Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 25, 1954.

Subject:

• US Policy on Indochina

Alternative US policy possibilities

Inaction

1. US inaction with regard to Indochina and a US attitude of washing its hands of whatever comes out of Geneva will almost certainly lead to one of two alternative results:

a. The Communists will agree to and the French will accept a settlement which, while providing for a temporary cessation of hostilities on a line possibly in the vicinity of the waist of Indochina, will include, such provisions on phased withdrawal of French forces and on early elections as to assure a rapid Communist take-over of all Indochina; or

b. The Communists will be encouraged to make demands which even the French will find it impossible to accept and the Communists will proceed to the military conquest of Indochina.

2. Achievement by the Communists of either of these alternatives, while the US stands aside, will:

a. Radically increase Communist appetite for and confidence in their capacity successfully to undertake further immediate expansion of the area of Communist domination;

b. Dangerously decrease the will and capacity of the remaining free states of Southeast Asia to resist further Communist expansion;

c. Bring heavy political and economic pressure on Japan for a shift from its present policy of cooperation with the US;

d. So increase defeatism in and recriminations among the US and its Western partners, particularly France and the UK, as seriously to jeopardize the basic US-led coalition.

Action

3. In the present situation, with French lack of will to continue the Indochina fighting by themselves, with reduction of Communist worries about possible US intervention, and with the political and military weakness of the local states, any conceivable line of US action with regard to Indochina must of necessity include one essential ingredient—demonstrated willingness by the US to use US armed forces either to secure a US objective or to guarantee a settlement. The only alternatives to inaction all have as a basis a US willingness to intervene with armed force.

4. All courses of action are moreover premised on a US willingness to use its own armed forces, if necessary alone. We have no hope of getting UK participation in using forces in Indochina, at least at this time. We may or may not be able to secure French participation. But we can act independently, and still, by patient explanation to our friends of the reasons for actions, keep our basic coalition intact. The alliance will be less harmed by carefully justified US independent action, than it will be by US pressures to force our friends to do what they will not do, or by mutual recriminations after the loss of all Indochina.

5. Alternative possible courses of US action, together with their major implications are:

a. Immediate US intervention in Tonkin.

At this stage it is clear that such action by the US would (1) alienate the US from the UK and probably the remainder of the Commonwealth; (2) be opposed by the French who would probably seek to forestall it by a rapid capitulation to Communist demands; (3) involve maximum risk of provoking a general war with Communist China, and some risk of development of global war. The US would have to expect to be without major Allies in either case.

b. Threaten the Communists with introduction of US forces if they do not agree to an armistice based on the present situation, as the US defines it.

This course of action would involve a US commitment to support retention by the French of a position in the delta. There might be possibilities of Communist acceptance. There could be, however, no assurance that the French, under Communist pressure, would stick to demands for a position in the delta, and the US might again be faced with having taken a position only to be deserted by an ally.

c. Introduce US forces south of the line Thak Kek-Dong Hoi either to support a settlement based on that line or to defend the line.

If the line were established by agreement, the use of force by the US would be contingent on a violation of the line. If the line were established by US intervention there would be risk of provoking Chinese Communist intervention, but less than if the US intervened in Tonkin. The Five-Power Military Conference has estimated that the line could be defended against Viet Minh attack by four divisions, in addition to those needed to maintain order in the area.

The situation in South Vietnam would in any case be so precarious that without US troops, military aid, and economic assistance, and without a reversal of French policies, there would be slim prospects of viability. If these conditions were met there would be substantial prospects of organizing a position of some stability in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Recommendations

Either action or inaction involves serious risks for US security. On balance, the following appears to be the best choice among the available alternatives.

a. The US should decide that it will take whatever measures are necessary to preserve a non-Communist position South of the line Thak Kek-Dong Hoi.

b. The US should tell the French that it will support with US forces an armistice which:

(1) Preserves as a minimum all territory South of the line Thak Kek-Dong Hoi;

(2) Does not exclude the introduction of US military equipment or personnel;

(3) Does not contain political provisions likely to result in a Communist take-over.

c. The US should make clear to the French that if their negotiations seem to be leading toward a settlement which does not meet the above points the US will feel free to take such actions as may be necessary to assure continuation of a non-Communist position South of the line.

d. If the French do appear to be imperiling such a position by their negotiations, the U.S. should:

(1) Induce the Associated States to withdraw, along with the US, from the Geneva Conference;

(2) Provide such assistance to the Associated States, including US armed forces, as may be necessary to hold and develop a stable position South of the line Thak Kek-Dong Hoi.

e. The US should attempt to get support from Asian nations and its Western allies for the above courses of action and to have the line accepted as part of the frontier of any Southeast Asia pact.

f. As in Korea and Germany, the US should treat the division of Indochina not as definitive, but as provisional until unity can be achieved.

g. The US should immediately initiate a vigorous aid program, a troop training program, and other appropriate measures to promote a stronger Southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and to foster the development of native governments prepared to live up to their responsibilities.

h. The US should press the French to grant complete political and economic independence in the area south of the line, and to dramatize this independence by appropriate measures.

i. The US should endeavor to bring the above actions within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations.

1. A handwritten notation on the source text states that this paper was seen by Secretary Dulles. Additional marginal notations indicate that it was drafted by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff and represented a revision of a portion of a paper by Edmund A. Gullion, also of S/P, on U.S. policy in Indochina. The Gullion paper, dated June 23, is in PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”.