Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 295

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

top secret

[Washington, June 23, 1954.]

Outline of General Smith’s Remarks to the President and Bipartisan Congressional Group,² 8:30 a.m., June 23, 1954

1. General Smith spoke first of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, in which the US was as one of the belligerents a principal. He said that the US had maintained its principal positions:

1. The authority of the UN.

2. Good relations with the ROK.

3. Good relations with the other UN nations participating in Korea.

4. Demonstration that the failure to reach agreement was the fault of the Soviets.

He expected that the US would report to the UN, and that the existing situation would continue until some further conferences were held.

2. The US position toward the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, which was still going on, was different, for the US was not a belligerent or a principal, and therefore had to remain aloof and be somewhat restrained. He said that Dulles a long time ago had told Bidault that if Indochina were put on the Geneva agenda, violent communist fighting would break out in Indochina. This had happened. He said that the UK had been anxious to play a major role at Geneva as a peace maker, carrying the Asian members of the Commonwealth along, but not involving commitment of British forces.

a. He added that during the Geneva Conference, the decline in morale and effectiveness of the Vietnamese army and the fall of the Laniel Government in France had compelled the US to re-evaluate its position.

b. The original US position was that enemy forces should be evacuated from Laos and Cambodia, because they had been invaded and should be treated differently from Vietnam, which was in a state of civil war; that whatever fair settlement was arrived at for Vietnam, we wanted an impartial and effective International Supervisory Commission, and not one with two built-in Communist vetos. These positions became the central issues of the Indochina phase. On the latter issue, when the British finally proposed the International Advisory Commission, to be composed of the Colombo Powers, and the Soviets rejected this proposal, the Soviets incurred Asian ill-will.

c. The Indochina phase developed in three installments. During the first installment, Eden hoped for a compromise. Bidault took a strong and courageous stand of no compromise of matters of principle, and the Communists were inflexible and calm. The second installment began on May 29, when the French began direct talks with the Viet Minh as to cease-fire and withdrawal areas. This phase was dominated by sharp Communist attacks against the Laniel Government. The third installment followed the fall of the Laniel Government, an indication by the UK that the Conference had failed, and a new tactic by the Communists of apparent conciliation and minor shifts from inflexible positions (such as an indication that they would treat Cambodia differently; that Burma or Indonesia might be a 5th member of the International Supervisory Commission; that they would agree to a partition of Vietnam).

d. The US throughout these developments continued to hold to its basic views, but as the US is not a principal or a belligerent, it has not the power to determine the decision.

e. General Smith prophesied that a continuance of French political weakness, a continuance of UK desire to avoid conflict in the Far East, a continuance of the Communist firmness of position, and a belief that the Communists would probably move to the following position, which the French, UK, and Associated States would accept:

1. A partition of Vietnam, or some intermediate step looking toward partition.

2. Communist control of about one-half to one-third of Laos.

3. No Communist control in Cambodia.

4. An ineffective International Supervisory Commission.

5. The arrangement to be subject to revision in the future at such time as the Communists might decide.

3. General Smith thought that Australia was now really concerned, New Zealand somewhat less concerned, and Canada still thought some solution would be possible through discussion. He felt there were changes also in the point of view of the UK, Burma, and to some extent in India. He felt there would be a greater willingness now to move to a regional grouping in Southeast Asia. If we would have been able to draw the line at a different place. If the US had been able to make its views prevail three months ago when it initiated the idea of a regional grouping. He pointed out that India felt that when Viet Minh invaded Cambodia and Laos, they had done more than cross a geographic line, because Cambodia and Laos were culturally and ethnically more like India.

a. Chou En-lai had told Eden privately that he recognized the difference between Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and Vietnam, on the other hand. He did not want American bases in Laos and Cambodia. General Smith thought that if a free election were held today in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh would get 80% of the votes, as Bao Dai was corrupt and the French still continue to impose colonialism. Chou indicated that the Viet Minh were entitled to all of the Tonkin Delta, and if they got it, they would be liberal about the south of Indochina. What Chou really wanted was to have the Geneva Powers guarantee three little buffer countries to the south of the Tonkin Delta.

4. Dulles said that he felt there were some redeeming features coming out of the Geneva Conference. Many more countries were now saying that the original proposal of the US for a regional grouping, made in March, had been sound. It was unfortunate that it took so long to educate these other countries for the need of action. In the second place, France now had a Government responsive to the people, whereas the Laniel Government had been really fictional (although on the US side). Because the French position in Indochina was confused and unpopular, the US had never wanted to support it unless it became purified. Dulles felt that it should soon be possible to salvage something from Southeast Asia, free of the taint of French colonialism, with the support of Burma and other Asian States, and with probably the benevolent neutrality of India which would be a strong factor in influencing UK action and this something could be guaranteed by a regional grouping which would include the US. In losing the Tonkin Delta, the US had not lost assets valuable to her, for the rice for Japan comes from southern Indochina. Dulles said there would be two problems:

a. The establishment of a military line which could not be crossed by the enemy, and

b. prevention of internal and creeping subversion.

Dulles feared the latter problem more than the former. To meet it, he said it would be necessary to build up indigenous forces, and to give some economic aid. For that reason, we would need the unexpended balance of 800 million provided for Indochina, with more flexibility in its use. General Smith added that the real purpose of the Navarre Plan had been to build up indigenous military strength, and that the purpose would continue under the regional grouping.

He also pointed out that this would be a very poor time for Congress to refuse to appropriate further funds for India, just as India was beginning to come in our direction.

1. The source text was transmitted by Bowie to Under Secretary Smith with a note of June 23 which read as follows: “General Cutler asked me to give you a copy of the attached outline that he prepared of your remarks on the Geneva Conference to the President and the Congressional group.”
2. The President’s appointment book indicates that 13 Senators and 17 Representatives, including the Congressional leadership of both parties, were present at this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”)