751G.00/6–1654
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)
Participants:
- The Secretary
- M. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador
- Livingston T. Merchant
The Ambassador of France called on the Secretary late this afternoon at his own request. His purpose was to transmit to the Secretary the contents of a personal telegram which he had just received from Bidault. He had not waited to have a translation made but read it himself in free translation. Bidault, incidentally he said, had returned to Geneva but would be back in Paris June 17.
Bidault’s telegram covered four related questions. It started out by referring to the discussions which had been going on between the French and the United States for some weeks concerning possible U.S. intervention in Indochina. Bidault said there had been agreement reached on “the major part of the U.S. conditions” and that the French had thought they had understood our position. However on June 11 a member of the U.S. Delegation at Geneva had told a member of the French Delegation that the United States Government wished to maintain until the end of the negotiations its freedom of action, that it [Page 1711] desired no announcement concerning any agreement be made in the French Assembly, and further that a military judgment would be needed at the time of intervention to determine its feasibility.
Bidault’s message went on to say that on June 12 an official of our Embassy in Paris had told a French official that when the French reached a final decision the United States Government would study the situation in Indochina to see if at that time intervention was feasible.
In the light of these developments Bidault asked if there was any use in continuing the negotiations.
The second point made by Mr. Bidault was to note that he had made no statement in the Assembly concerning these negotiations and that this had given him considerable trouble during the debate. He referred in this connection to the Secretary’s speech at Los Angeles.
Thirdly, Mr. Bidault said that the clear impression had been created in France, and he believed in the Soviet Union, that the threat to the Chinese which American intervention would represent had now dissolved.
Lastly, the Bidault message said that the French cannot go on in Indochina alone. They are appreciative of the dollar assistance we have given them and he would regard it as ironic if the intervention which was refused to France in Indochina was later granted to defend Malaya.
Bonnet added that it seemed to him that in the past week the situation had deteriorated and that the impression was general that there was no hope of U.S. intervention and that the Communists knew it.
The Secretary replied by reading to the Ambassador the first paragraph of his telegram of May 17* which reported our belief that the French were primarily interested in employing the possibility of our intervention as a card to be played at Geneva. The Secretary went on to point out that it was impossible to give an indefinite option on U.S. intervention. He pointed out that the military estimate of what is required today to restore the situation in Indochina is a great deal higher than it was six weeks ago. It would require four or five divisions and in effect commit our strategic reserve to a remote quarter of the world to go into action against a third-rate power, whereas six weeks ago it had appeared that sea and air forces with a token land force would have been sufficient. The Ambassador indicated skepticism that at any time only token land force would be required. The Secretary further referred to the declining morale and rising defections in the Vietnamese forces.
The Ambassador said that Bidault sees no point in going on talking since there is no U.S. counterpart for a French commitment. Moreover [Page 1712] he said he has the impression that in the past two weeks any effort to prepare U.S. opinion for intervention has been relaxed.
The Secretary repeated that the situation had changed. He stated that he had no doubt Congress is prepared to respond to a Presidential request and that whereas we had no objection to the French using the possibility of our intervention for negotiating purposes with the Communists, the fact was that the Laniel Government had never requested our intervention and had never met one of our basic conditions which was the expression of a firm intention to continue fighting in Indo-china. The Secretary added that given what seemed to be the existing temper of the Assembly, it seemed unlikely that any Government successor to Laniel would take such a resolute position.
There followed a further exchange along the same lines in which Ambassador Bonnet reiterated his argument that everything had been practically agreed and then the U.S. appeared to draw back and further qualify its willingness to intervene. The Secretary reiterated forcefully the point that the United States could not give an indefinite option to any other country to take such serious action with all its risks of global consequences when it had no indication as to the time or conditions under which the option might be exercised. He reiterated our willingness to reopen the negotiations immediately with any new French Government which was serious in its purpose to carry on the war in the absence of honorable terms with the Communists.
At the close of the conversation the Ambassador asked if we would come in if a new Government requested it. The Secretary asked in reply, “Under what conditions?” He pointed out that the military situation would be totally different if in the meantime Tonkin had been lost. He went on to say that when there is a French Government with adequate Parliamentary backing for continuing the war we will sit down and talk to them and give them a prompt reply to any request. He pointed out that no guarantee can be given as to the answer in light of the possibility that the situation would have still further changed radically. He went on to say that the U.S. Government has not changed its view of the importance of Southeast Asia nor its determination to save it as long as it can be saved. He closed on the note that all this had been foreseen at Berlin; that it had required no gift of prophecy to have known as he did in February that agreement to negotiate with the Communists on Indochina would place the French on a slippery slope. Nevertheless he had acceded to Bidault’s judgment at the time that in order for the Laniel Government to stay in power it had to place Indochina on the agenda for the Geneva Conference. Even the reckless use in the interval by Ho Chi Minh of his military assets was then foreseen.
[Page 1713]The Ambassador agreed that the time was late and the situation had deteriorated.
Ambassador Bonnet seemed tired and emotionally upset.