Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 202d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 17, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

June 17, 1954

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 200th meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); Assistant Secretary Anderson for the Secretary of Commerce (for Items 1 and 2); Assistant Secretary Siciliano for the Secretary of Labor (for Item 5); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Assistant Attorney General Barnes (for Item 3); Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah (for Item 5); Walter S. DeLany, Foreign Operations Administration; Assistant Secretary of the Army Milton (for Item 5); Herbert N. Blackman, Department of Commerce (for Items 1 and 2); Irving Kramer, Foreign Operations Administration (for Items 1 and 2); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

4. Five-Power Examination of the Military Situation in Southeast Asia (Including Indochina) (NSC Action No. 1112)²

Before giving his report, Admiral Carney alluded to the terms of reference of the Five-Power staff conversations and his instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the objectives he should pursue in the conversations. Admiral Carney next gave high praise to the participants in the conversations for their efforts to be cooperative. There was a wide range of agreement in the course of the discussions.

Admiral Carney then proceeded to give an oral report on the major fields explored in the course of the conversations. The first of these was an intelligence survey of the situation in Southeast Asia. Unanimous agreement was reached on all aspects of this survey except on the question of the attitude of Soviet Russia in the event that the United States and its allies became embroiled with the Chinese Communists. The British and French delegates expressed the view that in this contingency the Soviets would come to the assistance of the Chinese Communists and World War III would ensue. The U.S. position, said Admiral Carney, was that the behavior of the Russians was problematic rather than probable. The general intelligence survey was followed by a presentation by General Valluy on the situation in the Tonkin Delta.

Thirdly, said Admiral Carney, there was a report on military courses of action in Indochina, with special reference to the Tonkin Delta. Here the consensus was that if the Delta were lost to the Communists it would be extremely difficult to draw any other defense line in Indochina. The “least bad” of such possible lines was thought to be at the narrow waist of Annam, which would run roughly from Thakhek to Dong-Hoi. All of the conferees agreed on the vital importance of strengthening the internal security of the remaining Southeast Asian countries.

The fourth area of investigation dealt with the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression. It was generally agreed that the broad strategy in this contingency would be to fight as far to the north as possible. If we fail to halt the Communists in the north, the best bet was to halt them at the Kra Isthmus. It was also the unanimous opinion of the participants that if the Chinese Communists overtly aggressed and an air offensive were initiated, our side should make use of atomic weapons. Admiral Carney observed that he was surprised that this view had unanimous acceptance.

The next discussion centered on military problems which could be anticipated in the event of a cease-fire in Indochina. The conference agreed that the subject was rather academic, but such ideas as emerged were largely based on experience with the Communists in Korea.

Admiral Carney then said that these separate reports were followed by a summary and conclusions. The following were the most important: First, all agreed that the Tonkin Delta was the key to the strategic situation in Southeast Asia. There was no dissent from this view. Second, there was agreement that the French Union forces in the Delta would be subject to increasing attack this month. The French delegate had initially made plain to the others the fact that the French were resigned to defeat. Subsequently, however, he changed his view to entertain the possibility that the French Union forces could hold out for a time at least. Third, there was agreement that by September the Vietminh would be ready to launch a heavy coordinated attack in the Delta. If the French Union forces had not in the meantime been heavily reinforced, they would probably suffer a major defeat. Admiral Carney indicated that General Valluy had privately expressed to him the view that if the French Union forces suffered such a defeat in the Tonkin Delta, the fighting would cease everywhere else in Indochina. Fourth, it was agreed that if the military situation in the Delta were to be stabilized, three fresh divisions as a minimum would have to be in place before the attack began in September. Although the record does not show it, Admiral Carney indicated that the French expected these divisions to be supplied by the United States. Fifth, with respect to the situation if and when the Delta were lost, there was an agreement on the possibility of establishing a new defense line at the narrow waist of Annam. This would require four divisions for static defense, some of which might be supplied out of French forces extricated from the Delta. If sufficient forces could not be extricated from the Delta, the participants agreed that it would be hopeless to try to hold this new line. If an effort were made to obtain the needed forces from southern Indochina, the result would be a collapse of security in the rear of the defense line. There were insufficient forces to do both jobs. If it proved impossible to defend at the Annam waist-line, it was agreed that there was no other suitable defense terrain in Thailand or southern Indochina. The next point of defense would therefore have to be the Kra peninsula.

In his comments on these conclusions, Admiral Carney indicated that there had been very little optimism as to organizing the defense of the remainder of Indochina if the Delta were lost. Very little had been said about Burma, although the British delegate, Harding, pointed out that after having quite a whirl with their newfound independence, the Burmese were beginning to sober up and once again to seek advice from the British. Harding therefore thought that the Burmese might gradually be induced to take an interest in defense arrangements in Southeast Asia.

