751G.00/6–1754: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2807. Repeated information Paris 999, Geneva 243, Hanoi, Bangkok unnumbered. Prince Buu Loc asked me to see him this morning. He made a general “tour d’horizon” and spoke with extreme candor.
Buu Loc said he was deeply concerned at fate of Tonkin delta. He said if it was decided militarily to withdraw from delta it would have very serious repercussions on Vietnam’s capacity to continue war since Tonkin was manpower reserve of this country (analogous remark of General Alessandri as reported Embassy despatch 570 of June 41 when General observed that Viet Minh strategy was based on two essential elements, namely the human and food resources of Tonkin delta). Buu Loc went on to say if military determined certain areas in delta could not be held at least effort should be made to remove population for resettlement elsewhere. This would afford Vietnamese Army ready source of manpower although it would pose problems of great magnitude with respect to resettlement of families and to physical means of moving large number of people.
Turning to present political crisis in Vietnam, Prince said Ngo Dinh Diem had formally been offered responsibility of forming government. He had already called on Minister for Associated States Dupont and although date of his arrival here was not yet known, Buu Loc imagined that Diem would be here within week.
I took occasion to observe to Prince that Saigon was buzzing with rumors that Diem was candidate of US. I said this was news to us and although we had heard many nice things of Diem as a man of great rectitude and patriotism, my government had never in his case nor any other sought to interfere in domestic politics of Vietnam.
[Page 1719]Buu Loc expressed considerable apprehension lest Diem by his sincerity and unworldliness become dupe of “more expert people.” He said frankly there was danger Diem might be used as the facade for grafters and professional corruptionists who would go on their way while Diem naively supposed that corruption in this country had been terminated with his elevation to office. I observed (having in mind Geneva telegram Secto 437, repeated Paris 430, Saigon 164)2 that security forces of Vietnam were now made up of alumni from the prison island of Poulo Condore and I wondered if they would be chosen instrument for campaign of official austerity and honesty, of pitiless severity against past and present governmental grafters.
The Prince then launched into vigorous denunciation of Nguyen De. He said Nguyen De was cause of most of Vietnam’s present internal political misfortunes. He said, “Nguyen De is like a man who can’t make love, but doesn’t want anyone else to”. He said Nguyen De knew that he himself could never be Prime Minister, but he determined to frustrate any other occupant of that office. Although Buu Loc professed that he had openly reproached Bao Dai at impossibility of conducting affairs of state so long as Nguyen De was “the real government of Vietnam”, fact that Buu Loc is now on his way out would indicate that Nguyen De still has upper hand. Buu Loc agreed in my assessment that Tam had made a serious practical blunder when, in attacking Nguyen De, he likewise attacked Bao Dai. This forced Nguyen De once more back into arms of Bao Dai, whereas if Tam had played his cards more cleverly he might indeed have taken successful aim at Nguyen De.
The Prince was enigmatic re possibility that Bao Dai would return to Vietnam. He said with great earnestness, however, that if Ngo Dinh Diem or any other Prime Minister were to succeed in his task he would require full powers from Bao Dai and thus be able to make decisions on the spot. He said it was impossible to conduct government as at present by referring administrative decrees back to Cannes for signature.
Buu Loc said of his own plans that he intends to return to Paris as High Commissioner and eventual Ambassador. He said diplomatic front in France had much deteriorated and he felt he could be of more use to Vietnam now in trying to repair bridges near the Seine. Afterwards, if it was agreeable to US Government, he hoped to make a visit to US and would eventually like to be Ambassador in Washington. Possibly later on, “after I have gained more experience”, he would consider returning to tasks of government in Vietnam.
[Page 1720]Buu Loc said that he would recommend to his successor advisability of exchanging diplomatic representation with Japan and other two Associated States. He was not quite sure whether it would be useful at this juncture for Vietnam to enter into formal relations with Chinese Government on Formosa.
Buu Loc concluded interview by saying Communists in Asia had successfully followed consistent policy of concentrating on one or two champions such as Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh. Their propaganda had been unremitting and undivided, whereas democratic powers seemed to be all over lot, first in favor of one, and then another, protagonist. He thought French were precluded by reason of long cherished animosities from building up any one national leader here. US, which had unrivaled means of mass media and of propaganda at its disposal could, if it so wished, popularize Vietnamese national figure who would serve our common cause. He mentioned such names as Quat, Tri, Tam, and Huu. I said if he was not careful we might decide on himself and put him back to work.
- Despatch 570 from Saigon, June 4, reporting on the views of General Alessandri, military adviser to Bao Dai, is not printed. (751G.00/6–454)↩
- For text of Secto 437 from Geneva, June 14, summarizing a conversation between Nguyen Dac Khe of the Vietnamese Delegation and Heath and Bonsal of the U.S. Delegation, see vol. xvi, p. 1134.↩