Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, June 25, 1954, 11:30 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, June 25, 1954, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follow a list of those present (27) and discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

II MDAP Equipment to Indochina

Mr. Murphy called on Mr. Nolting² to touch on the elements of the problem of MDAP aid to Indochina.

Mr. Nolting said the problem divided itself conveniently into two parts: (a) direct aid to forces in Indochina; and (b) end item military assistance. He emphasized that (a) was not an immediate problem, since support for forces in the form of money could be continued up until the last minute without concern it would subsequently increase the enemy’s military capabilities. What was of concern, however, was (b). It was necessary to scrutinize the flow of shipments into the area, the ports where the shipments were unloaded (Haiphong, Hanoi and Saigon), and the delicate question of timing and discussion of this subject with the French. Involved also was the legal angle, and the feasibility of any plan for the disposition of MDAP equipment already in French hands and on its way.

The question arose as to what reserves of ammunition and matériel were presently in the hands of the French. It was brought out that General Stewart’s office had a study under way, and that instructions on the subject of submitting further information were being drafted for CINCPAC.

Pursuing this matter further, the alternative advantages of (1) diverting shipments now in the pipeline, or (2) holding back those shipments was touched upon.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Nolting to review briefly the question of title to MDAP equipment, and terms of possible repossession. Mr. Nolting pointed out that under the terms of agreements with the French, it is the State Department’s position that we have the right of repossession, but he added that procedures to that end had not been finalized. It was a question of timing, he said.

Admiral Duncan³ asked if the decision which the JCS were asked to make was whether or not to divert, or to slow down shipments now. Admiral Radford indicated that it was difficult to reach a decision on that subject unless we knew how much matériel the French had left.

Mr. Hensel remarked that MAAG Saigon should know.

General Cabell said that it was a CIA estimate that they had approximately 600 planeloads of matériel in the Hanoi area.

Mr. Hensel said that his figure was 972,000-odd tons for the total of matériel which had been shipped to Indochina.

Admiral Duncan added that matériel evacuation plans for the Tonkin Delta included an estimate of some 10,000 vehicles and 382 artillery pieces in the Red River Delta area.

Mr. Robertson interjected that very shortly we would be faced with a Franco–Vietminh settlement and that it was urgently necessary to determine what to do with the matériel in the Delta.

Admiral Radford stated that it would be impossible to recover the matériel in the Hanoi–Haiphong area unless we were prepared to go in and do it ourselves by force, a development which would involve us very deeply in the fighting there.

This posed the advisability of destroying the matériel. The Admiral pointed out this would be difficult: We had no people who could do it overtly; there were complications in accomplishing destruction by covert means. Any attempt to evacuate matériel would take a very long time, since Haiphong can handle only two ships at once.

Mr. Robertson pressed his point that any cargoes in American ships going directly to Haiphong should now be diverted to Saigon. It was brought out that very few American ships bring supplies directly into Haiphong; they ordinarily offloaded at Saigon, whence the cargoes were moved north in French bottoms.

The question arose as to how much was presently in the pipeline. Precise data on this subject did not seem to be available. General Ridgway said that he had complete information on matériel yet to be shipped, but not on matériel already there, or on the way.

Mr. Hensel interjected to say that he felt we should delay everything for a little while, and accomplish a slow-down such as was applied to Yugoslavia some months ago in connection with the Trieste problem.

Admiral Duncan stated that if the French wished a settlement with the Vietminh, we should expect a return of our matériel, and we should expect also to stop any further shipments to Indochina.

Admiral Radford suggested that the JCS undertake a review of what matériel is on the way to Indochina, and on the basis of this information decide (a) whether to divert, or whether (b) to slow down, and (c) what action should be taken if a settlement between the French and Vietminh were reached.

Mr. Bowie favored informing the French that we expect them to get our matériel out in order to safeguard it from falling into Vietminh hands; and then to look into the question of what we do about it.

Admiral Radford reiterated that there was little chance of getting this enormous amount of equipment out. He emphasized again that in his opinion all of Viet Nam would eventually be lost, regardless of any terms of settlement. He inquired why the State Department could not find out from the French, since talks were currently under way between the French and the Vietminh, what the French plan to do about MDAP equipment in Indochina.

Mr. Murphy cautioned that under the language of our agreements with the French repossession would be difficult. He noted that repossession rights were apparently limited to matériel “no longer required for the purposes for which originally made available”; that it would have to be “offered” for return; and that he did not believe the French gave any cause for believing that they would be liberal in interpreting these clauses.

Admiral Radford then suggested that we inform the French that we expect them to get the matériel out. He said we could at least tell the French that they do not have authority to turn over this matériel to the Vietminh.

Ensuing discussion brought out the fact that the whole problem was complicated by the desire of the U.S. Government not to cut the ground out from under the French in her political or military efforts in Indochina, and not to give the French any ground for saying that we had torpedoed their talks with the Vietminh.

Mr. Murphy emphasized that we had not discussed the question of a slow-down, or of diversion of MDAP equipment with the Secretary, and would have to talk to him before any decision was taken. However, we could at once inform the French of our desire to know what precautions they had taken to safeguard MDAP matériel.