General Valluy, said Admiral Carney, had proposed to follow up the conclusions of the report with a statement which he had composed, pleading for solidarity among the five nations participating in the conference. While Valluy’s text was not accepted, a revision by Harding was. With respect to future Five-Power staff agency conversations, Admiral Carney made it clear that the United States was reserving its position for the present. We had agreed, however, to participate in an Intelligence Conference scheduled for July at Singapore. On the other hand, we had not committed ourselves to attend a meeting of the military planners of the five powers scheduled for Melbourne in September.

At the conclusion of Admiral Carney’s report, the President expressed surprise at the pessimistic views as to the results of a Vietminh attack in the Delta, even though such an attack did not involve overt Chinese support. Admiral Carney could only repeat to the President that initially General Valluy had had nothing hopeful to offer with respect to this contingency, but that he did subsequently modify the view that such an attack would result in the quick collapse of the French Union forces in the Delta.

The President reiterated that this current pessimism was in marked contrast with the earlier desire of the French Union forces to confront the enemy in a pitched battle.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Admiral Carney whether the conference had discussed the question of using any ROK divisions. Admiral Carney replied that while the record contained no reference to this subject, it had in fact been discussed. The French view had been that ROK forces would not be acceptable. Secretary Dulles added the comment that as he understood it, the French were insulted at the very idea of enlisting aid from the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented briefly on the increasing rate of desertions among the Vietnamese forces. The problem of morale and the will to fight was still unsolved. In commenting on this point, Admiral Carney said that General Valluy insisted that the loss of Dien Bien Phu had radically altered the military balance in Indochina in favor of the Vietminh. This was not merely a matter of numbers, but derived from the fact that the troops lost at Dien Bien Phu constituted the flower of the French Expeditionary Corps. Also of great significance were the psychological repercussions of the defeat on the Vietnamese troops.

All this, said the President, simply went to prove that the native populations of these states regarded this whole business as a colonial war. Agreeing with the President, Secretary Dulles commented that from time to time he thought it best to let the French get out of Indochina entirely and then to try to rebuild from the foundations.

The President stated that in any event all this proved that it was impossible for the United States to intervene in Indochina and accomplish anything until the native peoples agreed on a political objective for which they were willing to fight. There was certainly no sign of this at present.

Secretary Wilson expressed great concern about the vast amount of equipment which the United States had shipped to Indochina. If the French Union forces were badly defeated, the Vietminh would get possession of much of this equipment, and as a result their army would be among the best equipped in Asia.

Governor Stassen inquired of Admiral Carney as to the real feasibility of establishing and holding at the waist-line of Annam. Could such a line be held if the Chinese Communists refrained from intervention? Admiral Carney replied that he personally was doubtful if such a line could long be maintained, even against the Vietminh alone. Secretary Dulles, however, expressed the opinion that such a line was not likely to be frontally attacked if it was manned by forces representative of the coalition. The Vietminh would prefer to use tactics of subversion rather than to attack these allied forces directly. Whether in the meantime you could succeed in building real military strength south of the line was problematic, since political factors would play an important role. Governor Stassen thought it important to emphasize that choice of a defense line at the waist of Annam would very probably obviate the likelihood of overt Chinese Communist intervention, since the Chinese Communists would have succeeded in creating a buffer state in northern Indochina.

The President observed that the worst feature of this Annam line was that it exposed Thailand and Burma to attack. Admiral Carney agreed with the President that the choice of such a line would leave the flank exposed. Governor Stassen pointed out, however, that both Thailand and Burma would be subject to a defense guaranty by the coalition powers. This should prevent a direct Communist attack on them, and, as regards internal subversion, these two countries were in better shape and were better able to resist subversion than any other area of Southeast Asia. Secretary Dulles agreed with Governor Stassen that if the allied powers could unite in defense of Southeast Asia on a line which would include Burma, Thailand, and Indochina south of the Annam waist-line, and if the powers asserted themselves to build up the armed forces of Thailand, it would perhaps be possible to establish a defense position which could withstand military assault and which would comprise an area that was economically viable. But, continued Secretary Dulles, for the United States or its allies to try to fight now in the Delta area was almost impossible, if for no other reason than that the French have no inclination to invite us in. They are desperately anxious to get themselves out of Indochina. Under these circumstances, Secretary Dulles thought it was probably best to let them quit.

At this point the President suggested that the Council discuss the next item on the agenda.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Chief of Naval Operations on developments during the Five-Power examination of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina), conducted pursuant to NSC Action No. 1112.

b. Noted oral remarks by the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the situation in Indochina with particular reference to the morale of Vietnamese units.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on June 18.
2. For NSC Action No. 1112, see the memorandum of discussion at the 196th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 8, in volume xii. For the report of the Five-Power Military Conference, dated June 11, and related documentation, see ibid.