751G.00/5–3154: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
priority
4612. Repeated information Geneva 327. Limited distribution. When Trapnell and I arrived at Laniel’s house for meeting this morning, we found Maurice Schumann and Ely also present. The meeting was short and it was confirmed that Ely would go to Washington for bilateral military talks. His mission will ostensibly be to attend Five-Power Military Talks, and it is fully understood that bilateral negotiations will remain secret. Ely is unable to arrive Washington this week and Valluy has been authorized to represent him both at Five-Power Talks and at commencement of bilateral negotiations which Ely [Page 1642] stated he understood were to cover training of local troops, command structure and war plans. Valluy will also arrange date for Ely’s arrival with JCS. Ely said he was going London tomorrow for one day visit with Harding whom he does not know well, for purpose of making friendly contact prior to opening of Five-Power Talks.1
Laniel once more mentioned French fear of Chinese Communist air attack. He made it clear that French regard present bilateral negotiations as a prelude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail or should Communists drag negotiations at Geneva while attempting to obtain a military decision in the delta. On the other hand, Laniel clearly considers that an all-out air attack on the delta by the Chinese, while not likely, is a possibility and should be planned for. He feels that such an attack would completely change the present situation and wants the best assurances possible of prompt U.S. help in the event of such a Chinese attack. Ely confirmed that his understanding with Radford on this subject was purely a technical one between Chiefs of Staff and was subject to political decision by U.S. He said that Radford had plans ready so that U.S. assistance could come very rapidly once the political decision had been made. I informed Laniel that after my meeting with Schumann Saturday night2 at which Schumann had raised the subject, I had sent an inquiry on Sunday to Washington explaining in full French view that (1) U.S. intervention because of continuation and aggravation of present military situation in Indochina, and (2) U.S. reaction to an all-out Chinese air attack were two very separate problems, and that some arrangement should be made to handle a Chinese air attack if it should occur prior to creation of a SEATO alliance.
If we should inform the French that we will not react to a Chinese air attack except after making the necessary arrangements for collective action, I am afraid that this would have a profound and immediate effect both on French attitude in Geneva and on present French plans for bolstering the defense of Indochina. We gave Laniel General Trapnell’s opinion that Ely’s overall plan seemed good and that French should be able to hold areas which Ely plans to defend. Ely then arranged for further technical discussion with Trapnell later in morning. See following telegram.3
- Military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand met in Washington June 3–11 to consider the military situation in Southeast Asia. For the report of the conference, see volume xii.↩
- Regarding the conversation of Saturday night, May 29, see telegram 4607, May 30, supra.↩
- Infra.↩