751G.00/6–2254: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2873. Repeated information Paris 1021, Geneva 259, Hanoi, Bangkok unnumbered. Governor Tri of North Vietnam came in to see me this morning. He said he had come down from Hanoi at Prince Buu Loc’s request to discuss current situation and had informed Buu Loc that once there were a Vietnamese Government to which he could address his resignation he would do so.
Tri said he had asked General Ely and General Salan for a frank statement of French military intentions so far as they related to Tonkin but had received series of shoulder shrugs and evasive answers. He said in particular it was morally wrong for French High Command so to restrict defense perimeter in Delta as to expose thousands of loyal inhabitants to Viet Minh reprisals. He was likewise fully aware of vindictive desire of General Navarre, by handing southeast quadrant of Delta defense over to relatively green national army forces, thus to insure that they would receive a bloody defeat at hands of veteran Viet Minh divisions. He had, however, at least for time being, secured agreement of Ely and Cogny not to force this split up of military responsibility in Delta. Nevertheless, Tri was fearful that without proper warning French generals would commence further retraction of their defense perimeter and final evacuation to Haiphong without facilities being offered for evacuation of that portion of Tonkin population which are anti-Viet Minh and would be willing to [Page 1730] risk rigors of starting a new life elsewhere, presumably to south Vietnam.
Tri mentioned, as had Prince Buu Loc (Embtel 2807),1 difficulty of evacuating sizeable element of Tonkin population. I have almost certain hunch that if this crisis arises we will receive a last-minute appeal either from Tri directly or officially from Vietnamese Government for US aid in a Dunkirk-type sea lift operation. It would be helpful to have guidance from Department and our defense authorities as to attitude US might adopt in case of such an appeal.
Tri fully understood position of US and his indignation was centered on French egoism and faint-heartedness. He said that High Command here, apparently reflecting jitters in Paris, had become so demoralized by fall of Dien Bien Phu that it had no concept of fighting for an eventual victory, although in terms of men and fire-power French Union command in Tonkin could, if it had any desire to, most certainly hold the Delta.
Tri seemed, however, reconciled to eventual loss of Tonkin through partition by negotiation. He said explicitly he was convinced that French without consultation with Vietnamese were already in contact with Viet Minh with a view to cease fire and armistice terms.