Mr. Murphy remarked we had no information concerning the ceasefire terms. He reverted to the situation during the fall of the French in 1940, when events moved so fast that no one knew what was happening until it was all over.

Mr. Nolting broke in to say that another club we have over the French is the $785 millions appropriated for Indochina. Mr. Murphy suggested that payment to the Vietnam forces should be continued. Admiral Radford agreed, but he inquired just who we would be doing business with if the French reached a settlement with the Vietminh.

Mr. Nolting pointed out that the $785 millions should be separated into two parts: (1) $400 millions for the French and other forces in Indochina not tied to the Navarre plan; and (2) $385 millions linked to the Navarre plan. We had solid grounds for stopping payments from the $385 million if a settlement eventuated.

Admiral Radford suggested that if we do not get the equipment back from the French, under any settlement, we could certainly Charge the value of that equipment against these appropriations. The Navy Department, he said, could very well use these funds itself.

Mr. Murphy suggested that State talk further on this matter with Mr. Hensel’s office, and it was agreed by everyone that all Departments were interested in economy in this operation.

Decisions:

1. Summing up, Admiral Radford said that the JCS would immediately look into the question of stopping shipments enroute. He said that the question of slowing down shipments was one for the Defense Department and not the JCS, though the JCS favors such a move, and favors also removing all supplies if possible, but with the realization that the U.S. will probably have to go in and get it without much help from our French friends.

2. Mr. Murphy said we would take a hard look at the question on our side; would talk with the Secretary about it; and should be in a position to give the JCS the benefit of our views within one week. Immediately, though, State would send a telegram to Paris inquiring what precautions the French had taken to safeguard MDAP equipment. (Admiral Radford suggested that General Trapnell might be available to help on this exercise.)

Mr. Nolting inquired if it were not true that deliveries to the Vietminh from the Chinese Communists had increased significantly in recent months. It was agreed that this was so. Mr. Nolting then inquired what effect a simultaneous decrease in U.S. supplies would have, if it became known that such a decrease had been ordered.

Admiral Duncan said it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hide such a development.

Mr. Hensel thought it could be kept under wraps for a week or ten days. He was virtually alone in this view, and the Chiefs indicated concern over the psychological effect of such a step on the part of the U.S.

Mr. Murphy concluded by saying that unfortunately the Vietminh might end up being the best equipped army in Asia. Mr. Robertson noted wryly that at Dien Bien Phu the Vietminh has seized enough matériel to equip two divisions.

III Evacuation of Non-American Personnel from Tonkin Delta

Mr. Murphy referred to this item, and inquired if there were any developments.

Admiral Radford confirmed that plans were up-to-date.

Admiral Gardner added that there had now been injected into the problem the question just discussed, namely, the problem of removing equipment from the Tonkin Delta. He said that approximately 110,000 civilian French and native people were involved, with the complement of military personnel unknown.

Mr. Bowie inquired concerning the period of time needed to effect this evacuation.

Admiral Radford stated that this depended upon the pressure under which the evacuation was accomplished. If it were a question of removing people only, the evacuation would not take so long; but if it were a question of removing also large amounts of equipment, the operation might take several months, if not more than a year.

To an inquiry, Admiral Radford replied that if there were a ceasefire in Indochina, presumably it would be the responsibility of the French to evacuate their own people from the delta, and the problem would, under such conditions, not fall on the U.S.

Mr. Murphy closed this part of the discussion by indicating that so far the French have not asked us for assistance in this operation.

IV Aid and Training for Cambodia

Mr. Murphy called on Mr. Robertson to discuss the question of aid and training to Cambodia.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the communists were putting the squeeze on Cambodia, by offering to withdraw Vietminh troops against Cambodia’s commitment to allow no bases to free world forces, and to receive no supplies from the Free World. As an indication of the present situation in Cambodia, Mr. Robertson read excerpts from Saigon’s telegram no. 2894, June 24,⁴ reporting a sharp upturn of Cambodian morale and making a strong recommendation that we provide Cambodia with necessary war matériel and, if possible, with a training mission. He also read excerpts from a draft State telegram in reply in which the U.S. undertook to encourage the Cambodians in their anti-communist stand, and in their reliance upon us for aid and assistance. In supporting the tenor of his telegram, Mr. Robertson inquired: what else could we do, if we were not going to write Cambodia off entirely?

Admiral Radford indicated that it was ultimately a question of breaking with the French and dealing directly with the Cambodians. He stated that, from a practical point of view, under any “partition” settlement Vietnam would eventually be entirely lost to us, and that consequently we were more or less forced to help Cambodia. He thought that any aid or training mission might possibly be run from Bangkok under the MAAG there.

It was pointed out that any aid that might be required under any conceivable program for Cambodia would not amount to much, since the Cambodian army amounted to only 20,000 troops. It was agreed to get Mr. Robertson’s telegram off right away, in spite of what Mr. Murphy was confident would be strong French opposition.

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.
3. Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
4. Telegram 2894 from Saigon, June 24, summarizing discussions held that day by McClintock with Cambodian officials at Phnom Penh, is not printed. (751G.00/6–2454)