Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 322
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Secretary of State
The question of our present or eventual disassociation from Geneva Conference decisions and the reduction of our participation to a quasi-advisory or observer capacity, raises some very important policy considerations in addition to the very cogent point you brought up yesterday. I think the following are worth some thought.
Presumably, any settlement reached at Geneva will establish a new balance between Communist power of aggression and free world power of resistance. I take it that it is the objective of U.S. foreign policy to make that equilibrium as favorable as possible to our side, to minimize the possibility of further defeats in this area, and to localize the present one as far as possible.
Whatever settlement comes out of the Conference, it will reflect the inability of our side, notably France, Viet Nam, and the U.S., to reach an acceptable basis for continuing the fight to hold the Tonkin Delta against a Communist advance. Do we guarantee that settlement, or do we disassociate ourselves from it? If the settlement, an unpalatable reflection of unpalatable facts, is one which we would consider not only unsatisfactory but about which we would be prepared to do something practical and remedial, then we should not become associated with it. [Page 1734] If it were possible for us, either in association with others or alone, to act quickly and effectively, we would wish to avoid any restriction on our freedom of action.
But if, as now appears probable, we will have no choice other than reluctantly to accept, whether by association or otherwise, the general results of the military defeat which is the dominant theme of the present phase of the Conference, then it may be that it should be our endeavor, at least from a long-term foreign policy point of view, not only to obtain through diplomatic united action as good a settlement as possible, but also to see to it, by participation in the guaranteeing of the settlement, that the other side is not tempted by the weakness and disunity of the opposition to violate the settlement reached. There will remain, after this Conference, important military and political assets in all three countries of Indochina which it will be to our interest actively to preserve.
I realize fully the considerations which make our association with the current weakness of the Franco–Viet Namese military and political position undesirable. However, I cannot escape the feeling that for us to disassociate ourselves from the harsh reality to which our friends are bowing would accelerate Communist momentum in Southeast Asia, decrease the prestige of the U.S. as a realistic, responsible and reliable ally in the long period of struggle ahead, and thus possibly discredit or weaken our capacity to conduct U.S. foreign policy.