Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”

Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 24, 1954.

Subject:

• Observations on apple-cart-upsetting.

1. If newspaper accounts of the Mendes-France–Chou En-lai talks have any basis (as of yet we have no telegram in) it is clear that the momentum of the French slide is such that any conceivable program we might propose with regard to US intervention will (a) split our basic coalition and (b) appear to world and US opinion as a desperate US move to frustrate a cease-fire and free elections. We would appear in the unenviable position of being against both peace and democracy.

2. Whatever we may or may not be able to do to salvage something out of the Indochina situation it seems clear that we need a different climate to do it in. There is at hand, I think, one way of achieving a new climate. Very simply that is to bust up the Geneva Conference.

3. For our own withdrawal we have, in fact, already prepared the way. We have Congressional approval for disassociating ourselves from anything which will involve partition, or which will subvert the recognized governments. The Geneva negotiations are well past that stage. A US walkout will merely be the logical last step of disassociation.

4. But our withdrawal is not enough. The breaking off the Geneva talks would come with better logic and much greater force if it were done by the Associated States. A walkout by Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which after all have been said to be independent, on grounds that the negotiations were moving in a direction which threatened their independence could clearly be justified. The US would then be able to assume a position of support for independent Asian nations which were exercising their independence.

5. The possibilities of persuading the Associated States to act are, in the case of Vietnam and Cambodia at least, very real. At an early stage we dissuaded the former Vietnamese delegation from walking out. The present Government of Vietnam is, whatever its failings, considerably more nationalistic than the last. The Cambodians have just appealed to us for assurances of support in order to be able to reject the most recent Communist proposals. We are replying in an affirmative fashion, and my guess is that they would be prepared to break off the talks. The Laotians, who are more under the French thumb, would be something of an unknown.

6. A breakup of Geneva will not, of course, keep the French from negotiating. But they will be doing it in that aura of solitary capitulation which they have been trying hardest to avoid. They will of course be furious, as will the British.

7. But a breakup of Geneva by the Associated States will place us in a position where we will have flexibility to see what requests for assistance come from whom. Ideally we should know in advance just which ones we will and will not honor. But we will not be committed to honor any of them and any subsequent action we may take can be justified as a response to the appeals of states striving to protect their independence.

8. We will also have flexibility, if by any chance the French come round to a different position, to help the French. And although there will be temporary rage in Paris, we will not, in fact, have taken any concrete step which necessarily jeopardizes our long run relations with the French.

9. I recommend, therefore, that we give serious immediate consideration to influencing the Associated States to breaking off the Geneva negotiations and to ourselves joining them in a walkout, selecting the most propitious early occasion.

Charles C. Stelle

1. Stelle was a member of the Policy Planning Staff. A handwritten notation on the source text read “Ed Gullion concurs.” Gullion was also a member of S/P.