751G.00/6–2454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State1
priority
2887. Sent Moscow 9, repeated information Paris 1024, Geneva 261, London 75, Hanoi, Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Following is country team message concurred in by O’Daniel for MAAG, Everett for USOM, Hellyer for USIA …:
With the Geneva Conference going into estivation for three weeks and Mendes-France Government on point of determining conditions under which France would accept a cease-fire in Indochina during next four weeks, it seems a suitable occasion for some stock-taking on our part similar to that which was attempted in Embtel 2256, May 20 last year.2
Two interacting events—Geneva Conference and Dien Bien Phu—have served to bring cause of Western Powers in Southeast Asia to a perilously low ebb. Last autumn General Navarre for strategic reasons [Page 1735] set up what he thought would be a man trap in Dien Bien Phu but ignored possibility that enemy might be able for first time in Indochina war to make effective use of artillery.
Based on estimate that military situation in Indochina was at least in fair balance, that “Navarre plan” would produce its intended commitment, and that in fact Dien Bien Phu could be held against any attack, Berlin Conference gave rise to Geneva conference on assumption of Western Powers that at latter meeting Foreign Minister Bidault of France would be negotiating from a position of strength. It is important to note that none of the Associated States was consulted prior to decisions either to establish Dien Bien Phu or to hold a Geneva conference.
Announcement of impending Geneva conference served as a catalyst on Viet Minh and Chinese Communists side. It was determined by their high command at all costs to take Dien Bien Phu as this condition precedent for Bidault’s negotiations at Geneva would be destroyed. Backed by vastly increased Chinese supply, and by exceedingly able tactical use of artillery and sapping techniques and with fanatic disregard of casualties, General Giap took Dien Bien Phu on May 7. His losses, though great (possibly 20,000 men) were not much in excess of French losses in casualties and prisoners (18,000). In addition to psychological defeat of French Union forces which in effect made Dien Bien Phu Stalingrad of Indochina war, enemy received considerable matériel booty from his victory. General Salan, present acting Commander-in-Chief, Indochina, informed me on June 21 that he thought enough equipment fell into enemy hands to outfit at least two Viet Minh divisions.
Impact of Dien Bien Phu was not limited to negotiations at Geneva. French public at least insofar as it is represented by its Parliamentarians demanded that heads should roll. Generals Ely and Salan were sent post-haste to Indochina to make a military assessment of situation and their assessment was promptly leaked to a Parisian newspaper by a member of Laniel Cabinet, Minister for Associated States, Marc Jacquet, who was forced to resign in consequence. In quick succession General Navarre, General Lauzin, General Bodet and Commissioner General DeJean were relieved of their posts and a new team made up of Generals Ely and Salan was brought to the scene.
Before his relief Navarre had consistently maintained that it was beyond capacity of Franco–Vietnamese forces successfully to continue war later than October 1 this year without “internationalization”, by which he meant US military intervention. In this assessment he was supported by General Ely. Furthermore, although balance of military force in Tonkin was approximately same on either side with a marked superiority in fire power, both air and artillery, on French side, it was [Page 1736] conclusion of General Ely and of Commander in north, General Cogny, that it would be difficult and probably impossible to hold capital of Tonkin, Hanoi, against a determined Viet Minh attack. Preparations for evacuation of Hanoi have gone on apace and it is probable that French High Command in Indochina, unless this war is internationalized by early autumn, will seek to withdraw Expeditionary Corps from Tonkin, evacuating from Haiphong defense perimeter. It will then become a political decision whether this force will be redeployed to defend remainder of Vietnam south of Red River delta or whether it will be embarked for transit back to France. Ely told me June 15 it would stay and fight, presumably in Central Annam and Cochin China.
One [None] of Secretary Dulles’ conditions for US intervention in war in Indochina as publicly set out in his Los Angeles speech has yet been met. There has been no official appeal from three Indochinese states for US intervention; independence of two of the Indochinese states (Vietnam and Cambodia) has not yet been granted; interest of United Nations in war in Indochina has not thus far become officially manifest; there has been no concert among interested powers for collective intervention in the war; and with advent in power of Mendes-France government, dedicated to proposition of immediate cease-fire, there is no evidence that France intends to continue war to victory.
