and the West also have the military capabilities to
defeat Communist armed forces presently operating in areas in
Asia outside of Chinese Communist control. The only major
problem in this category is in Indochina. The French, if their
present political concessions to the Associated States attract
the willing support of the indigenous population, do have the
capability, in conjunction with the indigenous armies of the
Associated States, to defeat the organized forces of the
Vietminh, provided the French put in major reinforcements. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the French will have the
political will to undertake such a
[Page 304]
course of action. It appears highly
possible that, barring substantially increased U.S. absorption
of the economic costs of the war, or even intervention by U.S.
forces, the French will not have the will to carry the war to a
successful conclusion. U.S. military intervention could achieve
the defeat of the Vietminh.
51. There is a possibility, although no certainty, that
threatened defeat of the Vietminh by the French and Vietnamese
or the intervention of U.S. forces in Indochina, would result in
Chinese Communist intervention on the Korean pattern. On the
other hand the Chinese Communists might well be unwilling to
take on the costs and losses which would follow such an
intervention. If the Chinese Communists did intervene the U.S.
and Western capabilities and the probable outcome would be
similar to those described in the case of U.S. and Western
reaction to further Chinese Communist aggression outside their
present areas of control, (para. 48)
52. For reasons arising out of the nature of the Chinese Soviet
connection, and because the present conflicts of Chinese
Communist interest with the West so greatly exceed the conflicts
of interest between the Chinese Communists and the Russians, the
United States and the West, short of inflicting decisive
military defeat on Communist China, probably do not have the
capacity of breaking the Sino-Soviet Alliance. The Chinese
Communists and the Russians may eventually come into conflict,
or at least cease to act as a unit, and the U.S. and the West
may be able to capitalize on specific tensions and conflicts
within the partnership. But in the last analysis a fracture of
the alliance, if it comes, will stem primarily from the internal
relationships of the partners and only secondarily from either
the pressures or inducements of the West.
53. The United States and the West, provided they act in concert,
do have the capability of imposing difficulty and some delay on
Chinese Communist attempts at large scale industrialization. The
Soviet Union and the European satellites will find it difficult
to provide the capital goods which the Chinese Communists will
require. The United States, Japan and the West are the only
other important potential sources of such capital goods. Western
capacity to affect the Chinese economy, even if the West acts in
concert, does, however, have limits. The Chinese Communists have
weathered the present level of economic controls without
apparent direct effect on a major military effort, and without
major effects on their progress in rehabilitating their economy.
Continuation of U.S. and Western controls might be expected to
increase Chinese Communist difficulties in achieving anything
approaching a rapid industrialization, and to intensify the
difficulties which the Chinese Communist regime will in any case
encounter in capital formation. But
[Page 305]
Western controls will not of themselves
prevent substantial Chinese Communist economic development.
54. The United States and the West, again provided they act in
concert, also have the capability of denying the Chinese
Communist regime full status in the international community. The
West can withhold or withdraw recognition, and if it acts in
concert, exclude the Chinese Communists from the United Nations.
Membership in the UN would place
Peiping in a better position to support USSR propaganda efforts, improve Peiping’s
international position, and add to Peiping’s prestige by
endowing it with symbolic recognition of its prestige and
permanence. Thus far the Communists do not appear to have
regarded diplomatic relations or UN membership as important enough to cause them to
abstain from efforts to eliminate Western influence from
mainland China, Korea, and Southeast Asia; it is possible
however that they will regard UN
membership as important enough to warrant material
concessions.
55. The United States and the West have the capability of
assisting in the creation of strength in non-Communist Asia,
which will assist in the restoration of the Far Eastern
structure of power, and reduce the relative strength of the
Chinese Communists. The United States and the West have the
opportunities of directly and importantly assisting the
development of economic and military strength in Japan, and to
some degree India. The United States and the West have the
opportunity of importantly affecting the balance of power in the
Far East by fostering and strengthening independent
non-Communist states in Indochina. The United States and the
West can continue to assist development of military and economic
strength in Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines and the
remainder of Southeast Asia. By political moves which lessen the
“colonial” aspects of Western actions in Southeast Asia, the
United States and the West have the opportunity of increasing
the possibilities of eventual regional organization in the Far
East.
the relationship of u.s. china
policy to the free world coalition
56. It is all too evident that the Free World will not act as a
unit toward Communist China. And the divisions of the Free World
over attitudes toward Communist China tend to engender emotional
heat of an intensity similar to that engendered by the China
issue in domestic U.S. opinion. India, under Nehru’s leadership, continues
to believe that the best approach to the problem is to attempt
to wean Mao’s regime
away from Russia by extensive promotion of non-Communist
contacts with Communist China; Indian fears of Communist China,
and Indian desires for a strong, third force, Asian bloc add
emotional intensity to this belief. Other
[Page 306]
Southeast Asian states, impelled
by fear of Communist China, by desires to expand trade, and by
desires to prevent or avoid involvement in a general Asian war,
tend to share Indian beliefs. Partly because of their desire to
keep in step with India, partly from their fears about Hong
Kong, and partly because of the important place which the idea
of the China market occupies in British thought and politics,
the U.K. leans towards the thesis
that the Chinese Communists should be accorded conciliatory
treatment and has some support in Commonwealth opinion. The
Japanese for their part have overweening expectations of what
trade with the mainland might achieve for the Japanese economy,
and also fancy themselves as possible mediators between
Communist China and the West. The French grope for ways in which
their difficulties in Indochina might somehow be settled by
arrangements with Peiping. On the other side of the fence, the
South Koreans and Chinese Nationalists are fearful that any
accommodation with Communist China might quash their particular
ambitions.
57. U.S. policy toward China must take account of the welter of
variant, opposing, and emotionally supported views which are
held by the other countries of the Free World. Because of the
variety of these views no U.S. policy toward Communist China
will meet support from all of the Free World. Because of the
intensity of emotional and national feelings on the subject of
Communist China, any U.S. policy toward Communist China will
encounter strenuous and vocal objections from at least some of
the countries of the Free World. Because of both the variety and
emotional intensity of these views, U.S. attempts to impose on
other countries adoption of its own program toward Communist
China, whatever that program may be, will have dangerously
divisive effects on the Free World coalition. This last point is
perhaps the most important. The United States must obviously
adopt some policy towards Communist China, and it obviously
cannot please everybody. But the United States can avoid the
most dangerously divisive potentials of the Chinese Communist
issue, by refraining from excessive pressure on its friends to
follow American policies with respect to Communist China.
