Editorial Note
A message from British Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower, received in Washington on June 21, 1954, read in part as follows:
“My dear friend;
“I have always thought that if the French meant to fight for their Empire in Indo-China instead of clearing out as we did of our far greater inheritance in India, they should at least have introduced two years’ service which would have made it possible for them to use the military power of their nation. They did not do this but fought on for eight years with untrustworthy local troops, with French cadre elements [Page 1729] important to the structure of their home army and with the Foreign Legion, a very large proportion of whom were Germans. The result has thus been inevitable and personally I think Mendes-France, whom I do not know, has made up his mind to clear out on the best terms available. If that is so, I think he is right.
“I have thought continually about what we ought to do in the circumstances. Here it is. There is all the more need to discuss ways and means of establishing a firm front against Communism in the Pacific sphere. We should certainly have a S.E.A.T.O., corresponding to N.A.T.O. in the Atlantic and European sphere. In this it is important to have the support of the Asian countries. This raises the question of timing in relation to Geneva.
“In no foreseeable circumstances, except possibly a local rescue, could British troops be used in Indo-China, and if we were asked our opinion we should advise against United States local intervention except for rescue.” (751G.00/6–2154)
For the full text of the message, which dealt with a variety of issues, see volume VI.