Sharp questions, however, will very presently be raised. If Mendes-France government agrees to cease-fire it probably, according to recent telegrams received from Geneva, will seek an armistice on basis of partition, leaving Tonkin delta to Viet Minh and maintaining a truncated Vietnam at some point, presumably below eighteenth parallel of latitude. However, it is possible that Communist side, which is fully aware of weaknesses on Western side, may at conference table insist on a cease-fire which would maintain Viet Minh ascendancy throughout all Vietnam or, failing that, that armed forces of General Giap might attempt to take delta and swiftly redeploy to take central Annam and Cochin China as well, where best areas are already penetrated by Viet Minh irregular forces.
Since, however, Viet Minh can by cold war techniques easily take over remainder of Vietnam once their capital and war base is established at Hanoi, in same fashion that Czechoslovakia was taken over once Sudetenland was given away at Munich, it is probable that a cease-fire will be arranged on the “honorable” terms that French expeditionary force will be peaceably allowed to evacuate Tonkin with its arms and equipment, but on further condition that this expeditionary force not disembark at any point in Indochina and that it return forthwith to France. This will leave central and southern portion of Indochina in a seriously weakened state. At this point it is probable that direct appeals will be made to US: (a) from the [Page 1737] emperor in absentia, Bao Dai, who will not move closer to the front than his redoubt at Cannes; and (b) from local leaders such as Prime Minister Designate, Ngo Dinh Diem; chief of staff of Vietnamese armed forces, General Hinh; and Minister for National Defense, Dr. Quat. US will then have to determine what sort of answer is to be given to these appeals, having in mind military situation and effect of a negative or affirmative answer on not only military and political posture of Indochina, but likewise on opinion of Asia in general.
Department’s hopes that Bao Dai would prove himself at long last a leader have met with frustration. Suggestion advanced in Tedul 110 May 22, repeated Paris 4225, Saigon 2385,3 that Bao Dai might appoint a consultative or even constituent assembly was answered by Bao Dai’s communiqué set out Paris telegram 4907 sent Department, repeated Saigon 616, Geneva 413,4 indicating that he would under [no] circumstances grant a constitution at present time. Furthermore, it has proved impossible for Vietnamese Governments to administer in Vietnam without reference to Bao Dai in Cannes, and most recent suggestion of Prince Buu Loc (Embtel 2807, repeated Paris 999, Geneva 243)5 that future prime ministers be given full powers by His Majesty was answered in the same communiqué by a statement that all powers would be kept in hands of absentee emperor. In consequence, US in formulating its attitude toward an appeal by Bao Dai or a Vietnamese Government functioning in his name, must keep in mind fact that Bao Dai is not champion of his people nor a ruler with sufficient courage to share their fate. Department will likewise keep in mind Bao Dai and his grand vizier, Nguyen De, have by decree handed over security services of Vietnam to a band of gangsters and that public corruption in Vietnam has reached a point of unparalleled magnitude and public disgrace. For US to back such a monarch and such a government against tide of Vietnamese public opinion would in my judgment not only be foolish from a policy point of view, but likewise immoral.
Question then arises: Should US give assistance to a new regime in what is left of Vietnam which presumably would be in form of an Annamese/Cochin Chinese republic? It is possible, given pressure of Communist advance on northern frontier, that such a republic could be quickly formed and would receive considerable popular support. Irrespective, however, of whatever form the Vietnamese state may take, it is unanimously agreed here that such state must depend for its survival upon a well-trained, cohesive national army capable of sustained operations in mass. This force will be required regardless of [Page 1738] the ultimate political and military situation in Indochina. Development of a Vietnamese national army constitutes, in our judgment, the number one military objective toward which US policy must be oriented. Political and psychological rewards will follow in the wake of strong visible indigenous armed strength, particularly if this strength is known to be supported by US experience and wherewithal.
Most vital ingredient in formula for attaining an effective Vietnamese national army is time. Minimum of 5 months from present date required to train and field initial divisions. To delay initiation of army build-up program, therefore gives enemy additional time in which to thwart undertaking before it produces desired results. Of equal importance to question of time is necessity for prompt utilization of US training know-how and support in form of instructors and personnel. No substitute for these ingredients exists.
Measures which can and should be initiated immediately to develop Vietnamese army are: Direct US assistance in training; assignment to chief, MAAG, Indochina, of authority to organize and conduct indigenous training, to include authority to execute, within limits of US policy directives, on-the-ground agreements to expedite training program; augmentation of MAAG to accommodate new training role; matériel support of training establishment and new indigenous forces.
While foregoing relates primarily to Vietnam, it is emphasized that approach applies equally to Cambodia and Laos.
The Department will recall that Cambodians have formally requested US assistance to form three divisions (May 20); that General Ely expressed verbally a desire for US training assistance, June 9, and that Buu Loc on June 18 requested US training assistance based on Ely’s June 16 “memo of understanding”.
If an Annamese/Cochin Chinese Republic were established and a national army made an effective fighting force, it should be militarily possible to hold narrow line along 18th parallel between Gulf of Tonkin and Annamite chain of mountains. It should likewise be possible by utilization of psychological warfare techniques and by judicious grant of economic aid to build up a national feeling of self-reliance in Annam and Cochin China which would at least for immediate future constitute a bulwark against Communist infiltration by familiar cold war techniques.
US should immediately address itself to problem of strengthening present regimes in Cambodia and Laos. Here populations are more homogeneous than in Vietnam and there are royal houses to which inhabitants are genuinely devoted. Likewise omnipresent corruption of Vietnam has not penetrated to same degree. Both countries are devoutly Buddhist and although his religion impels populace to negative attitudes, at same time it affords a moral base which is lacking [Page 1739] in Vietnam, with exception of Catholic and certain confessional communities.
In Laos, human material is exceedingly weak as Laotians merely wish to live and let live and have no national ardor. However, Laos has an exceedingly favorable geographical situation from point of view of military defense, and with a little stiffening should be able to hold few river valleys and mountain defiles by which access to Mekong can be had from North and East.
In Cambodia, human material is more amenable to formation in military organization, although terrain from a military point of view makes defense a much more difficult problem. However, it should be possible, taking into account fact that populations of Thailand, Cambodia and Laos are all akin, that they possess a joint religion, and that militarily their defense problem is one, to work out a system of collective self-defense with US and other Western aid which would make it exceedingly difficult for Communist Viet Minh to gain these countries by open attack. Defense of Cambodia and Lower Laos would also be very much enhanced if there were an Annamese/Cochin Chinese Republic as a buffer state between Viet Minh Tonkin and the other two Indochinese kingdoms.
If foregoing analysis has any validity, recommendations to meet problem fall into two categories: Steps which should immediately be taken and steps which should be adopted over a more long range period of time. Among immediate steps I would submit following for Department’s favorable consideration:
- (1)
- There should be immediate inauguration of a military training program by MAAG, Saigon for Vietnam and Cambodia. In implementation this program, Chief, MAAG Indochina, to be furnished terms of reference by US Government defining limits within which he will carry out organization and conduct of training. It is essential to bring in training personnel as quickly as possible, as well as such equipment as may be needed for optimum number of divisions which MAAG Saigon will be able to train in immediate future. Communist armistice proposals at Geneva make very clear their intent to freeze military levels after a cease-fire, and to force withdrawal, if possible, not only of all foreign troops from Indochina, but all foreign technicians as well. Therefore, time is of essence if this objective is to be realized.
- 2.
- It is imperative that with utmost speed we revise basis of relationships between US and France and US and Associated States re conduct of foreign military operations and US financial backing for this war. Pentalateral agreement must be abrogated and replaced by agreement for direct US military assistance to the three Indochinese kingdoms including training assistance as outlined in preceding paragraph. Future relationship of US foreign aid program to France re French participation in Indochinese war must likewise be revised. Agreement of September 29, 1953 should be replaced by agreements [Page 1740] for direct US financial assistance to Associated States. Financial support to France so far as Indochina is concerned, should be in strict proportion to adequacy of French efforts in the war here. Of course, if French Government to its eternal credit decides not to capitulate and to continue war in Indochina with courage and vigor, US should give all-out support to such a resolve and assist in its implementation.
- 3.
- There should be a separate MAAG in Cambodia under general over-all supervision of Chief MAAG Saigon. MAAG Saigon should have a resident branch in Laos. MAAG’s terms of reference for all three countries should be similar to those of our training and logistical missions in Korea, Formosa and Thailand.
Following long range recommendations are submitted for Department’s consideration:
- (1)
- US in response to an appeal from Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos for military intervention should, after negotiation of a Southeast Asia collective security pact, give guarantees with other signatories of that instrument of political and territorial integrity of Annam/Cochin Chinese Republic, of Kingdoms of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.
- (2)
- In this connection I strongly recommend that strategically vital air base at Tourane, which has only field built according to NATO specifications in Indochina, be made an international base for use of powers subscribing to an eventual collective security pact. Possession of Tourane base would be tangible evidence of retaliatory power of this coalition in event integrity of four Southeast Asian states were threatened by Viet Minh or Communist China.
- (3)
- It is implicit if turn of events takes course forecast above that recognition of Bao Dai regime would be withdrawn and US would recognize Republic of Annam/Cochin China. To strengthen our representation in Cambodia and Laos Embassy at Phnom Penh and Legation at Vientiane should be presided over by a resident Ambassador and Minister respectively. Ambassador in Saigon would of course remain at that post.
- (4)
- Both Cochin China and Cambodia are economically rich countries with no excess population and with large possibilities of becoming export surplus countries by use of proper management. US by technical assistance program could provide guidance in such management for immediate period after cessation of hostilities. US should be prepared grant a reconstruction loan to these three countries as we have done in Korea. Aid should be direct and not channeled through the French. Eventually, because of intrinsic earning power of these areas, it should be possible for World Bank to grant Cochin China and Cambodia a business-like bankers loan. Exception might, however, have to be made in case of Laos, which is a deficit country both in terms of national resources and population. Laos would require a financial subvention in addition to economic aid if it were to be kept in defense system outlined above.
- (5)
- US financial and economic assistance should be given on terms of strict reciprocity; i.e., aid would be made available in return for actual performance by recipient governments. In Asia give-away programs [Page 1741] are too frequently mistaken in the oriental mind as meaning that the donor not only has a soft heart but also a soft head.
- (6)
- There is an unrivaled opportunity for use of psychological techniques in attempting to solve problem which Communists have solved and we have not. This is problem of providing people with some ideal for which to fight and some “mystique” which will give them fortitude and feeling of national accomplishment which is so markedly lacking on our side in this war and which is so markedly evident on Viet Minh side. It should, however, within lines advocated in this telegram, be possible to develop a feeling of solidarity as between three cognate Kingdoms of Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, stressing not only national affinities but likewise link of Buddhism. At same time our psychological specialists should seek to minimize historic fears and rivalries which have for so many centuries embittered relations between Cambodia and Cochin China. One important task which should be accomplished in psychological field is to commence an intensive program to give people of Indochina some knowledge of English. This is lingua franca of East from Suez to Japan but thus far Indochinese kingdoms, speaking only French as a foreign language, have been cut off from currents of thought now stirring in Asia.
Conclusion: Program offered above would necessitate sending of American military instructors and advisors to Indochina, but not American combat units and it would imply need for resolute and daring diplomacy and a readiness on part of United States to expend not so much funds as ideas in an effort to redress a thus far unfavorable situation. Program outlined must, however, have some backing of force if it is to succeed. It would nevertheless seem that within framework of time available to us it should be possible to negotiate a treaty of collective defense for Southeast Asia which would meet with support not only of the Western democracies which thus far have found themselves unable to concert their action in sufficient time, but with their people at interest, the Southeast Asian States themselves.